Oil is not a global market in the way a wire transfer is global. It has to physically move, and it moves through eight places narrow enough to be closed.
A world oil price implies a world market, and a world market implies that a barrel in one place can substitute for a barrel in another. It can — but only after a voyage, and a small number of passages carry a disproportionate share of those voyages. This ledger prints the flow through each of the eight, six years of history for each, and each one's share of world maritime oil trade.
The dataset is the authoritative public one on the subject and it is a year behind the market it describes. That is stated at the top of this page rather than at the bottom, because it changes what the table can be used for: these are measurements of what is at stake in each passage, not readings of what is moving through it today.
The page closes with the industry's own forecast of when normal flows would resume, taken in April 2026, which can now be checked against the outcome. It was wrong, and the way in which it was wrong explains a rig count that has not moved.
Prepared by The Baratelli Institute · publication date September 10, 2026. Every figure below carries its own measurement date, which is set by whoever measured it and is often older than this page.
Crude, condensate and refined products combined. The final column is the Institute's computation against a maritime-trade denominator of 79.8 million barrels a day on the same clock.
| Passage | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 1H 2025 | 1H 2025 as a share of maritime oil trade | What the passage is |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Malacca | 22.8 | 22.1 | 23.0 | 24.0 | 22.5 | 23.2 | 29.1% | The largest by volume and the least discussed. Links the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea; the practical alternatives add days and cost. |
| Strait of Hormuz | 19.2 | 19.7 | 21.9 | 21.8 | 20.7 | 20.9 | 26.2% | About a fifth of global liquids consumption and a quarter of all maritime traded oil. Also 11.4 billion cubic feet a day of LNG, more than a fifth of global trade in it. |
| Cape of Good Hope | 7.