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Elon Daily

Every Musk-controlled company in one ledger, and a tag on every number telling you whether anyone had to sign it.

For twenty years, writing about Musk's companies meant writing about numbers nobody was legally responsible for. That changed in June 2026, when SpaceX went public and pulled xAI and X onto a consolidated income statement with it. Four of the six businesses below now sit inside a single SEC registrant; two remain private, and this page prints "not disclosed" rather than filling the gap with a press estimate. Every figure carries a tag showing what stands behind it.

6Companies tracked
4Inside one SEC filer
$42.6BCombined Q3 2026 furnished revenue
−$24.7BCombined H1 2026 free cash flow
1.4 GWSpaceX nameplate AI compute
2Still fully private
Editorial close: 17 November 2026 · EDGAR scanned daily · Figures change only when a new primary document appears
Six companies, one page

Go straight to the company you came forincluding the two that file nothing, which are on the page as blanks with the reasoning attached.

How to read this page

The five tags

Most coverage of these companies mixes audited figures, company statements, leaked decks and secondary-market marks into one paragraph and lets the reader sort it out. An advisor planning around that mix cannot tell which numbers would survive a deposition. So every figure here is tagged. Section 8 sets out what each rung means in full and lists every document the page was built from.

FiledSubmitted to the SEC under signature and Section 18 liability: 10-Q, 10-K, S-1, a 424(b)(4) prospectus, a 13D/G, or the body of an 8-K reported under an item other than 2.02 or 7.01.
FurnishedIn an exhibit to a Form 8-K, which the cover page says is not to be deemed filed. Real and public, one rung down. Most of the operating detail lives here.
ReportedA named publication carried it, attributed but unsigned. Frequently correct, legally weightless.
EstimatedA private round, a secondary mark, an analyst model. Nobody is representing that this is what anything is worth.
Not disclosedNo primary source contains it. The page prints the words rather than importing a plausible number. An empty cell is information.

This table defines the vocabulary rather than using it, so it carries no rung of its own. Every table below carries one: a rung column, or a note like this one where the whole table shares a rung. Only Filed means signed under Section 18, and nothing is promoted to it to fill a table.

Master ledger

The six companies, and what is actually knowable about each

Company What it is Disclosure status Latest hard number Tag As of
SpaceX Launch, satellite broadband, and, since February 2026, frontier AI. Nasdaq: SPCX. CIK 0001181412. SEC registrant. Files 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K. Q3 2026 revenue $14,575M; net income $4,404M Filed 30 Sep 2026
Tesla Vehicles, energy generation and storage, services. Nasdaq: TSLA. CIK 0001318605. SEC registrant since 2010. Q3 2026 revenue $28,046M; net income to common $787M Filed 30 Sep 2026
xAI Grok and the AI compute platform. Wholly-owned SpaceX subsidiary since 2 Feb 2026. No separate filings. Consolidated into SpaceX's SI segment: the segment the issuer reported as AI through the Q2 10-Q, renamed in the release furnished 20 Oct 2026 and carried under the new name in the Q3 10-Q filed 22 Oct 2026. SI segment Q3 2026 revenue $7,560M Filed 30 Sep 2026
X The real-time platform, formerly Twitter. Acquired by xAI 28 Mar 2025; now two levels inside SpaceX. No separate filings. Advertising line within SpaceX's SI segment. Advertising Q3 2026 revenue $538M (up from $454M) Filed 30 Sep 2026
Neuralink Implantable brain-computer interface. Private. No periodic reports. No filed financial statements exist Not disclosed —
The Boring Company Tunnelling and underground transit. Private. No periodic reports. No filed financial statements exist. Post-money valuation of $23 billion on a $3 billion round, per the company's own statement Reported 9 Sep 2026

"Latest hard number" means the most recent figure the Institute has read in a primary source, not the most recent figure in circulation. Combined Q3 2026 furnished revenue of $42.6B is the arithmetic sum of SpaceX's $14,575M and Tesla's $28,046M: $42,621M, rounded; the two companies are separate registrants and do not combine for any accounting purpose. Both Q3 figures sit on the Furnished rung and neither has yet appeared in a Form 10-Q: SpaceX furnished its quarter on 20 October 2026 and Tesla on 21 October 2026, both under Item 2.02, where the exhibit language disclaims Section 18 “filed” status. The Q2 2026 figures these rows replaced: SpaceX $7,814M and Tesla $28,236M, both Filedare retained in the detail tables further down this page rather than discarded, so a reader can see which rung each quarter rests on.

SpaceX · Nasdaq: SPCX

1. SpaceX: the rocket company is no longer mostly a rocket company

The single most useful thing in the first 10-Q is the segment table. SpaceX reports in three segments: Space (designing, building and flying reusable rockets), Connectivity (the Starlink broadband network), and AI (Grok, X, AI solutions, and computational infrastructure). In the quarter ended June 30, 2026, Space produced $962 million of the company's $7,814 million in revenue. That is 12.3%. Connectivity produced 54.9% and AI produced 32.8%.

Put a sharper point on it: for the six months ended June 30, 2026, Space revenue was $1,581 million against $1,611 million in the same period of 2025, a decline, while total revenue grew 54%. The launch business did not shrink because anything went wrong with it; it shrank as a share of the whole because two other businesses grew around it. Anyone still valuing this company on launch cadence is valuing an eighth of it.

Q3 2026: the furnished release

The newest numbers on this page are furnished, not filed. SpaceX reported the quarter ended September 30, 2026 in a press release carried as Exhibit 99.1 to a Form 8-K under Item 2.02 on October 20, 2026. An exhibit furnished under Item 2.02 is not filed for Section 18 purposes, and the Institute tags it Furnished rather than Filed throughout. The 10-Q for the same period had not been filed as of the measurement date of this page; where a number below is also in the filed Q2 10-Q further down, both are printed and both carry their own rung.

The shape of the company moved again, and harder than it moved in the second quarter. Consolidated revenue was $14,575 million against $5,576 million a year earlier, and the segment the release now calls SI produced $7,560 million of it: 51.9% of the whole, against 14.6% in the third quarter of 2025. Space produced 12.1%. The launch business is now the smallest of the three by revenue, by operating result, and by Adjusted EBITDA, and it is the only one of the three that lost money in the quarter.

A naming change rides along with it, and it matters for anyone reading this page against an older one. The release states that “Super Intelligence (SI) refers to the operating and reportable segment previously reported as Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The segment named AI in the Q2 10-Q filed for the period ended June 30, 2026 is the segment named SI in the release furnished October 20, 2026. Same segment, two names, two measurement dates; the tables below use the issuer's current label and the Q2 tables further down keep the issuer's label as filed.

Segment summary, Q3 2026

$ millionsQ3 2026Q2 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Space: revenue1,7679621,6663,3483,277
Connectivity: revenue5,2484,2913,09712,7968,159
SI: revenue7,5602,56181310,9392,278
Total revenue14,5757,8145,57627,08313,714
Space: operating income (loss)(7)(542)259(1,211)(181)
Connectivity: operating income2,3671,6561,1905,2113,147
SI: operating income (loss)431(1,257)(1,722)(3,295)(4,182)
Total operating income (loss)2,791(143)(273)705(1,216)
Space: Adjusted EBITDA357(205)674(199)803
Connectivity: Adjusted EBITDA3,4992,5971,9238,1835,123
SI: Adjusted EBITDA4,9531,146(428)5,490(813)
Total Adjusted EBITDA8,8093,5382,16913,4745,113
Space: capital expenditure1,6061,1741,1133,8322,818
Connectivity: capital expenditure1,5431,3671,0074,2422,951
SI: capital expenditure16,44415,8284,76039,9958,077
Total capital expenditure19,59318,3696,88048,06913,846

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026 for the quarter and nine months ended September 30, 2026. Every one of the four groups sums to its printed total in all five columns, re-derived by the Institute. Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP measure as defined by the issuer and is reconciled to net income (loss) in the release; the consolidated reconciliation is reproduced below. SI is the segment previously reported as AIthe rename was disclosed in this release and does not apply to the Q2 10-Q tables further down this page.

The capital number is the one to carry away. Nine-month capital expenditure of $48,069 million is furnished in the segment table, and 83.2% of it$39,995 million, went into SI. That furnished figure ties exactly to the filed cash-flow line Purchases of property, plant, and equipment of $(48,069) million in the same release's unaudited statements, which is the kind of cross-rung agreement the Institute looks for before repeating a furnished number. A company spending nearly five times its Space-and-Connectivity capital combined on compute is not a launch company with an AI project attached.

Space segment, Q3 2026

$ millions except as notedQ3 2026Q2 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Customer launches (#)1210152936
Internal launches (#)2328298492
Total launches (#)353844113128
Customer payloads (in metric tons)11987111251274
Internal payloads (in metric tons)3583974151,2661,353
Mass to orbit (in metric tons)4764855251,5171,627
Launch services revenues1,1306481,0002,1082,056
Launch & development revenues6373146661,2401,221
Space revenues1,7679621,6663,3483,277
Less: cost of revenue4353294771,0451,104
Less: research and development1,2251,0768493,2312,069
Less: selling, general, and administrative1149981283256
Less: impairment————29
Space income (loss) from operations(7)(542)259(1,211)(181)
Add back: depreciation and amortization185158264509572
Add back: share-based compensation179179151503383
Add back: impairment————29
Space Adjusted EBITDA357(205)674(199)803
Space capital expenditure1,6061,1741,1133,8322,818

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026. Launch counts, revenue components and the expense build each foot to their printed subtotals in all five columns, re-derived by the Institute. Unit note: the two payload lines and the mass-to-orbit line are all stated by the issuer in metric tons, not in counts.

One line in the table above does not add, and the Institute is not correcting it. Customer payloads plus internal payloads differs from mass to orbit by one metric ton in three of the five columns: 119 + 358 = 477 against a printed 476, 87 + 397 = 484 against 485, and 111 + 415 = 526 against 525, while the two nine-month columns foot exactly. A one-ton residual on a 476-ton total is independent rounding of three separately rounded lines, not a discrepancy, and the Institute prints the issuer's figures rather than a recomputed total that would be no more accurate. The launch-count lines tie exactly in all five columns, which is what a genuine footing error would not do.

Connectivity segment, Q3 2026

$ millions except as notedQ3 2026Q2 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Starlink consumer subscribers (# in millions, period end)13.612.07.213.67.2
Starlink consumer ARPU ($ per month)6966836784
Consumer revenues3,1212,4851,9867,7545,198
Enterprise & government revenues2,1271,8061,1115,0422,961
Connectivity revenues5,2484,2913,09712,7968,159
Less: connectivity cost of revenue2,3682,0601,6576,0794,271
Less: connectivity research and development188294141687406
Less: connectivity selling, general, and administrative325281109819335
Connectivity income from operations2,3671,6561,1905,2113,147
Add back: connectivity depreciation and amortization9868056282,5741,706
Add back: connectivity share-based compensation146136105398270
Connectivity Adjusted EBITDA3,4992,5971,9238,1835,123
Connectivity capital expenditure1,5431,3671,0074,2422,951

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026. Revenue components and the expense build foot to their printed subtotals in all five columns, re-derived by the Institute. Starlink Consumer Subscribers is a renamed metric: the release states it was “previously disclosed as Starlink Subscribers” and that it covers personal plans (residential, roam) and business plans (local priority, global priority) while excluding managed enterprise and government customers in aviation, maritime, land mobility, fixed sites and government. ARPU is a monthly figure and is not additive across columns.

ARPU fell year over year and the Institute is not treating that as deterioration. Starlink consumer ARPU was $69 per month against $83 a year earlier, while consumer revenue grew 57.2% and the subscriber count grew from 7.2 million to 13.6 million. A subscriber base that nearly doubles in twelve months adds its marginal customers in cheaper geographies and on cheaper plans, which pulls the average down arithmetically without any existing customer paying less. ARPU rose sequentially, from $66 to $69. Note also that the denominator changed definition this quarter, so the year-over-year ARPU comparison is not a clean one and the release does not restate it.

SI segment, Q3 2026

$ millions except as notedQ3 2026Q2 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Nameplate compute (in GW)1.71.40.61.70.6
Advertising revenues5383674541,2481,323
SI solutions & infrastructure revenues7,0222,1943599,691955
SI revenues7,5602,56181310,9392,278
Less: SI cost of revenue2,6751,1065714,2371,574
Less: SI research and development3,1832,1781,3017,7403,331
Less: SI selling, general, and administrative1,2685323852,2631,083
Less: SI restructuring charges (credits)32278(6)472
SI income (loss) from operations431(1,257)(1,722)(3,295)(4,182)
Add back: SI depreciation and amortization2,4731,8859225,8512,506
Add back: SI share-based compensation821516941,715391
Add back: SI share-based compensation related to acquisitions1,217——1,217—
Add back: SI acquisition-related costs8——8—
Add back: SI restructuring charges (credits)32278(6)472
SI Adjusted EBITDA4,9531,146(428)5,490(813)
SI capital expenditure16,44415,8284,76039,9958,077

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026. Revenue components and the expense build foot to their printed subtotals in all five columns, re-derived by the Institute. SI is the segment previously reported as AI. Share-based compensation related to acquisitions is presented by the issuer separately from ordinary share-based compensation, and the Institute keeps that separation rather than combining the two.

SI turned an operating profit on a line that did not exist eighteen months ago. SI solutions & infrastructure revenue was $7,022 million in the quarter against $359 million a year earlier, and it is now 92.9% of segment revenue; advertising, which used to be the whole of this segment's commercial output, is 7.1%. The segment's reported operating income of $431 million is struck after $1,225 million of add-backs the issuer treats as non-recurring or non-cash in its own reconciliation: $1,217 million of acquisition-related share-based compensation and $8 million of acquisition costs, both arising from the Cursor transaction and both appearing for the first time this quarter. The $431 million is struck while bearing those charges; the Adjusted EBITDA line is the one that removes them. A reader who wants the quarter without the acquisition accounting should read both lines and know which is which.

Consolidated statement of operations, Q3 2026

$ millions except per-shareQ3 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Consolidated revenue14,5755,57627,08313,714
Consolidated cost of revenue5,4782,70511,3616,949
Consolidated gross profit (computed)9,0972,87115,7226,765
Consolidated gross margin (computed)62.4%51.5%58.1%49.3%
Consolidated research and development4,5962,29111,6585,806
Consolidated selling, general, and administrative1,7075753,3651,674
Consolidated restructuring charges (credits)3278(6)472
Consolidated impairment———29
Total costs and expenses, consolidated11,7845,84926,37814,930
Consolidated income (loss) from operations2,791(273)705(1,216)
Consolidated interest expense(675)(514)(1,968)(1,372)
Consolidated interest income8731551,426370
Consolidated other income (expense), net1,025140(937)342
Consolidated income (loss) before income taxes4,014(492)(774)(1,876)
Provision for (benefit from) income taxes(390)562(361)714
Net income (loss)4,404(1,054)(413)(2,590)
Net income (loss) attributable to shareholders4,404(1,054)(1,084)(2,590)
Earnings (loss) per share, basic ($)0.37(0.36)(0.15)(0.89)
Earnings (loss) per share, diluted ($)0.35(0.36)(0.15)(0.89)
Weighted average shares, basic (millions)11,9422,9417,2742,915
Weighted average shares, diluted (millions)12,4752,9417,2742,915

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026; unaudited. Gross profit and gross margin are Institute arithmetic on furnished inputs and are labeled as computed; the issuer does not present a gross profit line. Total costs and expenses, income from operations, the pre-tax bridge and net income were each re-derived from the printed components and foot in all four columns. Related-party amounts disclosed within these lines: interest expense includes $351 million for the quarter and $864 million for the nine months (none in either 2025 period), and other income (expense), net includes $561 million in both the quarter and the nine months (none in 2025). Em-dashes indicate a line the issuer reported as nil for that column.

Two net-income lines, and for the nine months they differ by $671 million. Net loss for the nine months is $(413) million; net loss attributable to shareholders is $(1,084) million. The release does not itemise the difference, and the Institute will not guess at it: it is the kind of line that resolves in the 10-Q and not before. What the reader should know is that the per-share figures are struck on the attributable number, so the nine-month loss per share of $(0.15) is derived from $(1,084) million and not from $(413) million. The quarter shows no such difference, nor does either 2025 period.

Reconciliation of net income (loss) to Adjusted EBITDA, Q3 2026

$ millionsQ3 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Net income (loss), as reported4,404(1,054)(413)(2,590)
Add: depreciation and amortization3,6441,8148,9344,784
Add: share-based compensation1,1463502,6161,044
Add: share-based compensation related to acquisitions1,217—1,217—
Add: acquisition-related costs8—8—
Add: restructuring charges (credits)3278(6)472
Add: impairments———29
Add: consolidated interest expense back6755141,9681,372
Less: consolidated interest income back(873)(155)(1,426)(370)
Add: other (income) expense, net back(1,025)(140)937(342)
Add: provision for (benefit from) income taxes back(390)562(361)714
Adjusted EBITDA, consolidated8,8092,16913,4745,113

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026. Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP measure as defined by the issuer and is not a substitute for net income (loss); the issuer's own reconciliation is reproduced here in full rather than summarised, and the Institute re-derived the total from the printed components in all four columns. The issuer notes that share-based compensation expense excludes awards granted in connection with acquisitions, which it presents on its own line. Signs are the issuer's: a parenthesised figure in this table reduces Adjusted EBITDA.

Read the gap between the two measures before using either. For the nine months, net loss of $(413) million becomes Adjusted EBITDA of $13,474 milliona $13.9 billion distance, of which $8,934 million is depreciation and amortization and $3,833 million is share-based compensation in its two forms. On a business that spent $48,069 million on property and equipment in the same nine months, depreciation is not a bookkeeping artifact to be waved past; it is the recognition of capital the company is still spending. The Institute prints both measures and recommends neither.

Consolidated balance sheet, September 30, 2026

$ millionsSep 30, 2026Dec 31, 2025
Cash and cash equivalents51,29424,747
Marketable securities38,561—
Accounts receivable, net4,7721,579
Inventory2,8912,416
Prepaid expenses and other current assets3,4572,210
Total current assets100,97530,952
Property, plant, and equipment, net89,48342,602
Finance lease right-of-use assets1,0401,260
Intangible assets, net6,3541,548
Digital assets1,5731,637
Goodwill48,42311,809
Deferred tax assets388141
Other assets5,8092,130
Total assets254,04592,079
Accounts payable13,25911,792
Deferred revenue, current10,7846,111
Debt and finance leases, current2,698928
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities5,9972,569
Total current liabilities32,73821,400
Deferred revenue, net of current portion6,7366,005
Debt and finance leases, net of current portion36,14621,968
Other liabilities1,6571,381
Total liabilities77,27750,754
Redeemable convertible preferred stock—38,752
Class A common stock83
Class B common stock51
Class C common stock—0
Additional paid-in capital212,53937,706
Accumulated deficit(37,448)(37,035)
Accumulated other comprehensive income1,6641,898
Total shareholders’ equity176,7682,573
Total liabilities, preferred stock, and equity254,04592,079

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026; unaudited, and the December 31, 2025 column is the issuer’s own comparative within that exhibit rather than a figure carried forward by the Institute. Every subtotal and both grand totals were re-derived from the printed components and foot in both columns. Related-party amounts disclosed within these lines: other assets includes $570 million at September 30, 2026 against $10 million at December 31, 2025; current debt and finance leases includes $2,181 million against $455 million; and non-current debt and finance leases includes $10,716 million against $4,052 million. The allowance for doubtful accounts within receivables is $67 million against $39 million. Share counts behind the three common-stock lines, in millions: Class A 8,240 issued and outstanding against 2,036 issued and 1,952 outstanding; Class B 5,339 issued and outstanding against 644; Class C nil against 482. The preferred line was 2,351 shares issued and 2,046 outstanding at December 31, 2025 and nil at September 30, 2026. Em-dashes indicate a line the issuer reported as nil for that column; the Class C zero is the issuer’s rounding of a balance below $1 million, not a nil.

The balance sheet is the quarter’s real news, and it is almost entirely a financing event. Total assets went from $92,079 million to $254,045 million in nine months. Three lines carry most of it: cash and marketable securities together rose from $24,747 million to $89,855 million, property and equipment roughly doubled to $89,483 million, and goodwill rose from $11,809 million to $48,423 million. On the other side, the entire $38,752 million preferred balance is gone and additional paid-in capital rose by $174,833 million: the initial public offering and the Cursor merger landing in the same nine months. Total liabilities rose by $26,523 million against that, so leverage fell sharply even as borrowings grew. What the Institute will not do is read any of this as a verdict on the operating business; a company can raise $85 billion and still be judged on what it earns, and the nine-month income statement above says the operating result is $705 million of income on $27,083 million of revenue.

Consolidated statement of cash flows, nine months ended September 30

$ millions9M 20269M 2025
Net loss for the period(413)(2,590)
Depreciation and amortization, per the cash flow8,9344,784
Share-based compensation, per the cash flow3,8331,044
Deferred income taxes(455)623
Unrealized (gain) loss on digital assets64(389)
Unrealized gain on investments in unconsolidated affiliates(532)—
Loss on debt extinguishment1,545—
Other non-cash items(254)193
Change in accounts receivable(2,882)(934)
Change in inventory(1,381)(378)
Change in prepaid expenses and other assets(1,305)(427)
Change in accounts payable(970)668
Change in deferred revenue4,922404
Change in other liabilities, net1,9911,122
Net cash provided by operating activities13,0974,120
Purchases of property, plant, and equipment(48,069)(13,846)
Capitalized interest(20)(96)
Proceeds from product rebates1,372—
Purchases of marketable securities(46,834)(601)
Maturities of marketable securities9,158548
Proceeds from sales of marketable securities771,173
Payments for intangible assets(866)—
Cash received from acquisition of businesses514—
Other investing activities, net57(175)
Net cash used in investing activities, nine months(84,611)(12,997)
Principal repayments on finance leases(270)(213)
Proceeds from debt and other financing obligations51,83410,947
Payment of debt issuance costs(124)(66)
Repayments on debt and other financing obligations(39,845)(6,014)
Payment of debt extinguishment premium(1,153)—
Proceeds from issuance of capital stock, net8,3195,299
Proceeds from employee equity award plans368206
Payments for repurchase of common and preferred stock(4,426)(525)
Taxes paid related to net share settlement(559)(194)
Proceeds from IPO, net of underwriting commissions and offering costs85,675—
Net cash provided by financing activities, nine months99,8199,440
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash(43)69
Net change in cash and restricted cash28,262632
Cash and restricted cash, start of the period25,12411,501
Cash and restricted cash, close of the period53,38612,133

All figures FurnishedExhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished October 20, 2026; unaudited, nine months only, as the issuer does not present a quarterly cash flow statement in this release. The Institute re-derived all three activity subtotals, the net change, and the closing balance from the printed components; both columns foot exactly. Row labels follow the issuer’s except where a working-capital line has been prefixed Change in for readability on this page; no figure has been reordered or combined. Purchases of property, plant, and equipment includes $480 million paid to related parties for the 2026 period against $285 million for 2025. The $48,069 million on that line is the same number the segment table above reports as nine-month consolidated capital expenditure, which is the one place in this release where a furnished total can be tied across two statements. The reconciling item between this statement’s cash caption and the balance-sheet cash line is restricted cash, which the issuer does not present separately: $2,092 million at September 30, 2026 and $377 million at December 31, 2025, both Institute arithmetic on furnished inputs and labeled as computed. Em-dashes indicate a line the issuer reported as nil for that column.

Operating cash flow turned positive and is nowhere near the capital programme. Nine-month operating cash flow of $13,097 million against $48,069 million of property and equipment purchases leaves a gap of $34,972 million, closed by $99,819 million of financing: of which $85,675 million is the offering. Two further details belong with the figure rather than beneath it. Deferred revenue contributed $4,922 million of the operating total, which is cash collected for performance not yet delivered and reverses as that work is done; and the release records a $1,545 million non-cash loss on debt extinguishment alongside a $1,153 million cash extinguishment premium, so the refinancing cost real money in the quarter even though the loss itself is added back. The Institute notes the direction and declines to annualise any of it: one quarter containing an initial public offering is the least representative quarter a company will ever report.
Three definitions moved this quarter, and two clocks are running on each. The release’s own Note 2 states that the segment previously reported as Artificial Intelligence (AI) is now Super Intelligence (SI); that the metric previously disclosed as Starlink Subscribers is now Starlink Consumer Subscribers, covering personal plans (residential, roam) and business plans (local priority, global priority) but excluding managed enterprise and government customers in aviation, maritime, land mobility, fixed sites and government entities; and that Total Satellites in Orbit now includes both operational and de-orbit approved satellites, where the prior definition counted operational satellites only and “would have excluded approximately 400 satellites from our Q3 2026 total.” The issuer adds that the satellite change “has no impact on our financial results,” which is correct and is not the point: a reader comparing a Q3 2026 satellite count against any earlier Institute page is comparing two different measurements, and the subscriber series changed its denominator in the same release. Anything on this page measured under the prior definitions is labeled with the date it was measured and has not been restated.
The Cursor merger, and the part of it that is not cash. The release states the merger completed August 14, 2026 at an implied equity value of $60 billion, with GAAP purchase consideration of $42.5 billion. The difference is the third figure: $23.4 billion of equity-award value attributable to post-acquisition service, which is not purchase consideration and will be expensed over the vesting period rather than capitalised, and which the issuer notes is subject to future forfeitures. The $1,217 million of acquisition-related share-based compensation in the reconciliation above is the first instalment of it. From closing through September 30, 2026 Cursor contributed $608 million of revenue, against the $7,560 million the SI segment reported for the quarter, so the segment’s growth is mostly not the acquisition, and the acquisition’s cost to reported earnings mostly is not yet in the numbers.
And one event after the quarter closed. On October 8, 2026 the company agreed to acquire a nationwide low-band spectrum licence portfolio of up to 14 megahertz of paired spectrum in the 800 MHz band, with closing expected in the first half of 2027 subject to regulatory and customary conditions. The release does not price it. No figure for this transaction appears anywhere on this page, and the Institute would rather leave the row empty than fill it with a number nobody has published.

What follows below is the Filed rung: the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026, with the auditor-reviewed detail and the disclosure controls that a furnished exhibit does not carry. It is not a stale duplicate of what is above it. It is a different document at a different level of accountability, and where the two overlap the reader should prefer the filed one and note the date on each.

Consolidated results

$ millionsQ2 2026Q2 2025H1 2026H1 2025
Revenue7,8144,07112,5088,138
Cost of revenue3,4952,2825,8834,244
Gross profit (computed)4,3191,7896,6253,894
Gross margin (computed)55.3%43.9%53.0%47.8%
Research and development3,5481,9587,0623,515
Selling, general and administrative912———
Loss on debt extinguishment——(1,545)—
Net loss(541)(1,008)(4,817)(1,536)
Net loss attributable to shareholders——(5,488)—
Loss per share, basic and diluted$(0.09)$(0.34)$(1.12)$(0.53)
Weighted average shares (millions)5,8642,9294,8792,902

All figures FiledForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2026. Em-dashes indicate a line the Institute did not read for that column, not a zero. Gross profit and gross margin are Institute arithmetic on filed inputs and are labeled as computed.

Read the H1 loss carefully. The six-month net loss of $4,817 million includes a $1,545 million loss on debt extinguishmenta refinancing charge, incurred once, in connection with restructuring the capital stack around the offering. Roughly a third of the half-year loss is that charge. The second-quarter loss on its own is $541 million, against $1,008 million a year earlier: the operating trend and the headline half-year number point in opposite directions, and only one of them is about the business.

Revenue by segment

$ millionsQ2 2026Q2 2025H1 2026H1 2025
Launch services6484909781,056
Launch & development314256603555
Space segment9627461,5811,611
Consumer2,4851,7214,6333,213
Enterprise & government1,8068672,9151,849
Connectivity segment (Starlink)4,2912,5887,5485,062
Advertising367426710870
AI solutions & infrastructure2,1943112,669595
AI segment2,5617373,3791,465
Total revenue7,8144,07112,5088,138

All figures Filed. Enterprise & government revenue includes Starlink Mobile service offerings, per the filing's own footnote. All products revenue is attributable to the Connectivity segment.

Three things in that table deserve to be said out loud. First, Starlink's enterprise and government line more than doubled year over year, from $867 million to $1,806 million in the quarter: growing twice as fast as the consumer line and now approaching half of Connectivity revenue. Second, AI solutions and infrastructure went from $311 million to $2,194 million in a single year, a sevenfold move that is the arrival of a compute-services business rather than the maturation of a model business. Third, and least discussed: X's advertising revenue is still falling. $367 million against $426 million in the quarter; $710 million against $870 million for the half. Inside a segment growing 130%, the advertising line is down 18%. Consolidation does not fix a business, it hides one.

Operating income by segment

Revenue by segment is the easy disclosure and most companies stop there. SpaceX goes further and publishes a full cost build for each segment, cost of revenue, research and development, and selling, general and administrative, down to income from operations. That is unusually generous, and it is the single most useful table this company produces, because it shows that the three businesses are in three completely different financial states.

$ millionsQ2 2026Q1 2026Q2 2025H1 2026H1 2025
Space: revenue9626197461,5811,611
  Cost of revenue329281330610627
  Research and development1,0769306932,0061,219
  Selling, general and administrative997087169175
  Impairment——5—29
Space: loss from operations(542)(662)(369)(1,204)(439)
  Segment Adjusted EBITDA(205)(351)(93)(556)131
  Capital expenditure1,1741,0529462,2261,705
Connectivity: revenue4,2913,2572,5887,5485,062
  Cost of revenue2,0601,6511,4013,7112,615
  Research and development294205143499266
  Selling, general and administrative281213121494225
Connectivity: income from operations1,6561,1889232,8441,956
  Segment Adjusted EBITDA2,5972,0871,5834,6843,200
  Capital expenditure1,3671,3321,1302,6991,944
AI: revenue2,5618187373,3791,465
  Cost of revenue1,1064565511,5621,002
  Research and development2,1782,3791,1224,5572,030
  Selling, general and administrative532463398995699
  Restructuring charges (credits)2(11)190(9)194
AI: loss from operations(1,257)(2,469)(1,524)(3,726)(2,460)
  Segment Adjusted EBITDA1,146(609)(276)537(387)
  Capital expenditure15,8287,72374923,5513,316
Consolidated loss from operations(143)(1,943)(970)(2,086)(943)
Consolidated capital expenditure18,36910,1072,82528,4766,965

All figures FurnishedQ2 2026 earnings release, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K. Segment Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP measure the company defines as segment income or loss from operations before depreciation and amortisation, share-based compensation, restructuring and impairment; it is presented here because the company presents it, not because the Institute endorses it. Three checks were run before publishing: the three segment revenue lines sum to consolidated revenue in all five columns; the three segment operating results sum to the consolidated result in all five columns; and consolidated capital expenditure of $28,476 million for the half ties exactly to purchases of property, plant and equipment in the Filed statement of cash flows. A furnished table that reconciles to a filed one is worth more than a furnished table that does not.

Read the capex row before anything else. The AI segment spent $15,828 million of capital in a single quartermore than eleven times the Space and Connectivity segments combined, and twenty-one times what the AI segment itself spent in the same quarter a year ago. For the half, AI capex of $23,551 million is 82.7% of every dollar of capital this company deployed. Whatever SpaceX is called, its capital budget belongs to a data-centre company that also happens to own the world's leading launch business and the world's largest satellite constellation.

The three segments are running three different companies. Connectivity is the only one making money: a 38.6% operating margin in the quarter, up from 35.7% a year earlier, throwing off $2.6 billion of Adjusted EBITDA against $1.4 billion of capex: self-funding with room to spare. Space is losing more money than it did a year ago and losing it deliberately: revenue grew 29% while research and development grew 55%, to $1,076 million, which is more than the segment's entire revenue. That is a company spending a dollar-and-a-tenth on Starship development for every dollar of rocket revenue it earns. AI made the quarter's most dramatic move: the operating loss halved sequentially, from $2,469 million to $1,257 million, and Segment Adjusted EBITDA crossed into positive territory at $1,146 million from negative $609 million three months earlier. Almost all of that came from one place: $1.6 billion of incremental infrastructure revenue recognized against $14.1 billion of newly signed Cloud Services Agreements. Whether that is an inflection or a pull-forward depends entirely on the shape of those contracts, and the shape is disclosed, in the registration statement rather than the earnings release. It is $1.25 billion per month through May 2029, terminable by either party on ninety days' notice. The terms and what they imply are set out in the data centre schedule in section 5.

What we could not check, and one thing the release got wrong. Segment operating income is furnished, not filed. The Institute attempted to read the equivalent segment note inside the Form 10-Q and could not: the retrieval available to us truncates that document partway through the notes, and rather than assert that the 10-Q "does not contain" a segment note we could not reach, we are telling you what we read and where. Separately, the AI segment highlights in the release state that compute capacity is "up from 1.0 GW in Q1 2026 and 0.4 GW in Q2 2026." The second reference is a typographical error for Q2 2025: the table on the same page carries 0.4 GW in the Q2 2025 column. We are noting it rather than silently correcting it, because a reader comparing this page against the source should not have to wonder who made the mistake.

Balance sheet

$ millions30 Jun 202631 Dec 2025
Cash and cash equivalents93,52224,747
Marketable securities6,487—
Total current assets108,04730,952
Property, plant and equipment, net65,73642,602
Goodwill11,64511,809
Total assets192,77092,079
Deferred revenue (current and non-current)14,28612,116
Debt and finance leases, current2,525928
Debt and finance leases, non-current36,83921,968
   of which related party13,3294,507
Total liabilities65,54650,754
Redeemable convertible preferred stock (temporary equity)—38,752
Total shareholders' equity127,2242,573
Total liabilities, temporary equity and shareholders' equity192,77092,079

All figures Filed. The related-party total is the Institute's addition of the filed current ($2,039M) and non-current ($11,290M) related-party components at 30 June 2026, and of $455M and $4,052M at 31 December 2025. The footing line is shown because a balance sheet that does not visibly balance is a balance sheet the reader has to take on trust: total liabilities, temporary equity and shareholders' equity ties to total assets in both columns: $65,546M + nil + $127,224M = $192,770M at 30 June 2026, and $50,754M + $38,752M + $2,573M = $92,079M at 31 December 2025. The temporary-equity line is the reason the prior-year column does not foot without it: $38,752 million of redeemable convertible preferred stock sat outside permanent equity under ASC 480-10-S99 because redemption was outside the company's control. It converted at the IPO, which is most of why book equity moves from $2.6B to $127.2B in six months.

The number a practitioner should actually carry. Cash and marketable securities of $100.0 billion against debt and finance leases of $39.4 billionroughly $60 billion of net cash, on a company that has never reported an annual profit and burned through a $4.8 billion half-year loss. This is the structural fact that governs everything else: for the next several years, SpaceX's spending is constrained by management's judgment, not by its lenders. Note also that a third of the debt is related-party, which means a third of the leverage sits on terms that were not set by an arm's-length lender.

Consolidated statement of cash flows

The income statement says SpaceX lost $4.8 billion in six months. The cash flow statement says something more useful, and something more alarming, and the two facts sit four lines apart. This is the full statement as filed, six months to 30 June, both years.

$ millions, six months ended 30 June20262025
Net loss(4,817)(1,536)
Depreciation and amortisation5,2902,970
Share-based compensation1,470694
Deferred income taxes(9)120
Unrealised loss (gain) on digital assets539(252)
Impairment and loss on disposal4054
Loss on extinguishment of debt1,545—
Other non-cash(72)126
Accounts receivable(2,003)(470)
Inventories(827)(360)
Prepaid expenses and other assets102(2,125)
Accounts payable(88)309
Deferred revenue2,169680
Other operating liabilities127141
Net cash provided by operating activities3,466351
Purchases of property, plant and equipment(28,476)(6,965)
   of which paid to related parties329101
Capitalised interest(20)(22)
Proceeds from product rebates1,195—
Purchases of marketable securities(13,630)(601)
Maturities of marketable securities7,248543
Sales of marketable securities—1,173
Equity-method investment—(86)
Purchases of intangible assets(856)—
Other investing52(74)
Net cash used in investing activities(34,487)(6,032)
Net proceeds from initial public offering85,675—
Proceeds from issuance of debt51,81210,943
Repayments of debt(39,396)(5,990)
Debt issuance costs(124)(61)
Premium paid on debt extinguishment(1,153)—
Issuance of capital stock, net8,3195,047
Employee equity plans316155
Repurchases of capital stock(4,426)(520)
Taxes paid on net share settlement(559)(238)
Principal payments on finance leases(173)(137)
Net cash provided by financing activities100,2919,199
Effect of exchange rate changes(42)75
Net increase in cash and restricted cash69,2283,593
Cash and restricted cash, beginning of period25,12411,501
Cash and restricted cash, end of period94,35215,094

All figures FiledForm 10-Q. Every one of the four sections was recomputed line by line and ties to the filed subtotal exactly, in both years. Two notes on presentation. First, the related-party capex line is a disclosure of how much of the $28,476 million went to related parties; it is shown positive because it is a component of the line above, not an additional outflow. Second, the beginning and ending balances are cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash, which is why they exceed the balance-sheet cash figures by $377 million and $830 million respectively: that difference is the restricted portion, and it is a reconciling item, not a discrepancy.

The one number to take from this statement. SpaceX generated $3,466 million of operating cash and spent $28,476 million on property, plant and equipment. Free cash flow for the half was negative $25,010 milliona quarter of a hundred billion dollars of cash consumed in six months, against negative $6,614 million a year earlier. It was funded almost entirely by the capital markets: $85.7 billion of IPO proceeds and $51.8 billion of gross debt issuance. This is the sentence the income statement will not say. The $4.8 billion net loss is a rounding error next to the capital intensity; the company's actual cash position is a function of the window staying open, and the window was very open in the first half of 2026.

Three further things worth reading twice. First, depreciation and amortisation of $5,290 million now exceeds the entire net loss, and grew 78% year over year: the depreciation charge from the 2025-26 capex wave has barely begun to land, and it will be the dominant force on the income statement for years. Second, the debt was largely refinanced, not raised: $51,812 million issued against $39,396 million repaid, at a cost of $1,545 million of extinguishment loss and $1,153 million of premium actually paid in cash. SpaceX paid roughly $2.7 billion to term out its balance sheet around the IPO. Third, deferred revenue provided $2,169 million of operating cash, more than half the total. That is customers paying in advance: a genuine strength, and also a reminder that this line reverses when growth slows.

The offering

ItemFiled detailTag
DateJune 2026; final prospectus filed under Rule 424(b)(4) on 12 June 2026Filed
Shares sold638.9 million shares of Class A common stock, including full exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment optionFiled
Price$135.00 per shareFiled
Net proceeds$85,675 million, after $575 million of underwriting commissions and offering costsFiled
Pre-offering splitFive-for-one forward stock split effected May 2026; all prior share and per-share data retroactively adjustedFiled
Preferred conversionAll redeemable convertible preferred stock converted automatically into Class A and Class B common at the IPOFiled
Shares outstanding afterClass A 7,607 million; Class B 5,569 million; Class C nil, at 30 June 2026Filed
Musk's economic and voting stakeGoverned by the prospectus and the dual-class structure. The Institute has not read the specific percentages in a primary source and does not print them.Not verified
Subsequent issuance: Cursor merger, 14 August 2026The merger of X67 Inc. into Anysphere, Inc. (“Cursor”) became effective 14 August 2026. Cursor's common and preferred stock converted into 389,289,254 shares of Class A common stock, plus 1,752,426 shares for vested Cursor restricted stock units391,041,680 Class A shares issued at closing, at an implied equity value for Cursor of $60.0 billion. Unvested Cursor awards were assumed and converted into approximately 29,128,326 restricted stock units and 44,365,047 options over Class A stock. Issued under the Section 4(a)(2) private-placement exemption, not registered.Filed

$575 million of costs on $86,250 million of gross proceeds is roughly 0.67%: an extraordinarily low all-in cost of issuance, and itself a data point about the negotiating position of an issuer of this size.

On the Cursor row, and why it is tagged Filed rather than Furnished. Every other 8-K figure on this page sits at the Furnished rung because it was read in an exhibit to a Form 8-K, and Tesla's own cover says an Item 2.02 exhibit is not deemed filed for Section 18 purposes. This one is different: the share counts and the $60.0 billion valuation appear in the body of the Form 8-K, reported under Item 2.01 and Item 3.02, signed by the Chief Financial Officer, with no furnishing legend anywhere on the cover. An 8-K body reported under an item other than 2.02 or 7.01 carries Section 18 liability. Tagging it Furnished because it arrived on a Form 8-K would be demoting a filed disclosure on the strength of the form number rather than the item number, and this page grades by liability, not by envelope.

The Institute's arithmetic on top of the filed figures, and labeled as ours: 391.0 million shares against the 7,607 million Class A shares outstanding at 30 June 2026 is an increase of roughly 5.1% in the Class A count; with the assumed unvested awards included the fully-diluted figure is roughly 6.1%. The $60.0 billion divided by the 389,289,254 conversion shares implies about $154 per share, which is the seven-day volume-weighted average close the merger agreement specifies and not a market quote on any single day. Estimatedand note that adding an August issuance to a 30 June balance-sheet count produces a pro-forma, not a current share count. SpaceX has not filed a share count as of a date after 30 June 2026, so this page does not print one.

Customer concentration

The filing discloses two customers above 10% of consolidated revenue and names neither of them. Customer A represented 18.3% of revenue in the quarter and 17.9% for the half (19.9% in the first half of 2025), with revenue in all three segments. Customer B represented 19.5% of the quarter and 12.2% of the half, entirely within the AI segment.

Disclosed customer concentration, Q2 2026Customer ACustomer BBoth
Share of consolidated revenue, per the filing18.3%19.5%37.8%
Implied revenue, $ millions1,4301,5242,954
Segments the filing places it inAll threeAI only—
Share of consolidated revenue, first half 202617.9%12.2%30.1%
Share of consolidated revenue, first half 202519.9%below 10%—

Percentages FiledForm 10-Q concentration note. Implied dollars are the Institute's multiplication against filed consolidated revenue of $7,814 million and are therefore accurate only to the rounding of the filed percentage, roughly plus or minus $4 million. The movement in Customer B is the story. It was below the 10% disclosure threshold in every prior period shown and is now the company's largest single customer, which is what a cloud contract signed in May does to a set of books. Together the two named-only-by-letter customers are 37.8% of consolidated revenue in a single quarter. For the terms attaching to Customer B's likely contract, and why the enforceable portion is far smaller than the reported one, see the data centre schedule in section 5.

Where a widely-repeated figure gets downgraded. The "roughly one-fifth of revenue from the U.S. government" framing that appears in much of the coverage is directionally consistent with Customer A, but the 10-Q says "Customer A," not "the United States government." Identifying Customer A requires the risk-factor and business sections of the prospectus, which is a different document. Until that identification is made from a primary source, this page reports the concentration percentage as filed and the identity as Not verified. The concentration risk is real either way; the attribution is what we decline to assert.

Backlog and other filed detail

ItemFiled detail
Backlog$47,461 million at 30 June 2026, of which $14,286 million sits in deferred revenue. Approximately 56% expected within one year, 34% in one to three years, 10% thereafter.
Property, plant and equipment, gross$83,071 million, of which servers and networking equipment $34,771 million, satellites $13,788 million, machinery and equipment $9,453 million, construction in progress $12,554 million.
Depreciation$2,735 million in the quarter; $5,064 million for the half. Against $1,310 million and $2,547 million a year earlier.
Goodwill by segmentAI segment $11,130 million; Connectivity $515 million. There is no goodwill in the Space segment.
SpectrumEchoStar AWS-4 and H-Block licenses covering 50 MHz, plus up to 15 MHz of unpaired AWS-3. FCC approval 12 May 2026; transfer to the holding trust closed 22 May 2026. $856 million paid to the trust and carried as a prepaid asset until acquisition closing.
Starlink subscribers and ARPUNot in the Form 10-Q. Disclosed one rung down, in the Q2 2026 earnings release: 12.0 million subscribers at 30 June 2026, ARPU $66 per month. Furnished

All figures FiledForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2026, and the notes thereto, except the final row, which is Furnished. The split matters: the balance-sheet and backlog figures above sit inside an SEC periodic report; the subscriber count sits in an 8-K exhibit. Both are real. Only one carries Section 18 liability.

On servers versus satellites. The gross PP&E table is the clearest single statement of what this company has become. SpaceX now carries $34.8 billion of servers and networking equipment against $13.8 billion of satellitestwo and a half times as much computing hardware as orbital hardware, with another $12.6 billion in construction in progress that the filing says is primarily AI infrastructure and facilities. Depreciation more than doubled year over year. The capital intensity of this business is migrating from space to data centres, and it is doing so faster than the revenue mix is.
The Starlink numbers, and the one that should worry you. Subscribers doubled year over year, from 6.0 million to 12.0 million, and rose 1.7 million in the quarter alone. ARPU went the other way: $85 per month a year ago, $66 todaya 22% decline. Both facts are furnished in the same table, and read together they say something the subscriber headline alone does not. Connectivity revenue grew 66% while the subscriber base grew 100%, because the marginal Starlink customer is worth roughly three-quarters of the average customer of a year ago. That is what international expansion into lower-income geographies and a shift toward cheaper consumer tiers looks like in a single line. It is not necessarily bad, Connectivity operating income still grew 79%, faster than revenue, but anyone modeling this business off subscriber growth alone is modeling the wrong variable.

One share to every American child: an October 2026 pledge with no filing behind it

On 19 October 2026 Musk posted on X that one share of SpaceX will be given to each American under the age of 18approximately 72 million childrenfor delivery in 2027. The pledge was carried the same day by CNN, CNBC and Reuters. It is the largest private commitment on the Institute's Trump Accounts contributor record, and the first one there denominated in shares rather than in dollars. Nothing about it appears in any SEC filing read at this close, which is precisely why it is set out below as a table of what was and was not said, rather than as a figure in the hero.

The pledgeWhat the source saysRung
What is being givenOne share of SpaceX common stock per recipient. A share count, not a dollar amount, which is the single most important thing about it, because the value of the pledge moves with the share price and the stated obligation does not.Reported
Who receives itEvery American under 18, stated as approximately 72 million children. The announcement gives no eligibility rule beyond age and nationality.Reported
When2027. No month, no tranche schedule and no first-delivery date.Reported
Where the shares are to be heldNot disclosed. Trump Accounts are the route both the announcement and the President's same-week remarks point to, and no program document has been located that names them as the delivery mechanism. The distinction is not pedantry: a Trump Account is a statutory vehicle with its own contribution and distribution rules, and a share delivered outside one is a different instrument in the recipient's hands.—
Holding period or transfer restrictionNot disclosed. Whether a recipient may sell, and when, is unstated.—
How a share is claimedNot disclosed. No registration step, custodian, claim window or default for non-claimants is described.—
Source of the sharesNot disclosed. Whether the shares come from the controlling holder's existing position, from treasury, or from a new issuance is unstated, and the three have different consequences for every other holder.—
Aggregate valueThe Institute's arithmetic, not a reported total: approximately 72 million shares at the $146 share price as of the 19 October 2026 announcement is about $10.5 billion. Both inputs are reported, the child count is itself approximate, and a share price is a measurement with a date on it.Estimated
Anything about this in the registrant's filingsNot disclosed. No 8-K, periodic report or prospectus supplement read at this close mentions the pledge, a share issuance for it, or a transfer by the controlling holder.—

Three rows above carry the third rung, one carries the fourth, and five carry no rung at allwhich is the honest shape of a pledge announced in a social post. The aggregate is tagged Estimated rather than Reported because no source states it: it is a multiplication the Institute performed on two reported figures, and it is printed with both inputs beside it so a reader can redo it at a different price. Brad Gerstner, who founded Invest America, called the pledge the “tip of the iceberg” for Trump Accounts on CNBC on 21 October 2026; that is a characterisation by an interested party, it is not confirmation of the delivery vehicle, and it feeds nothing on this page. No figure in this subsection feeds any calculation elsewhere on this pageit is not in the hero stats and not in any revenue, cash-flow or share-count total. The per-contributor record, including the four commitments that preceded this one, is kept at the Trump Accounts contributor reference.

A share-denominated pledge is not a dollar-denominated one, and that difference is the entire analytical content here. Every other large commitment on the Trump Accounts record is a cash figure: $250 per child, multiplied out. This one fixes the quantity and leaves the value floating, so the $10.5 billion above is what the pledge was worth on the day it was made and not what it will be worth when it is delivered in 2027. A reader carrying that figure forward is carrying a 2026 share price into a 2027 event.

The Institute's reading, and it is a reading rather than a measurement: the five Not-disclosed rows above are not gaps in the coverage, they are terms that do not exist yet. A pledge of roughly 72 million shares touching a controlling holder of a listed registrant has a securities-law shape, a tax shape and a custody shape, and none of the three is settled by a post. This page carries the pledge on the Reported rung until a document appears, and will move it the day one does.
Tesla · Nasdaq: TSLA

2. Tesla: operating income up 80% against the June quarter, down 56% against a year earlier, and the filed statements carry both

The engine room improved against the June quarter and deteriorated against a year earlier, and both are in the same filing. Tesla's third quarter of 2026, filed on 22 October 2026, produced revenue of $28,046 millionflat against the $28,095 million of a year earlier and down 0.7% from the $28,236 million of the June quarter. Income from operations rose sequentially from $398 million to $718 million, up 80%, lifting operating margin from 1.4% to 2.6%, and fell 56% against the $1,624 million of the September quarter of 2025, when the same margin was 5.8%. Net income to common stockholders was $787 million, down 29% sequentially from $1,114 million and down 43% from the $1,373 million of a year earlier, on earnings of $0.24 basic and $0.22 diluted.

The sequential movement has one cause, and it is the reversal of the item this page flagged a quarter ago. In the June quarter, interest income of $422 million and other income of $590 million against $81 million of interest expense contributed $931 million to a pre-tax result of $1,329 million: seventy percent of pre-tax income from things other than making and selling anything. In the September quarter that block contributed $238 million: interest income of $445 million, interest expense of $90 million, and other expense of $117 million, against a pre-tax result of $956 million. The crutch came out, which is why a better operating quarter reports as a worse one. Twenty-five percent of pre-tax income came from below the operating line this quarter, against seventy percent last quarter, and the operating line is what moved in Tesla's favour. The filed comparative puts that in proportion: a year earlier the same block contributed $335 million against pre-tax income of $1,959 million, or seventeen percent. Against both of its own comparatives the June quarter is the outlier, and the September quarter is closer to normal than either the sequential improvement or the year-over-year decline reads on its own.

Third quarter and nine months 2026: the filed income statement

$ millionsQ3 2026Q3 20259M 20269M 2025
Automotive sales20,09420,35955,57349,071
Automotive regulatory credits1134176391,451
Automotive leasing3534291,0981,311
Total automotive revenues20,56021,20557,31051,833
Energy generation and storage2,8813,4158,4288,934
Services and other4,6053,47512,9319,159
Total revenues28,04628,09578,66969,926
Automotive sales, cost of revenues16,57017,36546,05242,393
Automotive leasing, cost of revenues184225567692
Total automotive cost of revenues16,75417,59046,61943,085
Energy generation and storage, cost of revenues1,9272,3425,8826,230
Services and other, cost of revenues3,8713,10911,2038,526
Total cost of revenues22,55223,04163,70457,841
Gross profit5,4945,05414,96512,085
Research and development2,7611,6307,0784,628
Selling, general and administrative2,0151,5625,8304,179
Restructuring and other—238—332
Total operating expenses4,7763,43012,9089,139
Income from operations7181,6242,0572,946
Interest income4454391,3011,231
Interest expense(90)(76)(263)(253)
Other income (expense), net(117)(28)(62)173
Income before income taxes9561,9593,0334,097
Provision for income taxes1525706101,098
Net income8041,3892,4232,999
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests17164545
Net income to common stockholders7871,3732,3782,954
Earnings per share, basic / diluted$0.24 / $0.22$0.43 / $0.39$0.74 / $0.67$0.92 / $0.84
Weighted average shares, basic / diluted (millions)3,240 / 3,5413,227 / 3,5263,237 / 3,5393,223 / 3,523

All figures FiledForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2026, filed 22 October 2026. Every subtotal was recomputed line by line across all four columns and ties exactly: $20,094 + $113 + $353 = $20,560 million, $20,560 + $2,881 + $4,605 = $28,046 million, $5,494 − $4,776 = $718 million, $718 + $445 − $90 − $117 = $956 million, and $804 − $17 = $787 million, with the same five checks holding in each of the other three columns. The furnished update of 21 October 2026 survived the filing unchangedrevenue, income from operations, net income to common stockholders, pre-tax income, the three below-the-line items and both earnings-per-share figures are identical in the filed statement, so nothing this page printed from the furnished release required correction. Restructuring and other prints a dash in both 2026 columns because the filed statement carries no amount there, not because the line was omitted. The weighted average share counts are the earnings-per-share denominators; the period-end share count is a different figure and is addressed below.

Balance sheet at 30 September 2026

Balance sheet, $ millions30 Sep 202631 Dec 2025
Cash and cash equivalents17,85316,513
Short-term investments27,59427,546
Accounts receivable, net4,6364,576
Inventory14,09212,392
Prepaid expenses and other current assets6,2277,615
Total current assets70,40268,642
Operating lease vehicles, net4,0474,912
Solar energy systems, net4,4534,604
Property, plant and equipment, net50,59140,643
Operating lease right-of-use assets6,5556,027
Digital assets, net9621,008
Deferred tax assets7,9086,925
Other non-current assets12,5995,045
Total assets157,517137,806
Accounts payable17,23913,371
Accrued liabilities and other17,20513,279
Deferred revenue, current4,6613,424
Current portion of debt and finance leases1,3871,640
Total current liabilities40,49231,714
Debt and finance leases, non-current8,1366,736
Deferred revenue, non-current4,1263,631
Other long-term liabilities14,87412,860
Total liabilities67,62854,941
Redeemable noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries (temporary equity)5458
Common stock43
Additional paid-in capital47,41542,770
Accumulated other comprehensive income489361
Retained earnings41,38139,003
Total stockholders' equity89,28982,137
Noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries546670
Total liabilities and equity157,517137,806

All figures FiledForm 10-Q. Both columns foot to total assets on the same three-part footing this page applied to the June balance sheet: $67,628 + $54 + $89,289 + $546 = $157,517 million at 30 September, and $54,941 + $58 + $82,137 + $670 = $137,806 million at 31 December. The two minority-interest lines again sit outside total stockholders' equity, the redeemable interests in temporary equity under ASC 480-10-S99 because holders can require redemption, the ordinary interests below the parent's subtotal, and adding liabilities to equity alone leaves $600 million unaccounted for. Three movements over the nine months carry most of the balance-sheet change: property, plant and equipment net rises $9,948 million to $50,591 million, other non-current assets rises $7,554 million to $12,599 million, and accounts payable plus accrued liabilities rises $7,794 million to $34,444 million. The Institute does not print a period-end common share count at 30 September 2026, because it has not read one in a primary document. The 3,949 million figure shown for 30 June below is the period-end count from that balance sheet and must not be carried forward; the 3,240 million and 3,541 million above are the quarter's weighted average basic and diluted counts, which are the correct denominators for earnings per share and the wrong ones for an ownership percentage.

Nine months to 30 September 2026: cash flow

$ millions, nine months ended 30 September20262025
Net income2,4232,999
Depreciation, amortisation and impairment5,0614,505
Share-based compensation3,3461,871
Inventory and purchase commitment write-downs230313
Foreign currency transaction loss, unrealised901160
Deferred income taxes(658)234
Unrealised gain on SpaceX equity investment(863)—
Digital assets, net loss (gain)46(239)
Non-cash interest and other43235
Accounts receivable(188)(306)
Inventory(1,976)(416)
Operating lease vehicles30054
Prepaid expenses and other assets(2,846)(2,280)
Accounts payable, accrued and other liabilities7,3322,979
Deferred revenue1,746825
Net cash provided by operating activities14,89710,934
Purchases of property and equipment(13,014)(6,134)
Purchase of SpaceX equity investment(2,002)—
Purchases of short-term investments(22,646)(24,902)
Maturities of short-term investments22,74122,086
Purchases of intangible assets(7)—
Net cash used in investing activities(14,928)(8,950)
Proceeds from issuances of debt5,8344,232
Repayments of debt(4,954)(4,798)
Debt issuance costs(53)(5)
Exercises of stock options and other issuances7821,040
Principal payments on finance leases(63)(85)
Proceeds from directors in shareholder settlement—277
Recovery (payment) of settlement legal fees116(176)
Distributions to noncontrolling interests(126)(56)
Net cash provided by financing activities1,536429
Effect of exchange rate changes(115)134
Net increase in cash and restricted cash1,3902,547
Cash and restricted cash, beginning of period17,61617,037
Cash and restricted cash, end of period19,00619,584

All figures FiledForm 10-Q. All four sections were recomputed line by line and tie to the filed subtotals exactly in both years, and the roll-forward closes: $14,897 − $14,928 + $1,536 − $115 = $1,390 million, and $17,616 + $1,390 = $19,006 million. Two signs on this statement were derived from the reporting element rather than read off a presentation label, and are stated as derivations. The capture the Institute works from drops the negated-label role that supplies a reader's sign, so each line was resolved by what its element can mean: a depreciation or compensation line is one-directional and its sign is determinate, while a digital-asset or other-non-cash line is bidirectional and is not. The two resolved here are the digital-asset movement, which prints as a $46 million loss against a $239 million gain a year earlier, and non-cash interest and other, which prints as a $43 million addback against $235 million: the latter corroborated by the first-half statement above, which printed $33 million and $73 million on the same convention. Net income is $2,423 million, not the $2,378 million attributable to common stockholders in the income statement; the $45 million difference is income attributable to noncontrolling and redeemable noncontrolling interests, which is cash inside the consolidated group. The $19,006 million closing balance includes restricted cash and therefore exceeds the $17,853 million of balance-sheet cash by $1,153 million. Two reversals inside the quarter are visible only by subtraction and are the Institute's arithmetic, not printed figures: the SpaceX mark goes from a $1,005 million first-half gain to an $863 million nine-month gain, a $142 million giveback, and digital assets go from a $334 million first-half loss to a $46 million nine-month loss, a $288 million gain.

What this table set still does not carry, and why. Two items remain outstanding and both are absences of reading, not of disclosure. The Institute has not read a period-end common share count at 30 September 2026 in a primary document and so prints none; the 3,949 million figure below is the 30 June count and is not a substitute. And it does not print segment operating income for Tesla, for the reason given in the segment note further down this panel: Tesla's reportable-segment cut combines the automotive and services-and-other revenue lines, so the segment note is a different presentation from the statements above, and the Institute has tied the combined segment revenue line without having read the segment note in full. Both go in when they are read at the source.

Second quarter 2026: the filed income statement

$ millionsQ2 2026Q2 2025H1 2026H1 2025
Automotive revenue20,51616,66136,75030,628
Energy generation and storage3,1392,7895,5475,519
Services and other4,5813,0468,3265,684
Total revenue28,23622,49650,62341,831
Total cost of revenue23,48518,61841,15234,800
Gross profit4,7513,8789,4717,031
Research and development2,3711,5894,3172,998
Selling, general and administrative1,9821,3663,8152,617
Total operating expenses4,3532,9558,1325,709
Income from operations3989231,3391,322
Interest income422392856792
Interest expense(81)(86)(173)(177)
Other income, net59032055201
Income before income taxes1,3291,5492,0772,138
Provision for income taxes201359458528
Net income to common stockholders1,1141,1721,5911,581
Earnings per share, basic / diluted$0.34 / $0.32$0.36 / $0.33$0.49 / $0.45$0.49 / $0.45

All figures FiledForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2026. One note on the operating expense block: research and development plus selling, general and administrative equal total operating expenses exactly in three of the four columns, but fall $94 million short in the first half of 2025. The filed subtotal is the one printed. The Institute did not read the additional line that accounts for the difference and does not name it here.

Gross profit by line of business

Tesla does not publish a segment cost build the way SpaceX does. It reports two segments, automotive, and energy generation and storage, and it stops at gross profit. But the quarterly update deck furnished as an exhibit to Form 8-K breaks revenue and cost of revenue into matched pairs, and a matched pair is a gross profit whether or not the company labels it one. The table below is that arithmetic, done here and checked three ways.

Q2 2026, $ millionsRevenueCost of revenueGross profitMargin
Automotive sales20,00616,8663,14015.7%
Automotive regulatory credits146—146100%
Automotive leasing36418717748.6%
Total automotive20,51617,0533,46316.9%
Energy generation and storage3,1392,49964020.4%
Services and other4,5813,93364814.1%
Total28,23623,4854,75116.8%

Revenue and cost of revenue FurnishedQ2 2026 update, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K. Gross profit and margin columns are the Institute's subtraction and division, not printed figures. Three checks were run: the three total-line gross profits ($3,463 + $640 + $648) sum to $4,751 million, which is the Filed consolidated gross profit in the Form 10-Q above; the derived automotive margin of 16.9% matches the GAAP automotive gross margin the company states in its own highlights; and the derived services gross profit of $648 million matches the record figure the company names in the same document. Regulatory credits are a separate line on the face of the income statement, not a component of automotive sales: $20,006 + $146 + $364 = $20,516 million. They carry no cost of revenue, which is why the margin column reads 100%.

Where Tesla actually makes its money, and where it does not. Energy is the highest-margin line in the company at 20.4%, four points above automotive, and it is the smallest of the three. Automotive, at 16.9%, includes $146 million of regulatory credits that cost nothing to produce; strip them out and the margin on physically manufacturing and selling cars falls to 16.3%. Services and other is now Tesla's second-largest revenue line at $4,581 million, larger than energy, growing 50% year over year, and earning the thinnest margin of the three at 14.1%. The mix is shifting toward the lowest-margin line, which is most of why gross margin sat flat at 16.8% while revenue grew a quarter.
What we could not publish, and why the table stops at one quarter. The 8-K exhibit presents this matched-pair detail for the quarter; the Institute did not obtain a comparable prior-year breakdown from a primary document, and will not construct one from secondary sources. Separately, Tesla's Form 10-Q segment note reports segment revenue and segment gross profit for the two reportable segments: a different cut than the one above, since Tesla's automotive segment combines the automotive and services-and-other revenue lines. The one segment figure we could tie is that combined automotive segment revenue: $25,097 million for the quarter and $45,076 million for the half, which reconciles exactly to the furnished lines ($20,516 + $4,581 = $25,097; $19,979 + $25,097 = $45,076). We could not read the full segment note itself, for the same truncation reason described on the SpaceX panel, and so we are not printing segment operating income for Tesla. It may well be there. We did not see it.
Balance sheet, $ millions30 Jun 202631 Dec 2025
Cash and cash equivalents15,21916,513
Total assets148,524137,806
Total liabilities61,00554,941
Redeemable noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries (temporary equity)5458
Total stockholders' equity86,85882,137
Noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries607670
Total liabilities and equity148,524137,806
Common shares outstanding (millions)3,9493,751

All figures Filed. Both columns foot to total assets, and the footing is the point: $61,005 + $54 + $86,858 + $607 = $148,524 million at 30 June, and $54,941 + $58 + $82,137 + $670 = $137,806 million at 31 December. Adding liabilities to total stockholders' equity alone leaves $661 million unaccounted for, because two separate minority-interest lines sit outside that subtotal: the redeemable noncontrolling interests are carried in temporary equity above the equity section under ASC 480-10-S99 since holders can require redemption, and the ordinary noncontrolling interests sit below the parent's equity subtotal. Weighted average basic shares for the quarter were 3,237 million and diluted 3,540 million; the 3,949 million figure is the period-end count from the balance sheet, which is the correct denominator for an ownership-percentage calculation and the wrong one for earnings per share.

Consolidated statement of cash flows

$ millions, six months ended 30 June20262025
Net income1,6191,610
Depreciation, amortisation and impairment3,2092,880
Share-based compensation2,1811,208
Inventory and purchase commitment write-downs187248
Foreign currency transaction loss, unrealised59954
Deferred income taxes(301)9
Unrealised gain on SpaceX equity investment(1,005)—
Digital assets, net loss (gain)334(159)
Non-cash interest and other3373
Accounts receivable377601
Inventory(1,663)(2,407)
Operating lease vehicles26065
Prepaid expenses and other assets(1,028)(1,137)
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities3,3411,333
Deferred revenue491318
Net cash provided by operating activities8,6344,696
Purchases of property, plant and equipment(8,282)(3,886)
Purchase of SpaceX equity investment(2,002)—
Purchases of short-term investments(16,281)(13,500)
Maturities of short-term investments15,62112,791
Purchases of intangible assets(7)—
Net cash used in investing activities(10,951)(4,595)
Proceeds from issuances of debt4,6793,050
Repayments of debt(3,922)(4,129)
Debt issuance costs(4)(1)
Exercises of stock options and other issuances468528
Principal payments on finance leases(37)(67)
Proceeds from directors in shareholder settlement—277
Recovery (payment) of settlement legal fees116(176)
Distributions to noncontrolling interests(91)(36)
Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities1,209(554)
Effect of exchange rate changes(83)151
Net decrease in cash and restricted cash(1,191)(302)
Cash and restricted cash, beginning of period17,61617,037
Cash and restricted cash, end of period16,42516,735

All figures FiledForm 10-Q. All four sections were recomputed line by line and tie to the filed subtotals exactly in both years. The net income line is $1,619 million, not the $1,591 million attributable to common stockholders shown in the income statement above; the $28 million difference is income attributable to noncontrolling and redeemable noncontrolling interests, which is cash inside the consolidated group and therefore belongs at the top of this statement. Beginning and ending balances include restricted cash of $1,103 million and $1,206 million respectively, which is why they exceed the balance-sheet cash figures. Non-cash items disclosed separately: $2,633 million of property and equipment still sitting in liabilities and accrued expenses at period end, against $1,639 million a year earlier.

Tesla's free cash flow has almost disappeared. Operating cash of $8,634 million less capital expenditure of $8,282 million leaves $352 million of free cash flow for the half: down from $810 million a year ago, on revenue that grew 21%. Capex more than doubled while operating cash grew 84%. In the second quarter alone the company's own furnished figures show operating cash of $4,697 million against capex of $5,789 million, which is negative $1,092 million of free cash flow. Tesla is now, for the first time in this cycle, spending more on plant than the business produces. It has $43.5 billion of cash and short-term investments to do it with, so this is a choice rather than a constraint, but it is the same choice SpaceX is making, at one-thirtieth the scale.

Two lines here are new and neither is small. Tesla bought $2,002 million of SpaceX equity during the half and marked it up by $1,005 milliona 50% unrealised gain on a position it acquired in the same six months, recognized in earnings and then backed out of operating cash as a non-cash item. That $1,005 million is a fifth of Tesla's entire pre-tax income for the half. It is a mark on a related-party position in a company controlled by the same person, and it is the single item on Tesla's statements a governance-minded reader should look at hardest. Separately, share-based compensation of $2,181 million grew 81% and is now more than the company's entire net income: a real economic cost that never touches the cash flow statement as an outflow.

Where the R&D went. Research and development rose 49% year over year in the quarter, from $1,589 million to $2,371 million, and now consumes 8.4% of revenue against 7.1% a year ago. Gross margin was roughly flat at 16.8%. So the operating-income collapse is not a manufacturing story, gross profit actually grew $873 million, it is a spending story: operating expenses grew $1,398 million against $873 million of incremental gross profit. Tesla is funding something out of current earnings, and the filing's line items say most of it is engineering.
Musk's Tesla stake: what we can and cannot say. A Schedule 13G/A naming Elon Musk as the filing person and Tesla, Inc. as the subject was filed on 17 June 2026 under accession number 0001104659-26-075203. The Institute has confirmed the filing's existence, date, filer and subject directly on EDGAR. It has not read the share count or percentage in the primary document, and therefore prints neither. Two widely-circulated figures for Musk's Tesla position were tested against the filed share count of 3,949 million shares outstanding at 30 June 2026 and could not be reconciled to the percentages attributed to them. If you need this number, read the 13G/A itself. Not verified
xAI & X

3. xAI and X: why there is no separate set of books, and what that hides

The chain of ownership, in order. Twitter, Inc. was acquired by Elon Musk in October 2022. X.AI Corp. began operations in March 2023. On 28 March 2025, xAI, then X.AI Holdings Corp.: acquired X Holdings Corp. and X.AI Corp., making both wholly-owned subsidiaries. On 2 February 2026, SpaceX completed its acquisition of X.AI Holdings Corp. Each step was effected through a share exchange.

Both transactions were between entities under common control, and that phrase does specific accounting work. In a common-control transaction there is no acquirer and no acquiree in the purchase-accounting sense: no purchase price allocation, no fair-value step-up of the acquired assets, no new goodwill from the transaction itself. The receiving entity carries the transferred businesses at their existing book values, and, this is the part that trips people uprestates prior periods as though the combination had always existed.

The practical consequence for anyone reading these statements. SpaceX's "Q2 2025" comparative of $4,071 million in revenue is not what SpaceX reported or would have reported in 2025. It is the retrospectively combined figure for SpaceX, xAI and X together. Year-over-year growth of 92% is therefore a like-for-like organic comparison, not an acquisition effect, which is genuinely useful. But it also means no filed document anywhere states what SpaceX alone earned in 2025, and no filed document states a standalone valuation for xAI or for X. Any figure purporting to be one is an estimate, whatever confidence it is delivered with.
What people want to knowWhat is actually availableTag
xAI standalone revenueDoes not exist as a filed figure. The nearest primary datum is SpaceX's AI segment: $2,561M in Q2 2026, $3,379M for the half.Filed (segment)
X advertising revenue$367M in Q2 2026 against $426M in Q2 2025; $710M for the half against $870M. Disclosed as the Advertising line within the AI segment.Filed
AI solutions & infrastructure$2,194M in Q2 2026 against $311M in Q2 2025.Filed
Goodwill attributable to AI$11,130M at 30 June 2026, down from $11,296M at 31 December 2025: the movement is currency translation, not impairment.Filed
Preferred converted in the xAI merger1,987 million preferred shares carrying $37,476M converted into 1,424 million common shares. $2,413M of common was repurchased from current and former xAI employees.Filed
A combined or standalone valuation for xAI or XNo filing contains one, and by construction none can: common-control accounting produces no transaction value.Does not exist
X user counts, engagement, ARPUNot disclosed. The 10-Q carries a "user base" intangible of $754M net, which is an amortising acquired asset, not a user metric.Not disclosed

The editorial point. The most interesting fact about X inside SpaceX is not the size of the advertising line but its direction. It is the only revenue line in the entire consolidated filing that is smaller than it was a year ago in both the quarter and the half. In a group where Starlink's government business doubled and AI infrastructure grew sevenfold, an eighteen-percent decline is easy to miss, and consolidation is precisely the structure that makes it easy to miss. That is not an accusation of anything; it is what segment reporting is for, and it is why a practitioner reads the segment note before the press release.

Neuralink & The Boring Company

Neuralink and The Boring Company remain private, file no periodic reports, and have no filed financial statements of any kind. There is no revenue figure, no loss figure, no balance sheet, and no audited valuation for either company. Everything published about their finances derives from private financing rounds, secondary-market marks, or people describing documents they will not produce.

This page will not carry those figures under a tag that implies more than they deserve. When either company registers securities, files a Form D that contains something substantive, or is consolidated into a registrant, it will appear here with filed numbers. Until then the honest entry on the Filed rung is the blank one, which is not the same as saying nothing is knowable, and the entry immediately below is why.

The Boring Company: a priced round, on the Reported rung

On 9 September 2026 The Boring Company said it had closed a $3 billion financing at a $23 billion post-money valuation, led by the United Arab Emirates and affiliated investment entities, with Human Capital, Vy Capital, Valor Equity Partners, Sequoia Capital, Andreessen Horowitz, Temasek, Shamal Holding and Baron Capital participating. Proceeds are described as supporting an expanded partnership to build more than 150 kilometres of underground infrastructure across the UAE, extending the previously announced Dubai Loop, alongside hiring and Loop expansion in Las Vegas, Nashville and Dubai. The prior mark was $5.675 billion, set by the $675 million Series C announced 20 April 2022so the valuation is roughly four times its predecessor across a fifty-three-month gap.

Both valuations Reportedthe 2026 figure from the company's statement of 9 September 2026 as carried by Reuters on 10 September 2026; the 2022 figure from The Boring Company's own Series C announcement page of 20 April 2022. Two clocks, and they are stated because they differ: the $23 billion is a September 2026 measurement and the $5.675 billion is an April 2022 one, and any growth rate drawn between them is a rate across that specific interval and no other. Neither figure is audited, neither is filed, and neither feeds any calculation elsewhere on this page.

What this page has not verified, and will not print until it has. Two things sit adjacent to this round and are deliberately absent above. First, press accounts of the raise while it was still open described governance conditions attached to participationobligations on investors to assist with recruiting and business development, including introductions to municipal officials, with a company right to repurchase from investors who did not deliver. Those terms would be of real interest to this page's readers, because they name a mechanism by which a tunnelling business wins municipal work; they are not printed here because the Institute has not read them in a named primary source. Second, a Regulation D financing files a Form D on EDGAR within fifteen days of first sale, which would put an offering amount, an amount sold, an investor count and a claimed exemption on the record. The first pass at this page could not reach EDGAR and recorded that as a retrieval failure rather than as an absence. The check was re-run on 10 September 2026 and no Form D for The Boring Company was located. That still is not evidence of non-filing, and for a specific reason: the fifteen-day clock runs from first sale, not from the announcement, so a round made public on 9 September need not be on EDGAR until late September at the earliest, and the date of first sale is itself unknown, which means the deadline is unknown. That deferral was written on 10 September 2026 and has now expired on its own clock, so it is superseded here rather than deleted. The sentence it carried“the correct entry today is that the filing is not yet due to be findable”was a reasoned claim with a built-in expiry, and six weeks is past any reading of a fifteen-day clock from any plausible first-sale date. Re-measured 24 October 2026: a name sweep of EDGAR returns nothing for The Boring Company later than its Form D of 2018 (total offering $112,520,000, fully sold), and nothing at all for the September 2026 round. The honest statement of that negative is that no 2026 Form D surfaced by a name sweep at this closea filer can be indexed under a name or an affiliate this page did not search, so a sweep that finds nothing indicts the sweep as readily as the filing. What has changed is only this: the absence can no longer be explained by the deadline. This page will look again, and if a Form D appears it moves the offering amount and the amount actually sold from Reported to Filed overnight, and those two figures are not the same as the $3 billion in the press release, which is the more useful reason to wait for it. Update 3 November 2026: the Form D exists and the 24 October sweep missed it. The Boring Company filed a Form D under its own entity name, TBC – The Boring Co (CIK 1737630, accession 0001737630-26-000003), accepted 9 September 2026 and dated 10 September 2026, which is the day this page first said none had been located. The 24 October sweep was run under the wrong name string and the sweep, not the filing, was at fault. As filed: date of first sale 21 August 2026; total offering amount $3,420,699,200; total amount sold $3,198,599,250; $222,099,950 remaining; 141 investors, none non-accredited; Rule 506(b) exemption; equity, debt and security-to-be-acquired boxes checked; no sales commissions or finder’s fees; minimum investment accepted $10,391. Filed The amount sold is $3.20 billion against the $3 billion headline in the press release, and first sale preceded the 9 September announcement by about nineteen days. The Form D states no valuation, no lead investor and none of the investor-recruitment or share-buyback terms; those remain Reported and still unprinted here until read in a named primary source. Sources: SEC EDGAR, Form D, TBC – The Boring Co.
Why the blank matters more than a number would. Two of the six companies in this portfolio are structurally unobservable. An advisor building a client's exposure picture around this group is working with roughly two-thirds coverage, and the uncovered third is where the most speculative valuations sit. That ratio, how much of a concentrated position you can actually see into, is a better first question than any individual valuation. The family-office coordination framework treats it as the opening question for exactly this reason.
Rejected during preparation. Several specific claims about Neuralink, a patient-implant count and a mid-2026 financing round in a named jurisdiction, appeared only on content-farm aggregators with no primary source and no named reporter behind them. They are not on this page. When aggregator content and primary sources disagree, or when aggregator content simply has no primary source behind it, the aggregator loses.
Build rate

5. The physical plant: what is actually being built, and how fast

Financial statements measure a company in dollars, which is the right unit for a lender and the wrong unit for understanding what these two companies are. The comparison that gets made is to Henry J. Kaiser: the industrialist who took shipbuilding from a craft that produced a vessel in eight months to a process that produced one in a matter of days, not by inventing a better ship but by rebuilding the method of building. The claim implicit in that comparison is about rate: not what a company owns, but how quickly it can bring new productive capacity into existence.

That claim is testable. Both registrants disclose installed capacity, and both disclose the throughput they actually achieved against it. This panel puts the two numbers next to each other, because a nameplate figure with no utilisation figure beside it is marketing, and a utilisation figure with no nameplate beside it is noise.

Tesla: installed annual manufacturing capacity

SiteProductInstalled annual capacityStatus
CaliforniaModel 3 / Model Y>550,000 vehiclesProduction
ShanghaiModel 3 / Model Y>950,000 vehiclesProduction
BerlinModel Y>375,000 vehiclesProduction
TexasModel Y>250,000 vehiclesProduction
TexasCybertruck>125,000 vehiclesProduction
TexasCybercab>125,000 vehiclesProduction
NevadaTesla SemiNot statedCommissioning
—RoadsterNot statedDesign development
Vehicles, stated capacity>2,375,000
CaliforniaMegapack40 GWhProduction
ShanghaiMegapack20 GWhProduction
NevadaPowerwall>6 GWhProduction
TexasMegapackNot statedCommissioning
Energy storage, stated capacity>66 GWh
CaliforniaOptimusNot statedConstruction
TexasOptimusNot statedConstruction

All figures FurnishedQ2 2026 update, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, "Installed Annual Manufacturing Capacity". The two subtotals are the Institute's addition of the stated lines and inherit the company's "greater than" qualifier; they exclude every site marked Commissioning, Construction or Design development, because those have no stated capacity. Status labels are the company's own vocabulary and they are load-bearing: Production, Commissioning, Construction and Design development describe four different distances from a saleable unit, and only the first is generating revenue.

The column that belongs in this table and cannot yet be built: floor area. Installed capacity measures what a plant can make. It does not measure how much plant exists, and for a thesis about industrial build rate, square footage is arguably the better numberit is the physical scale of what has actually been erected, independent of what the tooling inside it is rated at. We tried to add it as a fifth column here and could not. The reason is worth stating precisely, because it is a retrieval failure and not a disclosure failure. Tesla's Q2 2026 shareholder update was read in full, all thirty-two pages: it contains no square footage figure for any site. Site-level floor area for a US registrant normally appears in Item 2, Properties, of the Form 10-Kan annual disclosure that does not repeat in interim reports, and one that sits beyond the character limit this page has been unable to clear on long EDGAR documents. The same is true of SpaceX: the full 150-page filed 10-Q was searched and returns zero occurrences of “square feet.” So the honest position is that the figure is not disclosed in any interim document and has not been retrieved from the annual one. Widely-circulated building sizes for individual sites, including the 810,000 square foot Southaven warehouse carried in the reported table further down, come from press coverage and county records, not filings. They will not be promoted into this table. When Item 2 is read at the source, the column goes in.

Tesla: supporting infrastructure

SiteFacilityInstalled capacityStatus
TexasCortex 1: AI training compute>90 MWProduction
TexasCortex 2: AI training compute>115 MWProduction
Texas4680 battery cell>40 GWhProduction
TexasLithium refining30 GWh equivalentEarly ramp
TexasCathode materials10 GWh equivalentEarly ramp
NevadaLFP battery cell7 GWhEarly ramp
Berlin4680 battery cellNot statedConstruction

All figures Furnishedsame exhibit, "Supporting Infrastructure". The company states in the same document that it "more than doubled" its onsite compute in Texas, measured in megawatts, during the first half of 2026.

What the plant actually produced

Tesla, Q3 2026AchievedAgainst nameplate
Vehicles produced464,39178%
Model 3 / Model Y457,387—
Other models7,004—
Vehicles delivered486,53282%
Model 3 / Model Y478,237—
Other models8,295—
Energy storage deployed13.7 GWh83%

Achieved figures Furnished“Tesla Third Quarter 2026 Production, Deliveries & Deployments”, Exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K furnished 2 October 2026 under Item 2.02. The model split is the company's own and it runs two ways only, Model 3 and Model Y against everything else; the two component lines sum to the totals above. Prior quarter, for comparison: 451,758 produced, 480,126 delivered, 13.5 GWh deployed. The nameplate denominators are the Q2 2026 capacity table above, not a Q3 one. Tesla restates installed capacity with the full quarterly update, and the Q3 2026 update was furnished after the close on 21 October 2026but the Institute has not read its capacity table at the source, so the denominators here remain the Q2 ones and a Q3 numerator is still being divided by a Q2 denominator. The percentage column should be read with that in mind, and it will be re-derived when the Q3 capacity table is read rather than inferred from the fact that the update exists. The "against nameplate" column is the Institute's arithmetic: the quarterly figure multiplied by four and divided by the stated annual capacity above. It is a rough measure and should be read as one: a single quarter annualised is not a run rate, deliveries can exceed production out of inventory, and storage deployed is not the same thing as storage manufactured. It is printed because a capacity table without it invites the reader to treat nameplate as output, which is the most common error made about this company in both directions.

Tesla, Q2 2026, not carried in the Q3 production release, and not yet read in the Q3 updateAchievedAgainst nameplate
Supercharger stations8,704—
Supercharger connectors82,357—
Active FSD subscriptions1,480,000—

These three sit in their own table because the Q3 2026 production release does not carry them: they appear in the full quarterly update, and the Q3 2026 update was furnished on 21 October 2026 without these three lines having been read at the source. They are Furnished figures measured at 30 June 2026 and they are printed here rather than refreshed, because a figure carried forward under a newer heading is the error this page exists to avoid. They are stale by one quarter and labelled as such, which is a different thing from being undisclosed. Carrying them in the Q3 table would have made six rows agree on a date that only three of them have.

SpaceX: compute, orbit and where the capital actually went

Physical throughputQ2 2026Q1 2026Q2 2025
Nameplate AI compute capacity1.4 GW1.0 GW0.4 GW
Customer launches1079
Internal launches283337
Total launches384046
Mass to orbit, metric tons485556652
Average mass per launch, metric tons12.813.914.2
Starlink subscribers, millions12.010.36.0

Compute, launch and subscriber figures FurnishedQ2 2026 earnings release. Average mass per launch is the Institute's division. See the warning on the SpaceX panel regarding a typographical error in the release's own description of the 0.4 GW figure.

SpaceX gross property, plant and equipment at 30 June 2026$ millionsShare
Servers and networking equipment34,77141.9%
Satellites13,78816.6%
Construction in progress12,55415.1%
Machinery and equipment9,45311.4%
Data centre infrastructure3,9914.8%
Launch sites3,1183.8%
Land and buildings2,9583.6%
Flight vehicle hardware1,5571.9%
Leasehold improvements8811.1%
Gross property, plant and equipment83,071100%

Dollar figures FiledForm 10-Q. Share column is the Institute's division; components sum to the filed gross total. Construction in progress is described in the filing as primarily AI infrastructure, which means the compute share of this balance sheet is understated by the table, not overstated. Share percentages are rounded independently and sum to 100.2%; the dollar components sum to the filed total exactly.

Spectrum and direct-to-device: two October 2026 documents, neither of them a filing

Section 1 carries one row, labelled Spectrum, on the Filed rung, because the Form 10-Q describes the AWS-4 and H-block transfer itself: licences covering 50 MHz plus up to 15 MHz of unpaired AWS-3, FCC approval on 12 May 2026, transfer to the holding trust closed on 22 May 2026, and $856 million paid to the trust and carried as a prepaid asset until acquisition closing. Two documents dated in October 2026 act directly on that unfinished sentence, and neither of them is an SEC filing. The Federal Communications Commission authorised a 15,000-satellite direct-to-device constellation on 6 October. SpaceX announced an agreement two days later to acquire a nationwide low-band portfolio in the 800 MHz band. Both are set out below from the primary documents, and the first one qualifies the second's framing in a way worth reading slowly.

The 800 MHz agreementWhat the source saysRung
CounterpartyGrain Management, LLC. Grain's own release of 8 October 2026 states that SpaceX will acquire 100% of Grain's nationwide 800 MHz spectrum portfolio. SpaceX's own update of the same date describes the portfolio and names no counterparty.Reported
What is being acquiredUp to 14 MHz of paired spectrum in the 800 MHz band, nationwide, per SpaceX's update of 8 October 2026.Reported
Stated purposeSatellite direct-to-device service. SpaceX describes an architecture pairing the satellite-to-mobile constellation with a terrestrial deployment, the global 2 GHz mid-band carrying capacity and the new low band serving as an indoor-penetrating coverage layer, and states that most existing mobile devices already support this underused band.Reported
ConsiderationNot disclosed. Neither principal states a price in either release.—
ConditionSubject to final FCC approval and customary closing conditions, per both releases. No closing date is stated in either.Reported
How the seller came to hold itGrain acquired the portfolio from T-Mobile, completion announced 11 August 2026, for cash plus Grain's own 600 MHz spectrum.Reported
Regulatory predicateGrain's release ties the sale to the FCC's July 2026 order approving Grain's acquisition from T-Mobile, which it says established a competitive selection process and a conditional pathway for direct-to-device deployment. The Institute has not read that order and takes no figure from it.Reported
Advisers to the sellerBDT & MSD Partners, financial; Milbank, legal; Latham & Watkins, regulatory. Named in Grain's release. No adviser is named on the buy side in either release.Reported
Anything about this in either registrant's filingsNot disclosed. SpaceX's most recent Form 8-K precedes the announcement, and nothing in either registrant's EDGAR record read at this close mentions the band, the portfolio or the counterparty.—

Every row above rests on two company statements issued on the same day, which is why every row that carries a rung carries the third one. A figure of roughly $8 billion has circulated in financial media as the price and is deliberately not printed here as the transaction value, because neither principal disclosed a price and a number attributed to neither party to a contract is not a term of that contract. A separate report of roughly $40 billion of SpaceX financing for AI accelerators was excluded from this page until 15 November 2026, because until then the Institute had not located a named primary source or a date for it. It now has one, and it is a filing: SpaceX’s Form 8-K dated 26 October 2026, Item 8.01, discloses a binding commitment letter to enter into a master finance lease with an entity managed by Apollo Global Management, with expected aggregate principal payments of approximately $40 billion. It is carried on the Filed rung in the source register below and is unrelated to the spectrum transaction in this table. Lenders, anchor investors and the chip generation named in SpaceX’s accompanying press release do not appear in the 8-K and are not printed here.

The FCC authorisationWhat the order saysRung
The documentAuthorization and Order, DA 26-1078, GN Docket No. 25-340. ICFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20250916-00282 and SAT-AMD-20251125-00339. Call Sign S00735, satellite name “SpaceX D2D Constellation.”Reported
Adopted and released6 October 2026, by the Acting Chief of the Space Bureau and the Chief of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau on delegated authority.Reported
Disposition“GRANTED-IN-PART, DEFERRED-IN-PART With Conditions”the order's own disposition field, quoted in its own casing rather than characterised or tidied.Reported
Constellation authorised15,000 non-geostationary satellites across nine shells between 326 and 335 km, at inclinations of 26°, 32°, 38°, 48°, 53°, 60°, 69°, 76° and 96.87°.Reported
Nature of serviceMobile satellite service, Supplemental Coverage from Space and fixed satellite service. Supplemental coverage and mobile satellite service within the United States; mobile satellite and direct-to-cell outside it; fixed satellite backhaul and telemetry, tracking and command.Reported
The operative conditionCondition 3, in terms: except for the testing permitted by condition 4, SpaceX must not commence operations in the 2 GHz MSS/AWS-4, AWS-H block and AWS-3 bands until Step Two of the SpaceX–EchoStar transaction is consummated. Step One moved the EchoStar subsidiaries into Spectrum Business Trust 2025-1 for SpaceX's benefit; Step Two moves them from the trust to SpaceX. The order cross-references DA 26-471, released 12 May 2026, the same approval section 1 of this page already carries from the 10-Q, and requires notice to the Commission within 30 days of consummation.Reported
Interim testingCondition 4 permits testing in those bands with the consent of EchoStar and the trust, by a letter filed 25 June 2026, until the spectrum acquisition closing date, on an unprotected non-interference basis during launch and early orbit.Reported
Backhaul grantedKa-band 17.3–20.2 GHz space-to-Earth and 27.5–30.0 GHz Earth-to-space; V-band 37.5–42.0 GHz (and 42.0–42.5 GHz outside the United States) and 47.2–52.4 GHz; E-band 71.0–76.0 and 81.0–86.0 GHz; W-band 92.0–114.25 GHz Earth-to-space, by waiver of the United States Table, unprotected and non-interference. The 18.6–18.8 GHz downlink waiver is also granted.Reported
What was deferredThe broader request to operate mobile satellite service for direct-to-cell outside the United States across the full 1429–2690 MHz range. Deferred, not denied, and not granted.Reported
Opposition on the recordPetitions to deny filed by Globalstar, Viasat and Iridium; comments from the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Eutelsat/WorldVu, 2014 AWS Spectrum Bidco, the MSS Association and DIRECTV among others.Reported
Anything about this in either registrant's filingsNot disclosed. No 8-K, periodic report or prospectus supplement read at this close mentions the order, the docket or the call sign.—

The rung column in this table is doing unusual work and is worth reading literally. The five rungs this page uses are defined relative to the Securities Exchange Act, and a Commission order adopted and released under the signature of two bureau chiefs is not an SEC filing, not an 8-K exhibit and not a press report. It is a primary government document, and on any sensible ranking it sits above a named publication rather than beside one. The page declines to invent a sixth tag mid-revision and declines equally to promote these rows to Filed, which means something specific here and is reserved for it, so they are carried one rung low and the full identifier is printed in every row, DA number, docket, file numbers, call sign and release date, so that a reader can pull the order and check it rather than take the Institute's word for it. Nothing in either table feeds a calculation anywhere on this page.

And the two authorisations of 15,000 satellites are different authorisations. The figure above is the direct-to-device constellation granted on 6 October 2026. A separate Commission action, DA 26-36 of 9 January 2026, authorised an additional 7,500 Gen2 Starlink satellites for fixed and mobile satellite service in the Ku, Ka, V, E and W bands, bringing that constellation's total to 15,000 in new shells between 340 and 485 km. Two orders, two constellations, one coincident total. Conflating them would be a dating error of exactly the kind this page exists to avoid.

The company's characterisation and the order's disposition are both accurate, and the sequencing is the point. SpaceX's update of 8 October describes the week's action as approval of a next-generation constellation “optimized for 2 GHz spectrum globally,” and states that Starlink Mobile can now become the first network operator to deploy both satellite and terrestrial spectrum. The order grants in part, defers in part, expressly defers the out-of-country 1429–2690 MHz request, and bars commencing operations in the 2 GHz bands until Step Two of the EchoStar transfer is consummated. Read together: the constellation is authorised and the spectrum it is optimised for is not yet usable.

The Institute's reading, and it is a reading rather than a measurement: a condition precedent written into an order adopted on 6 October 2026 is evidence that the condition had not been satisfied as at that date, which is consistent with the registrant's own filed account: the trust held the licences and the $856 million sat on the balance sheet as a prepaid asset pending acquisition closing. So a reader modelling direct-to-device revenue should be modelling two separate gates rather than one: a Commission authorisation, now held, and a transaction closing, not yet filed. The 800 MHz agreement adds a third, since it is itself subject to approval. None of the three is a reason to doubt the programme; all three are reasons to date it carefully.

The data centre schedule: every site the filings actually name

Until this revision the page reported the AI build as a dollar figure and a capacity figure and never once said where. That was a real gap, and it turns out to be closeable. The registration statement SpaceX filed for its June 2026 listing names its data centres, places them by road and by state, and gives the build times, which means facility-level detail on this company is Filed, not merely reported, and belongs on this page at the top rung. What follows is every facility named in a document SpaceX has filed with the Commission, and then, kept deliberately separate, the sites that appear only in press coverage and county records. The line between the two tables is the entire purpose of this page.

Facility, as the filing names itLocation, as the filing places itWhat the filing saysRung
COLOSSUSPaul R. Lowry Road, Memphis, TennesseeThe company's “flagship data center.” Its first cluster was brought online in 122 days, in the repurposed shell of an existing factory.Filed
COLOSSUS IIMemphis, Tennessee and Southaven, MississippiDefined in the plural, “our data centers” and described as a single coherent gigawatt-scale training cluster spanning two states and two utility jurisdictions. First cluster online in 91 days. Grok-5 was being trained here at the time of the filing.Filed
Both, togetherTennessee and Mississippi“Approximately 1.0 gigawatt of compute power, with additional power capacity available for data center operations.”Filed

All three rows Filedfinal prospectus, Form 424(b)(4), added to the sources table in section 8. Two of these facts are worth holding onto. First, the 1.0 GW in the prospectus and the 1.0 GW in the Q1 2026 column of the earnings release are the same number arrived at independently, one on the Filed rung and one on the Furnished rung, for the same period. That is the strongest form of corroboration available without an audit. Second, the filing supplies its own benchmark for the build times: it states that an industry benchmark to bring a 100 megawatt greenfield data centre online is approximately two years. COLOSSUS II's first cluster took 91 days. The comparison is the company's own and is presented as such.

Reported, and not found in any filing read hereLocationWhat is reportedRung
The COLOSSUS host buildingA former appliance plant, south Memphis, TennesseeGrid supply of 150 MW approved in November 2024 and energised May 2025, with a further allocation of up to 150 MW approved in February 2026. Installed GPU counts of 200,000 and of more than 220,000 both circulate; they do not agree with each other, and neither is filed.Reported
The Tulane Road buildingWhitehaven, Memphis, TennesseeA warehouse and adjacent parcels acquired by an affiliate in early 2025 for roughly $80 million.Reported
The Stateline Road buildingSouthaven, DeSoto County, MississippiA former logistics warehouse of roughly 810,000 square feet on about 48 acres, acquired December 2025.Reported
A fourth Memphis buildingTulane Road corridor, Memphis, TennesseeAnnounced publicly in July 2026, with a reported configuration of 220,000 next-generation processors. No document SpaceX has filed and this page has read names it.Reported
Southaven generationDeSoto County, MississippiA 1.2 GW gas plant of 41 turbines permitted under the Clean Air Act in March 2026. Separately, 69 trailer-mounted turbines at the same site are under an agreed decommissioning order with the state running into 2027.Reported

All five rows Reportedpress coverage and state permitting records, not filings. They are shown because a reader deciding what to believe is better served by seeing the reported layer than by having it silently withheld, and worse served by having it presented at the same weight as the prospectus. None of these figures is used anywhere else on this page, and none feeds any calculation.

One naming trap, because it has already caught people. Press coverage refers to two of the Memphis buildings as “Macrohard” and “Macroharder,” after rooftop signage. In SpaceX's own filed definitions, Macrohard is not a building. The prospectus defines it as a software platform under development with Tesla, designed to emulate digital workflows and operate computers autonomously. A reader who takes the rooftop as the corporate nomenclature will end up counting a software project as a data centre, and may double-count capacity. The filed vocabulary has exactly two data-centre names in it: COLOSSUS and COLOSSUS II.

Who is paying whom, and who owns the buildings

Naming the buildings answers half the question. The other half is commercial: somebody is writing a very large check every month for the compute inside them, somebody holds title to the shells, and somebody owns the accelerators. Those are three different parties, and the filings separate them: sometimes explicitly, sometimes only by implication, and in one case not at all. What follows is every counterparty relationship the documents name, with the rung attached to each.

CounterpartyDirectionWhat the document saysRung
Anthropic PBCPays SpaceXCloud Services Agreements signed May 2026 covering approximately 325,000 NVIDIA GPUs across COLOSSUS and COLOSSUS II, at $1.25 billion per month through May 2029, ramping in May and June 2026 at a reduced fee. After an initial three-month period, either party may terminate on 90 days' notice. This is the only cloud customer named by name in any document read here, and it is named in a filed one.Filed
Google LLCPays SpaceXA Cloud Service Agreement entered 5 June 2026 covering approximately 110,000 NVIDIA GPUs, CPUs, memory and related components, under which Google pays SpaceX $920 million per month from October 2026 through June 2029, with capacity ramping through September at a reduced fee. Two conditions matter and are rarely quoted. If SpaceX fails to deliver access to the committed number of GPUs by 30 September 2026, then after a one-month grace period Google may terminate immediately or accept the number delivered with a pro rata reduction in the monthly fee. After 31 December 2026 either party may terminate on 90 days' notice. Google retains ownership of and intellectual property rights in its own content, AI models and data.Filed
An unnamed hosting counterpartyPays SpaceXA hosting agreement described by chief financial officer Bret Johnsen as closed “earlier this month,” generating approximately $1.11 billion of revenue per month beginning 1 December 2026about $13.3 billion annualised, which is the multiplication and not a separate disclosure. Stated at the Goldman Sachs Communacopia and Technology Conference on 10 September 2026. The counterparty is not named, no contract term is given, and no cancellation terms are given. No document SpaceX has filed and this page has read describes it.Reported
“Customer B”Pays SpaceX19.5% of consolidated revenue in the quarter, disclosed as sitting entirely within the AI segment and absent from the comparable prior-year period: approximately $1,524 million. The 10-Q does not say who this is.Filed
“Customer A”Pays SpaceX18.3% of consolidated revenue in the quarter. Not attributed to a segment in the concentration note, and not named.Filed
CTC Property, LLCSpaceX subsidiaryNamed in the 10-Q as a subsidiary of the company, a joint-and-several guarantor of the SpaceX Bridge Loan alongside X Corp. and X.AI LLC, and the entity that holds the AI infrastructure assets subject to the sale-leaseback transactions below. The filings read here do not set out site-by-site title, acreage or purchase price.Filed
Valor Equity PartnersSpaceX paysAn equipment lease relationship with CTC, entered April 2026, disclosed as a related party: Valor's founder and chief executive, Antonio Gracias, is a director of SpaceX. The transactions were deemed failed sale-leasebacks and are therefore carried as borrowings rather than leases$2,039 million current and $11,290 million non-current, $13,329 million in total, against $455 million and $4,052 million at 31 December 2025. Related interest expense was $327 million in the quarter and $513 million for the half. Added 17 November 2026: Mr Gracias’s Schedule 13G/A (Amendment No. 1, event date 30 September 2026, signed 16 November 2026) reports beneficial ownership of 457,614,684 Class A shares, 5.5% of the class, all with shared and none with sole voting and dispositive power. Of those, 452,294,169 are held of record by the Valor Entities or their affiliates and the rest by Mr Gracias, his children, a family trust, AJG Growth Fund LLC and the Gracias Family Foundation. The 5.5% is the filer’s figure, on 8,246,541,218 Class A shares outstanding at 15 October 2026, and is a share of the Class A class only, not of total voting power. The director on the other side of this related-party lease is therefore also, through the Valor Entities, a holder of more than 5% of SpaceX’s Class A stock.Filed
Tesla, Inc.SpaceX pays$295 million of Megapack products purchased from Tesla in the quarter and $329 million for the half, recorded in property, plant and equipment. As at 31 December 2025 the company had purchased $506 million of Megapacks and $131 million of Cybertrucks at manufacturer's suggested retail price. All other transactions with Tesla in the period are described as immaterial. Tesla is a vendor to the data centres, not a co-owner of them: no filing read here describes any joint ownership, joint venture or shared-title arrangement between SpaceX and Tesla over any facility.Filed
Unnamed cloud providersSpaceX paysSpaceX's own purchase commitments total $27,955 million, of which $22,244 million falls due in 2027, described as third-party cloud capacity. The counterparties are not named.Filed

Rungs as marked: every row Filed but one: the December hosting agreement added on 10 September 2026. Three cautions, and the first two have caught commentary already. First, do not equate Customer B with Anthropic. The concentration note discloses a measured percentage without attribution; the prospectus discloses a named contract without a revenue figure. The two are consistent with each other and the arithmetic is suggestive, but the filing does not join them, and neither does this page. Second, Google has been moved from Reported to Filed, and the reason is a correction against this page rather than a new event: see the correction note immediately below. Third: the December hosting agreement rests on a spoken sentence at a sell-side conference. That is a named executive speaking on the record and it is a real source: it is not a signed document, it names no counterparty, and it states a monthly rate without a term. A monthly rate without a term cannot be turned into a contract value, and this page does not turn it into one.

Correction, 28 September 2026: the Google agreement was filed all along, and this page said it was not. Until this revision the row above carried the Reported rung, and the note beneath it said, in terms, that “the monthly figure attributed to it has never been filed” and that “no filed document read here names Google as a customer of anything.” Both sentences were wrong. SpaceX filed a free writing prospectus on Form FWP under Rule 433, against Registration File No. 333-296070, which names Google LLC, states the $920 million monthly fee, gives the October 2026 to June 2029 term, and sets out the delivery condition and both termination rights. It was filed in June 2026: three months before this page first asserted that no such document existed.

The distinction that was collapsed, and it is the one this page exists to police. The Institute had read the 10-Q, the 424(b)(4) and the Q2 earnings release, found no Google customer relationship in any of them, and wrote that up as a fact about the filing record. It was a fact about the Institute's reading list. The page's own stated method already warns against exactly this, that “not in the part of the document we read” and “not disclosed” are different claims and only one of them is ours to make, and the first half of the sentence in the table honoured it (“appears in no filed document read here”) while the second half quietly dropped the qualifier and generalised to the whole of EDGAR. A scoped claim and an unscoped one sat in the same sentence, joined by “and”, and the unscoped one was the false one. Where this page prints a negative, the negative now carries its own scope or it does not print.

On the rung, stated rather than assumed. An issuer free writing prospectus is filed with the SEC and is a statutory prospectus carrying Securities Act liability, which is why it is marked Filed here alongside the 424(b)(4). It is nonetheless a weaker instrument than the documents beside it: it is not signed, and under Rule 433 it is not deemed part of the registration statement unless the issuer elects to include it. That is a real difference and it is recorded rather than smoothed over. Whether the final 424(b)(4) prospectus also carries the Google agreement is not known to this page, because that document exceeds the retrieval limit described in section 8 and was read in part. This page does not claim it is absent there; it claims only that it was found in the FWP.

The live term, and the reason this correction is not merely housekeeping. The delivery condition matured on 30 September 2026a fixed contractual date, not one measured from this page's close, and the grace period runs roughly a month past it, which on the Institute's reading of the term places its expiry at the end of October 2026, within a week of this editorial close of 24 October 2026. October 2026 is also the first full-rate month and is in progress. A failure to deliver the committed GPU count does not simply cancel a contract at the margin: it hands the counterparty an election between walking away and repricing the largest single monthly revenue line disclosed anywhere in SpaceX's public record, at a moment when the company has just consumed $25.0 billion of free cash flow in six months. Nothing in the filings read here states whether the GPUs have been delivered, and this page does not guess. It is the single most consequential dated contingency on this page and it is now on it.

The superseded wording is quoted above rather than deleted, per the Institute's practice of retaining and labelling a claim that was overtaken or wrong. This is the second false negative of its kind on this page. The first is recorded in section 8.
The ownership question, answered as far as the filings answer it, and no further. SpaceX states at the company level that it owns and operates its data centres, and the property sits on its own balance sheet: $3,991 million of data centre infrastructure and $34,771 million of servers and networking equipment, all of it consolidated, none of it equity-method or off-balance-sheet. The holding vehicle named in the filings is CTC Property, LLC. What is not disclosed in any document read here is site-level title, which legal entity holds the deed to which building, on what terms, and whether any parcel is leased rather than owned. And the answer to the natural follow-up is a clean negative: no filing read here describes Tesla as owning any part of any data centre. Tesla appears once in this context, as a supplier of $295 million of batteries. The two companies are related parties, they transact, and they are separately capitalised. Combining their data centre estates in a single mental balance sheet is an error that the filings do not support.
Two numbers that should be read together, because they run in opposite directions. SpaceX's remaining performance obligations, revenue it has contracted to earn but not yet recognized, are $47,461 million. Its own purchase commitments are $27,955 million, with $22,244 million of that concentrated in a single year, 2027. So the company has roughly $1.70 of contracted future revenue for every dollar of contracted future spending, which sounds comfortable until the timing is laid alongside it: the spending has a hard date and the revenue, on the terms disclosed above, is substantially cancellable on ninety days. That is the same asymmetry the contract callout describes, expressed in the commitments note instead of the risk factors. A practitioner modeling 2027 for this company should start here.

What the money actually bought, six months of it

SpaceX gross property, plant and equipment, $ millions30 Jun 202631 Dec 2025ChangeGrowth
Servers and networking equipment34,77122,69412,07753.2%
Construction in progress12,5544,6047,950172.7%
Data centre infrastructure3,9912,9601,03134.8%
The three compute-related lines51,31630,25821,05869.6%
Satellites13,78811,9491,83915.4%
Machinery and equipment9,4536,3433,11049.0%
Launch sites3,1182,40471429.7%
Land and buildings2,9581,8761,08257.7%
Flight vehicle hardware1,5571,689(132)(7.8%)
Leasehold improvements8817849712.4%
Everything else31,75525,0456,71026.8%
Gross property, plant and equipment83,07155,30327,76850.2%

Both dollar columns FiledForm 10-Q, property, plant and equipment note. Change and growth columns are the Institute's arithmetic. Four checks were run: the nine components sum to the filed gross total in both columns; the two subtotals sum to the filed gross total in both columns; each change equals the difference of the two filed balances; and the total change of $27,768 million equals $83,071 less $55,303. Flight vehicle hardware is the one line that fell, which in a gross-cost schedule means retirement or disposal rather than depreciation.

The shells are the cheap part, and that is the finding. When a company says it spent $23.6 billion on data centres, the instinct is to picture buildings. The filing says otherwise. Data centre infrastructure, the structures, the power distribution, the cooling, is $3,991 million, 4.8% of everything SpaceX owns. The servers and networking equipment inside those structures are $34,771 million: 8.7 times the buildings that house them. That ratio is the whole economics of this business, because concrete depreciates over thirty years and accelerators depreciate over three to five. It is already showing up: SpaceX's depreciation for the half was $5,064 million against $2,547 million a year earlier, very nearly a doubling, and it will keep climbing as the $12,554 million sitting in construction in progress is placed in service. The cost of the build arrives on the income statement before the revenue from it does. Any model of this company that gets the depreciation schedule wrong gets the next three years wrong.
The data centres are not yet a profit driver, and the word matters. It is natural to describe this build as SpaceX's profit engine, and measured by revenue and by capital it plainly is the engine: AI took $23,551 million of the $28,476 million of capital deployed in the half, 82.7% of everything, and grew segment revenue from $737 million to $2,561 million year over year. But on the income statement the AI segment lost $1,257 million in the quarter and $3,726 million in the half. The profit driver is Connectivity, which earned $2,844 million of operating income on $7,548 million of revenue, a 37.7% margin for the half, 38.6% in the quarter, and which is currently funding the other two segments. AI's Segment Adjusted EBITDA did turn positive for the first time, at $1,146 million against negative $276 million a year earlier, and that is a genuine inflection. But Segment Adjusted EBITDA is defined by the company to exclude depreciation, and depreciation on a three-year server is not an accounting artefact: it is the principal cost of the product. A compute business that is EBITDA-positive and operating-loss-negative is telling you precisely one thing: the assets are not yet earning back their own depreciation. The correct sentence today is that AI is the revenue and capital driver and Connectivity is the profit driver. The correct sentence in four quarters may be different, and the line to watch is segment operating income, not Segment Adjusted EBITDA.
The largest compute contract is cancellable on ninety days' notice. The prospectus discloses the terms this page previously described as undisclosed, and they are worth reading closely. The Cloud Services Agreements signed in May 2026 cover approximately 325,000 NVIDIA GPUs across COLOSSUS and COLOSSUS II at $1.25 billion per month through May 2029a $15.0 billion annual run rate, with capacity ramping in May and June 2026 at a reduced fee. After the initial three-month period, either party may terminate on 90 days' notice. Two consequences follow. First, the furnished and filed documents corroborate each other: two months at the full rate would be $2.5 billion, the earnings release reports $1.6 billion of incremental revenue, and the 64% shortfall is exactly what the filed “reduced fee” ramp language predicts. Second, and less comfortably, the earnings release attributes $1.6 billion of a $1,743 million sequential increase in AI revenue92% of the segment's entire growth, to these agreements. The 10-Q narrows it further. An unnamed Customer B, disclosed as sitting entirely within the AI segment and absent from the comparable period a year earlier, was 19.5% of consolidated revenue in the quarter. Against $7,814 million of revenue that is approximately $1,524 million from one counterparty59.5% of everything the AI segment earned, and 87% of its sequential growth, from a customer that did not exist twelve months ago. The capital committed against it is measured in decades of concrete and years of silicon. That asymmetry between contract duration and asset duration is the single most important thing on this page for anyone underwriting the AI segment.
The most important sentence in the earnings release is in the definitions, and almost nobody reads it. The release announces “several Cloud Services Agreements totaling $14.1 billion in contracted sales.” That number looks small next to the coverage, and it is. The filed Anthropic terms, $1.25 billion a month over roughly 37 months to May 2029, imply about $46 billion of nominal value on their own Estimated. Add the separately reported agreement with Google, at $920 million a month for 32 months from October 2026, and the headline is roughly $75 billion Reported. SpaceX reports $14.1 billion.

The gap is not a discrepancy. It is a definition, and the company prints it in Note 2: contracted sales means the value of contracts signed for the non-cancellable, enforceable period, and expressly excludes estimated revenue for future periods cancellable by either the company or the customer. So $14.1 billion is the part that is actually enforceable. The remainder, on these numbers about four-fifths of the headline, is capacity either side may walk away from.

That is SpaceX grading its own contracts, and grading them honestly. A reader working from the press figures carries roughly $75 billion of assumed revenue against $83 billion of gross plant. A reader working from the company's own definition carries $14.1 billion, or about nineteen cents of enforceable revenue for every dollar of headline. Both numbers are true. Only one of them is a receivable, and the company tells you which. Note that the Google agreement is Reported and is not named in any document read here: SpaceX names no cloud customer in the earnings release, and the 10-Q identifies its largest only as Customer B.

Added 10 September 2026, and it makes the definition matter more rather than less. The December hosting agreement announced at Communacopia adds approximately $1.11 billion a month from 1 December 2026but with no stated term, so unlike Anthropic and Google it cannot be extended into a headline contract value at all, and this page will not invent a duration to do so. Note also the clock the $14.1 billion runs on: it was measured in the Q2 2026 earnings release, as of 30 June 2026, while the Google agreement, the December agreement and any others signed since all postdate it. The nineteen-cent ratio above is therefore a June measurement set against headlines accumulated through September. The Q3 2026 release has since been furnished, on 20 October 2026, and the Institute has not read a restated contracted-sales figure in it. That is a statement about what has been read at the source, not a statement that the release omits one: the parts of that release read for this page are the segment tables, the consolidated reconciliation and the operating metrics reproduced above. Until a Q3 contracted-sales figure is read, the $14.1 billion stands as a 30 June 2026 measurement and the nineteen-cent ratio above remains a June measurement set against headlines accumulated through September. That figure, not the press arithmetic, is still the one to wait for.
The $100 billion ARR statement, and what has to happen for it to be true. At the same conference Johnsen said that “by the end of this year, with annualizing our December number, we're on track to hit $100 billion of ARR.” Reported Read precisely, that is not a revenue forecast and it is not a 2026 result: it is a statement that one month, December 2026, multiplied by twelve reaches $100 billion. The arithmetic underneath it is checkable against the filings, and it is demanding. SpaceX's filed second-quarter revenue was $7,814 million, or roughly $2.6 billion a month, which annualises to about $31 billion. A December run rate of $100 billion requires roughly $8.3 billion of revenue in that single monthan increment of about $5.7 billion a month over the June quarter, achieved in two quarters.

The three compute agreements this page can describe supply a stated $3.28 billion a month between them once all are running: Anthropic at $1.25 billion Filed, Google at $0.92 billion Reported, and the December agreement at $1.11 billion Reported. Those cannot simply be added to the June base, because Anthropic is already inside the $7,814 millionat a reduced ramp fee, as Customer B's 19.5%, or about $1,524 million for the quarter and $508 million a month. Adding the three contracts and removing that overlap gives roughly $5.4 billion a month, or about $65 billion annualised Estimated. The named and described contracts do not reach $100 billion. The gap is on the order of $35 billion of annualised revenue that has to come from Starlink growth, launch, the full-rate step-up as the ramp fees expire, or agreements not yet described, and it is a gap in the Institute's information, not necessarily in the company's. The point is only that a reader cannot verify the $100 billion figure from anything SpaceX has published, and the arithmetic that can be verified lands short of it. The December number, when the company reports it, is the check.
What a megawatt appears to cost, with the caveat attached. Nameplate compute rose from 1.0 GW to 1.4 GW during the second quarter while the AI segment spent $15,828 million of capital, which divides to roughly $39.6 million per megawatt energised Estimated. That figure almost certainly overstates the true cost of a megawatt, and knowingly so: a large share of the quarter's spending bought capacity that is not yet in service, which is why construction in progress rose $7,950 million over the half. The number is offered as a ceiling, not a measurement. A true cost per megawatt would require the company to disclose capital expenditure by facility and by in-service date, and it does not.
The build-rate finding, stated plainly. SpaceX took its AI compute from 0.4 GW to 1.4 GW in four quartersthree and a half times, adding a gigawatt of nameplate capacity in a year. Tesla's entire disclosed AI training estate, Cortex 1 and Cortex 2 together, is 205 MW: SpaceX is running roughly seven times Tesla's compute. On the balance sheet the same fact appears differently: servers, networking and data centre infrastructure are $38,762 million of SpaceX's $83,071 million of gross plant, 46.7% of everything the company owns, against 22.2% for satellites, launch sites and flight vehicle hardware combined. Measured by the assets rather than the name on the building, SpaceX is already more a compute company than a space company, by a factor of two.
And the finding that cuts the other way. The launch business, the actual Kaiser comparison, the thing that builds and flies hardwarewent backwards in physical terms. Total launches fell from 46 to 38 year over year and from 40 sequentially. Mass to orbit fell from 652 to 485 metric tons, down 26%, and for the half from 1,102 to 1,041. Average mass per launch declined in each of the three periods shown. Space segment revenue still grew 29%, which means the revenue per unit of physical throughput rose sharply: better pricing, better mix, or both. But whatever else is accelerating at this company, tonnage to orbit is not. A thesis built on build rate has to survive its own metric, and this quarter that metric declined.

What a practitioner should take from this panel. The build-at-scale thesis is real but it is not uniform, and the two halves of it are moving in opposite directions. Capital is compounding into compute at a rate that has no obvious precedent in either company's history: $23.6 billion of AI capex at SpaceX in six months, a doubling of Tesla's Texas compute in the same six months. Meanwhile the manufacturing estate at Tesla is running at roughly three-quarters of its own stated nameplate, with four separate product lines sitting in Commissioning, Construction or Design development and therefore contributing nothing, and SpaceX's launch cadence is declining. Both of those are ordinary facts about industrial companies mid-buildout. Neither is a scandal. But an investor holding this thesis should know that what is being built at unprecedented speed today is data centres, and that the vehicle plants and the launch pads, the parts the Kaiser comparison actually invokes, are the parts currently running below their own capacity.

The Texas fab: the gap between what was announced and what has been filed

In August 2026 the Governor of Texas announced what would be, if built as described, the largest single industrial project either company has attempted: a semiconductor fabrication complex in Grimes County, north-west of Houston, referred to publicly as a “Terafab.” The announcement is specific and it is large. What follows is that announcement set directly against what the registrants have actually filed, because the distance between the two is the single most instructive thing about it.

The TerafabWhat the source saysRung
Capital, phase one$16.8 billion, per the Governor's office, 6 August 2026.Reported
Employment3,000 jobs, per the same announcement.Reported
Floor area100 million square feet at full build, per the same announcement.Reported
State incentiveA $30 million Texas Enterprise Fund grant.Reported
Foundry partner, as at 4 October 2026Undetermined, on the principal’s own account. Intel’s 1.4nm-class 14A had been the named process. On 3 October 2026 Musk confirmed discussions with TSMC about a facility TSMC would build and operate to serve Tesla, SpaceX and xAI exclusively, in his own words“Just discussions, but something may come of it.” TSMC has said nothing. The competing ownership structures in circulation are the reporting outlet’s own stated speculation and are not printed here.Reported
In SpaceX's Form 10-QZero mentions. A full-text search of the filed 10-Q returns no instance of “Terafab,” “semiconductor,” “fab” or “foundry.”Filed
In SpaceX's prospectusA framework only. The filed 424(b)(4) contemplates chip fabrication in general terms and states expressly that “any specific projects … have not yet been determined.”Filed
In Tesla's Q2 updateTesla names a fab, but it is its own, in Austinnot Grimes County, and not described as shared.Furnished
Capital committed on any balance sheetNot disclosed. No commitment, purchase obligation, construction contract or contingency in either registrant's filings read here is identified with this project.—

The rung column here is doing unusual work and is worth reading literally. The Filed rows are not filed confirmations of the project: they are filed silences, and a filed silence is evidence. A registrant that had committed $16.8 billion of capital would ordinarily disclose it: in commitments, in construction in progress, in liquidity, or in risk factors. As of the 30 June 2026 balance sheet date, none of that appears.

Both things are probably true, and the sequencing is the point. There is no reason to doubt that the announcement happened or that the state grant is real; a governor's office and a state incentive fund are named, accountable sources. But an announcement on 6 August 2026 sits after a 30 June balance sheet date, so its absence from the 10-Q is not yet a contradiction: it is a timing gap that the next filing will close one way or the other. What can be said today, precisely: a project described publicly at $16.8 billion has no filed capital commitment behind it, and the registrant's own prospectus says the specific projects have not been determined. The practitioner discipline is to carry it at zero until a filing carries it at something, and to watch three places in the Q3 10-Q: the commitments note, construction in progress, and the subsequent-events note. If it is real at the scale announced, it will appear in at least one of them. And note who is now saying so. The prospectus language above is the registrant’s; the 3 October confirmation is the principal’s, and the two agree. A project whose foundry partner is still “just discussions” in October is a project whose specific scope had not been determined in June, which is exactly what the 424(b)(4) says. The filed silence and the reported remark are not in tension; they are the same fact measured on two clocks.

Solar: one sentence, no figures

Tesla's Q2 2026 shareholder update contains a single sentence indicating an intention to manufacture solar panels. That is the whole of it. There is no capacity figure, no site, no capital number, and no solar line anywhere in the installed annual manufacturing capacity table abovewhich is notable, because that table is where Tesla itself puts every product it can attach a number to, including products that are only in Construction. A product absent from a company's own capacity table is a product the company is not yet prepared to quantify.

Separately, press coverage describes a project referred to as “Crystal Sun,” a roughly $10.1 billion facility in Fort Bend County, Texas, targeted for the first quarter of 2029. That figure is Reported and appears in no filing read here. It is recorded on this page so that a reader who encounters it elsewhere knows where it sits, and it feeds no calculation.

What would move solar up a rung. A stated annual capacity in gigawatts, a named site, or a capital commitment in the commitments note. Any one of the three would put a solar row in the capacity table. Until then the honest statement is that Tesla has said it intends to build solar panels and has disclosed nothing measurable about doing so, which is a different thing from Tesla having no plan, and a different thing again from the $10.1 billion number being wrong. It is simply not yet a filed fact.
What is not on this page, and will not be until it is filed. Energy generatedas opposed to storage capacity manufactured and deployed, is not disclosed by either registrant in the documents read here. Neither is data centre power consumption, water usage, land area, headcount by site, or square footage. Megawatts of compute is a capacity figure, not a consumption figure, and the two are not interchangeable. On facility detail this callout has been narrowed: SpaceX's registration statement does name and locate its data centres, and those rows now sit at the top of the schedule above on the Filed rung. What remains undisclosed is everything quantitative below the site name: no filing read here gives capital expenditure by facility, in-service date by facility, square footage, acreage, GPU count, power draw, water consumption or headcount by site. The widely-circulated figures for those things trace to press coverage and county permitting records, are carried in the separate Reported table, and feed no calculation on this page. If they enter a filing, they move up a rung the next morning.
Autonomy

6. Robotaxi and Full Self-Driving: what is deployed, what is subscribed, and what is carefully not said

Autonomy is the part of the Tesla story where the distance between the narrative and the disclosure is widest, and it is also the part where the company's own documents are most useful, not because they say a great deal, but because what they choose to say and not say is unusually legible. Two products sit here. Cybercab is a vehicle and a service; Full Self-Driving is a software subscription attached to the existing fleet. They are financially unrelated today and are treated separately below. Revised 10 September 2026: Cybercab entered commercial service in Austin in the first week of September, which changes the character of this section without yet changing a single filed or furnished figure in it: the four new rows below are all Reported, and the gap between what is now operating on public streets and what Tesla has put in a document is wider today than it was a week ago.

Cybercab and the robotaxi service: the deployment table

Robotaxi and CybercabWhat the document saysRung
Austin commercial deploymentA launch event in Austin on 3 September 2026, with driverless Cybercabs on public streets that day and public ride-hailing opening 4 September 2026 across the Austin geofence. The vehicle is a two-seater with no steering wheel, no pedals and no mirrors.Reported
Cybercabs registered in Texas45, per Texas vehicle registration records as at 3 September 2026. Separately, the federal audit described below is reported as covering roughly 1,000 Cybercabs. The two figures do not agree, they measure different things, registered fleet against declared production, and neither is filed. Tesla has not said how many are carrying passengers.Reported
Regulatory basis for deploymentTesla is reported to have self-certified the Cybercab as compliant with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, rather than petitioning NHTSA for a temporary exemption under 49 CFR Part 555.Reported
Federal responseNHTSA is reported to have opened an audit of that self-certification within hours of the first vehicles reaching public streets.Reported
Cybercab production status“Started production” at the Texas plant.Furnished
Cybercab installed capacity>125,000 vehicles per year, Texas, listed under Production in the company's own capacity table.Furnished
Service footprintDescribed as operating across seven major metropolitan areas.Furnished
Bay Area operating basisThe company's own footnote states the Bay Area service runs with a safety driver, under a limousine-class Transportation Charter Party permit, TCP0046782-A.Furnished
Cybercabs actually builtNot disclosed. No unit figure for Cybercab appears in the production and delivery table, which reports vehicles only in aggregate.—
Vehicles in the robotaxi fleetNot disclosed.—
Rides completed, or miles driven in serviceNot disclosed.—
Robotaxi revenueNot disclosed as a line. Any robotaxi revenue is inside the services and other line, which is $4,581 million in total and is not broken down.—
Which seven metros, by nameNot disclosed as a complete list in the documents read here.—

The four Reported rows at the head of the table were added 10 September 2026 and rest on press coverage and state registration records, not on any Tesla documentTesla has furnished nothing about the Austin deployment as of this editorial close, which is itself worth noting for a launch of this prominence. The remaining positive figures are FurnishedQ2 2026 update, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, and therefore predate the deployment. Every “not disclosed” row above means exactly that: the Institute read the document and the figure is not in it. It does not mean the figure could not be found elsewhere, and it does not mean the company does not have it.

The regulatory choice is the story, not the vehicle. A car with no steering wheel, no pedals and no mirrors cannot comply with several Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards as written, because those standards presuppose a human driver and prescribe the controls one needs. There are two ways through that. Zoox took the first: it petitioned NHTSA for a temporary exemption from eight standards under 49 CFR Part 555, waited years, and received final approval in July 2026: carrying with it the statutory cap of 2,500 vehicles a year. Tesla is reported to have taken the second: United States vehicle regulation is a self-certification regime, in which a manufacturer attests to its own compliance and NHTSA audits afterwards rather than approving beforehand. Nothing keeps a self-certified vehicle off a public road on the day it is certified.

The commercial consequence is exact and it is large. A Part 555 exemption is permission with a ceiling; self-certification is no ceiling and no permission. Tesla's installed Cybercab capacity is furnished at more than 125,000 vehicles a year: fifty times the cap that binds Zoox. A company that intended to build at that rate could not accept the exemption route and reach it. So the choice, if it is as reported, is not a shortcut around a formality; it is the only path consistent with the capacity figure already sitting in Tesla's own table.

The risk sits on the other side of the same coin, and it is not small. NHTSA is reported to have opened its audit within hours. Self-certification shifts the regulator from gatekeeper to auditor, and an adverse audit finding arrives after vehicles are built, sold and carrying passengers, as a recall, a consent order or a cessation, not as a denied application. The Institute takes no view on whether the certification is sound, and no reader should infer one from this page. What can be said is that the downside of being wrong is now paid in retrofit and recall rather than in delay, and that every figure in the four rows above is on the Reported rung. Tesla has furnished nothing about this deployment, and the disclosure that would settle most of it, a Cybercab unit line in the production and delivery table, is the same one this section has been asking for since it was written.
The one place Tesla's own document argues with itself, and it is worth sitting with. The same exhibit counts the Bay Area among a service footprint of “seven major metropolitan areas” and, in its own footnote, discloses that the Bay Area operation runs with a safety driver behind the wheel under a limousine-class charter permit. A chauffeured car dispatched by an app is a legitimate business and a sensible regulatory on-ramp. It is not a robotaxi. Tesla does not claim it is: the footnote is Tesla's own, and disclosing it was a choice the company did not have to make in that form. But a reader who takes “seven metros” at face value and does not read the footnote will materially overstate how much driverless service exists. Without per-metro disclosure of which markets are driverless and which are supervised, the honest count of genuinely autonomous metros is somewhere between one and seven, and this page cannot narrow it further. That is a disclosure gap, not an accusation.
What the capacity figure does and does not tell you. Cybercab sits in Tesla's capacity table at more than 125,000 vehicles a year, in Production, in Texas: the same line and the same status as Cybertruck. That is a real and checkable statement about installed tooling. It is not a statement about output. The Q3 2026 production release does split the quarter, but only two ways, 457,387 Model 3 and Model Y produced against 7,004 of everything else, so the number of Cybercabs that physically exist is still not derivable from any document read here. What the split does supply is a ceiling, and it is a tight one: Cybercab, Cybertruck, Model S, Model X and Semi together accounted for 7,004 units produced in the quarter, or about 28,000 annualised, against a Cybercab nameplate of more than 125,000 a year. A Cybercab output of zero remains consistent with everything Tesla has disclosed; an output above 7,004 is now excluded. When a per-model line appears, this row becomes the most informative single figure on the autonomy story.

Full Self-Driving: the subscription business, and the accounting trap inside it

Full Self-DrivingWhat the document saysRung
Active subscriptions1,480,000, up 56% year over year.Furnished
Attach rateGreater than 55% of the eligible fleet.Furnished
Cumulative distanceMore than 50 million kilometres driven on the system.Furnished
Software version and marketsv14 “lite” released in the United States and South Korea; four new European approvals during the period.Furnished
ChinaAbsent from the document. No FSD status for China appears in anything read here.Not disclosed
Deferred revenue, total balance$4,050 million at 30 June 2026, against $3,870 million at 31 December 2025.Filed
Deferred revenue recognized, six months$468 million.Filed
Expected to be recognized, next twelve months$962 million.Filed
FSD subscription priceNot disclosed in either document read here.—
FSD revenue, isolatedNot disclosed. See the caution immediately below.—

Operating metrics FurnishedQ2 2026 update. Deferred revenue figures FiledForm 10-Q revenue note.

The deferred revenue balance is not an FSD number, and reading it as one is the most common error made about this line. Tesla's filed revenue note describes the $4,050 million balance as covering Full Self-Driving, connectivity, Supercharging access and over-the-air software updates: four products in one bucket. The company does not split it. So the widely repeated move of dividing the deferred balance by the subscriber count to derive an implied FSD price per user is arithmetic performed on the wrong numerator, and it will overstate FSD every time by an unknown amount. Likewise the $962 million expected to be recognized over the next twelve months is a four-product figure, not an FSD run rate.

What can be said cleanly is narrower and still useful: the combined bucket grew $180 million over the half while recognising $468 million, which means gross additions to deferred revenue of roughly $648 million Estimatedthe four products together are being sold faster than they are being recognized. That is the shape of a growing subscription business. Attributing it to FSD specifically requires a disclosure Tesla has not made.
The one autonomy figure that is unambiguous, and it is the attach rate. More than 55% of the eligible fleet subscribes, and subscriptions grew 56% year over year to 1.48 million. Neither figure depends on an allocation, a price assumption or a segment definition: they are counts, furnished by the company, and they are the cleanest evidence on this page that FSD is a real business rather than a feature. What they cannot tell you is what it earns. With no disclosed price and no isolated revenue line, a 1.48 million-subscriber business of entirely undisclosed unit economics is the accurate description. The gap between those two sentences is the whole difficulty of underwriting Tesla's autonomy story from public documents.
What would change this section. Four disclosures, in descending order of how much they would matter: a Cybercab unit production figure in the delivery table; a per-metro breakdown of which robotaxi markets are driverless and which are supervised; deferred revenue disaggregated by product; and a stated FSD subscription price. The first two are operating disclosures Tesla could make at any time. The third is an accounting policy choice. Any of them appearing in a filing moves several rows above from Not disclosed to Filed the next morning, and this page will say so when they do. A fifth has been added by the Austin deployment and it now outranks the others: the outcome of the federal audit of Tesla's self-certification, and any Item 8.01 or risk-factor language the company files about it. A vehicle carrying paying passengers on a certification the regulator is actively examining is a disclosure event waiting to happen in one direction or the other, and the first document either party produces will be the most informative thing on this section since it was written.
Cross-company view

7. Five observations that only appear when you put the filings side by side

Both companies burned free cash flow this quarter, and only one of them can afford to.

For the six months, SpaceX generated $3,466 million of operating cash against $28,476 million of capital expenditure: free cash flow of negative $25,010 million. Tesla generated $8,634 million against $8,282 million: positive $352 million, down from $810 million a year ago, and negative $1,092 million in the second quarter alone. The direction is identical and the magnitude is not: SpaceX is consuming cash at roughly seventy times Tesla's rate, and it is doing so with $100.0 billion of liquidity and a freshly opened equity market behind it. Tesla is consuming cash with $43.5 billion. Neither is in difficulty. But both companies have now crossed from funding their own expansion out of operations to funding it out of the balance sheet, in the same six months, under the same person. For a client with concentrated exposure to both, that is one bet, not two.

SpaceX now carries more book equity than Tesla.

Shareholders' equity of $127,224 million against Tesla's $86,858 million, and cash of $93,522 million against Tesla's $15,219 million. Six months ago SpaceX's book equity was $2,573 million. The entire move is the IPO and the preferred conversion, not earnings: the company lost $4.8 billion over the same period. Book equity measures capital raised and retained, not value created, and there is no cleaner illustration of the distinction in current markets.

One of these companies is capital-constrained and it is not the loss-maker.

Tesla generates profits and holds $15.2 billion of cash; SpaceX generates losses and holds $100.0 billion of cash and securities. If the two were being run by the same treasury function, they are not, and cannot be, the money would flow the other way from where the income statements suggest. For an advisor, the lesson is that liquidity and profitability are separate questions and get separate answers.

Tesla answered that observation on 29 September 2026 with a credit agreement. On that date the company entered three senior unsecured facilities at once, a $20.0 billion three-year delayed draw term loan with Citibank as administrative agent, an $8.0 billion five-year revolver and a $2.0 billion 364-day revolver, both with Wells Fargo as administrative agent, and in the same filing terminated the $5.0 billion revolving credit agreement dated 20 January 2023, which would otherwise have run to 20 January 2028 and under which nothing was outstanding. Gross committed capacity therefore moves from $5.0 billion to $30.0 billion, which is the Institute's sum of the three Filed commitments rather than a figure the document states, and the revolving commitments alone may be increased by a further $4.0 billion to $14.0 billion in aggregate on certain conditions. Nothing has been drawn. The filing states that no loans were outstanding under any of the three facilities as at 29 September 2026 and that Tesla does not currently plan to draw on them in 2026, and all three carry a covenant requiring the company to maintain at least $5.0 billion of consolidated liquidity.

What the document does not do is say why, and this page will not supply a reason the filing does not. What can be said from the filing alone is that undrawn committed capacity is not cash and appears nowhere on the balance sheet, so the observation above stands exactly as measured at 30 June 2026, $15.2 billion of cash at Tesla against $100.0 billion of cash and securities at SpaceX, while the constraint behind it has been loosened by an instrument that costs only a commitment fee on the revolvers and a ticking fee on the term loan until it is used. The delayed-draw structure is the part worth reading twice. Its commitments reduce automatically to $10.0 billion on the first anniversary and to $5.0 billion at fifteen months, anything still undrawn terminates at eighteen months, and no more than ten draws are permitted in that window. That is a facility built to be drawn soon or not at all. The three credit agreements themselves are not attached to the 8-K and are to be filed as exhibits to the Form 10-Q for the quarter ending 30 September 2026, where the pricing grid and the covenant mechanics become readable rather than summarised; until then no term of them is claimed here beyond what the 8-K states.

Both companies are spending into the same bet.

Tesla's R&D rose 49% year over year; SpaceX's rose 81% ($1,958M to $3,548M in the quarter) and now exceeds its cost of revenue. SpaceX's construction in progress is $12,554 million, primarily AI infrastructure. Two separately-governed public companies, controlled by the same person, are simultaneously converting current earnings and raised capital into compute and engineering. Whether that is conviction or correlation is a governance question, not an accounting one, but it is a question a concentrated holder should be asking.

The related-party line is the one to watch.

SpaceX carries $13,329 million of related-party debt and finance lease obligations, a third of its total. The filing directs readers to its related-party note for detail on property, plant and equipment arrangements. Related-party financing at this scale, inside a controlled company with a dual-class structure, is the single item on these statements most worth reading in full each quarter.

Net operating losses: the widely-assumed tax shield, and what the filings actually contain

A recurring claim about both companies is that each carries a very large net operating loss carryforward capable of sheltering most of its taxable income for years. The claim is plausible on its face, SpaceX has lost $4.8 billion in six months and Tesla lost money for most of its first fifteen years, and the tax mechanic behind it is real. It is also, in the documents read here, unsupported by any filed figure, and this page will not print a number it has not read.

Take the statutory mechanic first, because it is law rather than disclosure and can be stated with certainty. For losses arising in tax years beginning after 31 December 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act amended Internal Revenue Code section 172 so that federal net operating losses carry forward indefinitely but may offset only 80% of taxable income in the year of use. So the “80%” in the common formulation is correct as a description of the ceiling on post-2017 federal NOLs. It is a rule, not a fact about either company. Separately, section 382 limits the annual use of pre-change losses after an ownership change: a live consideration for a company that has just completed a public offering and converted its preferred stock.

Tax position, as disclosedSpaceXTeslaRung
Federal NOL carryforwardNot disclosedNot retrieved—
State NOL carryforwardNot disclosedNot retrieved—
Section 382 limitationNot disclosedNot retrieved—
Deferred tax assets, 30 Jun 2026$354M$7,235MFiled
Deferred tax assets, 31 Dec 2025$141M$6,925MFiled
Income before tax, Q2 2026$(518)M$1,329MFiled
Income before tax, six months$(4,788)M$2,077MFiled
Income tax provision, Q2 2026$23M$201MFiled
Income tax provision, six months$29M$458MFiled
Effective tax rate, as statedNot statedNot stated—

Dollar figures Filedthe two Forms 10-Q. Neither interim report states an effective tax rate; the ratios a reader can compute from the rows above are the Institute's division and are quarterly, which is not the same thing as an annual effective rate. The two “not” labels in the top three rows are deliberately different words and the difference is the whole discipline of this page. For SpaceX, Not disclosed is a finding: the complete 150-page filed 10-Q was searched end to end and returns zero occurrences of “net operating loss,” “carryforward” or “Section 382.” The figure is not in the document. For Tesla, Not retrieved is an admission: the carryforward detail lives in the annual tax footnote of the Form 10-K, and that footnote sits beyond the retrieval limit this page has been unable to clear. It may well be there. We did not see it, and so we are not printing it.

Two published NOL figures for SpaceX are circulating and should not be relied on. In the course of this work, search summaries returned specific federal and state carryforward figures for SpaceX attached to a link list containing a CIK that does not belong to SpaceX. Those figures do not appear in SpaceX's filed 10-Q, which contains no NOL disclosure at all. This page is not reprinting them, even to rebut them with numbers, because reprinting a wrong figure is how a wrong figure survives. If you encounter a precise SpaceX NOL number, ask which filed document it came from and check the CIK.
What can honestly be said about the tax shield, and it is less than the claim. Tesla carries $7,235 million of deferred tax assets, up $310 million over the half. A deferred tax asset balance of that size is consistent with substantial loss carryforwards and credits, and it is the closest thing to filed evidence for the shield thesis, but a DTA balance is a net-of-valuation-allowance accounting figure, not a carryforward, and the two are not interchangeable. On the other side, Tesla paid a $458 million provision on $2,077 million of pre-tax income for the half, which is not the profile of a company sheltering the overwhelming majority of its income. SpaceX's DTA balance more than doubled to $354 million while the company lost $4.8 billion, and it paid $29 million of tax on those losses: almost certainly foreign and state, though the filing does not break it out. The defensible statement today is that Tesla holds a large deferred tax asset and pays real cash tax, and that SpaceX discloses no NOL carryforward at all in its interim report. Anything more specific requires the annual tax footnote, and this page will carry those figures the moment it can read them at the source.
Sources & refresh

8. What this page is built on, and when it changes

Every figure tagged Filed or Furnished above was read directly from one of the following documents. No figure on this page is sourced to an aggregator, a summary service, or a secondary compilation. The table is ordered by rung and then by weight: the four periodic reports, the registration statement and the filed 8-K body first, then the two 8-K exhibits, then the 8-K cover page read for one legal sentence only, then the Reported sources, an earnings call, a sell-side conference appearance, the Cybercab deployment coverage, and the company statements and Commission orders added at this revision for the spectrum and direct-to-device matter in section 5, each of which supports named rows and no calculation, and last the one document whose existence is cited but whose contents were not read.

DocumentCoversFiler / CIKRung
SpaceX Form 10-Q
Quarter ended 30 September 2026, filed 22 October 2026
Quarter and nine months ended 30 September 2026; cover page and shares outstanding at 15 October 2026; income statement across all four comparative columns; balance sheet at 30 September 2026 against 31 December 2025; full statement of cash flows for both nine-month periods; basic and diluted share counts; Note 3 revenue disaggregated by product and service and by type within each of the three segments; deferred revenue and backlog; customer concentration; Note 4 inventory; Note 5 property, plant and equipment and construction in progress; Note 6 goodwill rollforward, intangibles and the spectrum transaction. Read: the cover, the four primary statements, and Notes 1 through 6 complete. Where the read stopped: the retrieval truncated mid-sentence inside Note 7: Financial Instruments, at roughly 107,500 characters. Not in the part read, and therefore absent from this page rather than recorded as undisclosed: the ASC 280 segment footnote, Notes 8 through 20, which include the redeemable convertible preferred and the xAI and X mergers, related-party transactions, and the Cursor acquisition, Item 2 Management's Discussion and Analysis, Items 3 and 4, and all of Part II. The existence of a Note 20 establishes that the filing carries at least twenty notes, so the unread portion is the larger one. This document supersedes the earnings release furnished 20 October 2026 carried on the Furnished rung below, every figure of which it reproduced without correctionrevenue $14,575M, net income $4,404M, SI segment revenue $7,560M and advertising revenue $538M all appear in the filed statements unchanged, so the rung moves and no number does. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Filed
SpaceX Form 8-K
Date of report 24 October 2026, signed 26 October 2026, Item 8.01
A binding commitment letter to enter into a master finance lease with a lessor entity managed by Apollo Global Management, Inc., under which the lessor would acquire GPU pods and related equipment for data centers selected by SpaceX and lease them to it in tranches. Each tranche runs under its own lease schedule for approximately five to five and one-quarter years from commencement; rent is payable quarterly in advance as one-twentieth of the tranche’s financed cost plus a charge at a fixed annual rate on the outstanding lease balance, the fixed rate to be set at pricing, before the master lease is signed. Expected aggregate principal payments are approximately $40 billion, stated as an expectation. Closing is subject to specified conditions and expected before year-end 2026; lease schedules are expected to begin in the first half of 2027 on delivery. Not in the document: any GPU quantity, residual value, purchase option or guarantee, the accounting treatment, and any lender or investor other than Apollo. This is the 8-K body, not an exhibit to itItem 8.01 only, no Item 2.02 or 7.01, no exhibits, signed by the Chief Financial Officer, which is why it sits on the same rung as the periodic reports. It post-dates the 30 September 2026 balance sheet, so no figure in the 10-Q above reflects it. Read in full on 15 November 2026; it is signed 26 October 2026, a week before this page’s 3 November close, and that close’s sweep missed it. The EDGAR acceptance date was not read. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Filed
SpaceX Form 10-Q Quarter and six months ended 30 June 2026; income statement; balance sheet; full statement of cash flows; property, plant and equipment detail; IPO terms; revenue by segment; common-control mergers; concentration; backlog; spectrum; related-party debt and the Valor equipment financing; remaining performance obligations and purchase commitments; deferred tax assets. Read end to endall 150 pages, 440,810 characters, from the complete document rather than through the truncating retrieval path described below. This is what permits the page to say “not disclosed” rather than “not retrieved” about SpaceX net operating losses, square footage and semiconductor fabrication. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Filed
Tesla Form 10-Q
Quarter ended 30 September 2026, filed 22 October 2026
Quarter and nine months ended 30 September 2026; income statement across all four comparative columns; balance sheet at 30 September 2026 against 31 December 2025; full statement of cash flows for both nine-month periods; weighted average basic and diluted share counts. Read: the three statements and their denominators only. Not read, and therefore absent from this page rather than estimated: revenue by segment, the installed annual manufacturing capacity table, the Supercharger and Full Self-Driving disclosures, the tax footnote, the properties disclosure, and the debt footnote to which the credit agreements of 29 September 2026 were to be attached. This document supersedes the furnished update of 21 October 2026 carried on the Furnished rung below, every figure of which it reproduced without correction. Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Filed
Tesla Form 10-Q
Quarter ended 30 June 2026
Quarter and six months ended 30 June 2026; income statement; balance sheet; full statement of cash flows; share count Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Filed
SpaceX final prospectus
Form 424(b)(4)
Read for facility-level and contract-level detail that appears in no other document: the names, roads and states of COLOSSUS and COLOSSUS II; combined compute of approximately 1.0 gigawatt; build times of 122 and 91 days; the definition of Macrohard as a software platform rather than a building; and the full terms of the Cloud Services Agreements, including the monthly fee, the term, the GPU count and the ninety-day termination right Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Filed
SpaceX free writing prospectus
Form FWP, Rule 433, Reg. File No. 333-296070
Added 28 September 2026 and the basis for the whole of the Google row in section 7: the Cloud Service Agreement entered 5 June 2026, the approximately 110,000 NVIDIA GPUs, the $920 million monthly fee, the October 2026 to June 2029 term, the reduced-fee ramp through September, the 30 September 2026 delivery condition with its one-month grace period and pro rata fee reduction, the 90-day mutual termination right after 31 December 2026, and Google's retained rights in its own models and data. Read in fullit is short enough to fall well inside the retrieval limit, unlike the 10-Q and the prospectus. Marked Filed with the qualification set out in section 7: an issuer FWP is filed and is a statutory prospectus, but it is unsigned and is not deemed part of the registration statement. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Filed
SpaceX Form 8-K
Items 2.01 and 3.02, 14 August 2026
Completion of the Cursor (Anysphere, Inc.) merger on 14 August 2026: the share consideration of 389,289,254 Class A shares plus 1,752,426 shares for vested restricted stock units; the implied equity value of $60.0 billion and the seven-day volume-weighted average pricing mechanic; the assumed unvested awards; and the Section 4(a)(2) exemption relied on. Read in the body of the report, not an exhibit: there is no furnishing legend on it. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Filed
SpaceX Q3 2026 earnings release
Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished 20 October 2026
Added 22 October 2026 and the basis for every Q3 2026 SpaceX figure on this page. Read: the three-segment revenue, operating income, Segment Adjusted EBITDA and capital expenditure tables for the quarter and the nine months, with the Q3 2025 and Q2 2026 comparatives; the consolidated reconciliation carrying net income of $4,404 million against a net loss of $1,054 million a year earlier, and basic and diluted earnings per share of $0.37 and $0.35; the Connectivity operating metrics, including 13.6 million Starlink consumer subscribers and consumer ARPU of $69 per month; the Super Intelligence detail, including advertising revenues of $538 million; and two of the issuer's own renaming disclosures, reproduced verbatim on this page rather than paraphrased: that SI “refers to the operating and reportable segment previously reported as Artificial Intelligence (AI),” and that Starlink Consumer Subscribers was previously disclosed as Starlink Subscribers on a different definitional basis. Not read, and therefore absent from this page rather than carried forward from the Q2 release: any restated contracted-sales figure, the launch counts and mass to orbit, nameplate compute, and the full cost build by segment. Superseded, retained and labelled rather than removed: this row previously read that the EDGAR accession for the exhibit had not been resolved and that the row therefore carried no link. It was resolved on 24 October 2026 and the row now links to it. The exhibit is also superseded on the evidentiary rung by the Form 10-Q filed 22 October 2026, which reproduced every figure above without correction; the row stays because a furnished document that a filing confirms is worth more as a record than a deleted one. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Furnished
SpaceX Q2 2026 earnings release
Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K
Operating income and full cost build by segment; Segment Adjusted EBITDA; capital expenditure by segment; Starlink subscribers and ARPU; launch counts and mass to orbit; nameplate AI compute; Cloud Services Agreements and, in Note 2, the definition of contracted sales that limits them to the non-cancellable period; the Cursor acquisition; the bond issuance Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Furnished
Tesla Q3 2026 production release
Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, 2 October 2026
Added 3 October 2026. Third-quarter production, deliveries and energy storage deployed, with the company's own two-way model split: 464,391 vehicles produced and 486,532 delivered, of which 457,387 and 478,237 respectively were Model 3 and Model Y; 13.7 GWh of storage deployed. The release carries no revenue, no margin and no capacity restatement: those arrive with the Q3 update, furnished after the close on 21 October 2026, from which the Institute has read the income-statement block reproduced in the Tesla panel and not the capacity table, so this release refreshes three rows of the throughput table and nothing else on this page. Furnished under Item 2.02, on the same cover language that defines the Furnished rung below. Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Furnished
Tesla Q3 2026 update
Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, Item 2.02, furnished after the close on 21 October 2026
Added 22 October 2026 and, until the Form 10-Q landed later the same day, the basis for every Q3 2026 Tesla figure on this page. Read: the income-statement block only: total revenue of $28,046 million, income from operations of $718 million, net income attributable to common stockholders of $787 million, basic and diluted earnings per share of $0.24 and $0.22, and the below-the-line items of interest income $445 million, interest expense $(90) million and other expense $(117) million closing to pre-tax income of $956 million. Not read, and therefore absent from this page rather than estimated: cost of revenue, gross profit, research and development, selling general and administrative, the tax provision, revenue by segment, the installed annual manufacturing capacity table, the Supercharger network counts, the Full Self-Driving take-rate lines, and free cash flow. The three throughput denominators and the three Supercharger and FSD rows elsewhere on this page therefore remain 30 June 2026 measurements, labelled as stale by one quarter rather than refreshed, because this update's capacity table has not been read: the fact that the update exists is not a reading of it. The EDGAR accession for this exhibit has not been resolved, so this row carries no link. The Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026 was filed on 22 October 2026 and is listed on the Filed rung above; it reproduced every figure named in this row without correction, so this row documents the furnished original and is no longer the authority for any Q3 2026 Tesla figure. Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Furnished
Tesla Q2 2026 update
Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K
Revenue and cost of revenue by line; installed annual manufacturing capacity by site; supporting infrastructure including Cortex compute; production, deliveries and storage deployed; Supercharger network; free cash flow Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Furnished
Tesla Form 8-K cover Read for one purpose only: the Item 2.02 language stating that the information in the exhibit shall not be deemed “filed” for Section 18 purposes. This is the document that defines the Furnished rung used throughout this page. Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Filed
Tesla Form 8-K
29 September 2026, Items 1.01, 1.02 and 2.03
The three senior unsecured credit agreements dated 29 September 2026 and the termination of the 20 January 2023 revolving credit agreement: facility sizes, administrative agents, maturities and extension options; the delayed-draw step-downs and the ten-draw limit; the $500 million letter-of-credit sublimit; the permitted currencies; the $4.0 billion incremental revolving capacity; the Term SOFR, SONIA and adjusted EURIBOR bases and the rating-based margin, commitment fee and ticking fee; the $5.0 billion consolidated-liquidity covenant; and the statements that no loans were outstanding at 29 September 2026 and that Tesla does not currently plan to draw in 2026. This is the 8-K body, not an exhibit to itit carries no Item 2.02, is signed by the Chief Financial Officer, and is filed rather than furnished, which is why it sits on the same rung as the periodic reports. The credit agreements are not attached and are to be filed with the Form 10-Q for the quarter ending 30 September 2026. Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Filed
SpaceX Q2 2026 earnings call transcript
4 August 2026
Superseded as a source on 28 September 2026 and retained rather than removed. It was read for one thing only: the reference to an agreement with Googleand for seven weeks it was the sole basis for that row, on the Reported rung, because the Institute believed no filed document named Google as a customer. One did, and had since June; the Google row now rests on the Form FWP above and carries Filed. One discrepancy survives the change and is left visible rather than reconciled away: the call described the term as 32 months, and the FWP's own endpoints, October 2026 through June 2029, are 33 months inclusive. The filed endpoints govern. The Institute does not close the arithmetic into a contract value, because the reduced-fee ramp months are not quantified in the FWP and a total struck without them would be a number this page invented. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Reported
SpaceX remarks, Goldman Sachs Communacopia and Technology Conference
10 September 2026
The sole basis for two items added on 10 September 2026: chief financial officer Bret Johnsen's statement that a hosting agreement closed earlier in the month will generate approximately $1.11 billion of revenue per month from 1 December 2026, and his statement that annualising the December figure puts the company “on track to hit $100 billion of ARR.” A named executive on the record at a sell-side conference is a real source and an attributable one. It is not a document filed under signature, it names no counterparty and it states no contract term, which is why both items sit on the Reported rung and neither feeds a calculation on this page beyond the arithmetic explicitly labelled as the Institute's. A Rule 433 free writing prospectus by the same officer was located and checked, and it is the wrong vintageit records a June 2026 interview from the listing period and says nothing about the December agreement. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Reported
Cybercab Austin deployment coverage and Texas registration records
3–4 September 2026
The sole basis for the four Reported rows opening the robotaxi table in section 6: the 3 September launch event and the 4 September opening of public rides; the two-seat configuration with no steering wheel, pedals or mirrors; the 45 Cybercabs on the Texas registration record against a federal audit reported to cover roughly 1,000; the self-certification of FMVSS compliance in place of a 49 CFR Part 555 exemption petition; and the audit opened within hours. Tesla has furnished no document about this deployment as at this editorial close, and none of these figures feeds any calculation on this page. Tesla, Inc. / 0001318605 Reported
FCC DA 26-1078
Authorization and Order
adopted and released 6 October 2026
GN Docket No. 25-340; ICFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20250916-00282 and SAT-AMD-20251125-00339; Call Sign S00735. The sole basis for the FCC authorisation table in section 5: the disposition line, the 15,000-satellite nine-shell constellation and its altitudes and inclinations, the nature and scope of service, condition 3's bar on commencing 2 GHz MSS/AWS-4, AWS-H and AWS-3 operations until Step Two of the SpaceX–EchoStar transaction is consummated, condition 4's interim testing consent, the Ka, V, E and W backhaul grants and the W-band and 18.6–18.8 GHz waivers, the deferral of the out-of-country 1429–2690 MHz request, and the petitions to deny. Read from the Commission's own published text, not from coverage of it. A federal agency order is not an SEC filing, so it is carried one rung low rather than promoted; the full identifier is printed in every row it supports. Federal Communications Commission / no CIK Reported
FCC news release DOC-417881A1
on DA 26-36
9 January 2026
Read for one purpose only: to establish that the 15,000-satellite total cited for the Gen2 Starlink constellation is a different authorisation from the 15,000-satellite direct-to-device constellation granted on 6 October 2026. Supports the second paragraph of the note beneath the FCC table and no figure elsewhere. Federal Communications Commission / no CIK Reported
SpaceX company update
8 October 2026
Supports the 800 MHz rows in section 5 that describe the portfolio and the architecture: up to 14 MHz of paired nationwide low band, the pairing of the satellite-to-mobile constellation with a terrestrial deployment, the 2 GHz mid-band capacity layer and the low-band coverage layer, the statement that most existing handsets already support the band, and the company's own characterisation of the week's Commission action. Names no counterparty and states no price. A company statement on its own website is not a filing and not an 8-K exhibit; it feeds no calculation on this page. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. / 0001181412 Reported
Grain Management press release
Washington, D.C.
8 October 2026
The only source naming the counterparty and the shape of the transaction: SpaceX to acquire 100% of Grain's nationwide 800 MHz portfolio, subject to FCC approval and customary closing conditions; Grain's own acquisition of that portfolio from T-Mobile completed 11 August 2026 for cash plus Grain's 600 MHz spectrum; the asserted link to the Commission's July 2026 order approving that acquisition; and the sell-side advisers. States no price. The July 2026 order referred to in this release was not read and no figure is taken from it. Grain Management, LLC / no CIK Reported
Schedule 13G/A Existence, date (17 June 2026), filer and subject only. Contents not read; no figure taken from it. Musk Elon / 0001494730 Not read
Schedule 13G/A
Amendment No. 1
signed 16 November 2026
Supports the 17 November 2026 addition to the Valor Equity Partners row: 457,614,684 Class A shares beneficially owned, 5.5% of the class, shared voting and dispositive power only, and the 452,294,169 held of record by the Valor Entities. Read in the primary document; the four holder components foot to the total. Gracias Antonio J. / subject Space Exploration Technologies Corp. 0001181412 Filed

These are the primary documents themselves, not a summary of them: every Filed and Furnished figure on this page was read in the document linked above and nowhere else. The Musk Schedule 13G/A row is the exception that proves the rule: its existence is filed, its contents were not read, and so no figure anywhere on this page derives from it.

One limitation of method, disclosed, and narrowed this revision. The retrieval tooling available to the Institute truncates very long documents at roughly 110,000 characters. A Form 10-Q exceeds that comfortably, and for most of this page's life that meant both 10-Qs were read through the financial statements and partway into the notes, but not to the end. The consequence was a rule we held to strictly: this page never asserted that a 10-Q omitted something, because a disclosure we could not locate might simply sit past where we stopped reading. Where that happened, the page said the Institute did not reach it: a claim about our reading, not about the filing.

That limitation now applies to one of the two registrants rather than both. The SpaceX Form 10-Q has been read end to end from the complete document, all 150 pages and 440,810 characters, outside the truncating path. Statements on this page that a figure is Not disclosed by SpaceX are therefore findings about the filing: the document was searched in its entirety and the term does not appear. Tesla's position is unchangedits interim report was read partway, and its annual tax and properties disclosures have not been reached at all, which is why the tax table above says “not retrieved” in the Tesla column and “not disclosed” in the SpaceX one. Those are two different statements and this page will keep them apart. Conflating them cost us a published error once already, and the method note is here so it does not cost us a second one.

Refresh cadence

The page is called Elon Daily, so EDGAR is scanned daily. An automated sweep runs every morning against the two registrants' filing histories and against the filing calendar. It is worth being precise about what that means, because a daily scan is not a daily rewrite: most mornings the correct outcome is that nothing on this page changes, and the sweep is built so that a run which changes nothing is a successful run. What runs daily is the check. What changes is the page, and only when a new primary document exists to change it.

This page is a living reference and updates on the filing calendar, not on the news cycle. Both SpaceX and Tesla are calendar-year filers, which means quarterly reports land in the weeks after 31 March, 30 June and 30 September, and an annual report after 31 December. Between those dates the page changes only when a Form 8-K, a Schedule 13D/G amendment, or a registration statement introduces a new filed figure. A story about one of these companies that is not accompanied by a filing does not move a number on this page; it may, if it is well-sourced, add a line tagged Reported.

What would change this page most. Three events, in order of impact: a SpaceX Form 10-K, which would bring an audit opinion and full-year segment data to figures that are currently unaudited interim; a prospectus-level read of the risk factors, which would let the Customer A concentration be attributed rather than merely measured; and any registration event at Neuralink or Boring, which would take this portfolio from two-thirds observable to fully observable for the first time.

Editorial positioning: explicit reframe

This is a provenance-tagged reference page, not a valuation call. It records what six Musk-controlled businesses have disclosed, and what rung of disclosure each figure sits on. It is not investment advice, is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security, is not tax advice, and is not a forecast. Where a figure is absent, the page leaves the cell empty rather than filling it from an estimate. Where the Institute did not read far enough into a document to locate a disclosure, the page says so in those words rather than asserting the disclosure is absent. “Not in the part of the document the Institute read” and “not disclosed” are different claims, and only the first is ours to make.

Educational references and tools, not legal, tax, accounting, or investment advice, and not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Consult a qualified professional about your specific situation. © 2026 The Baratelli Institute.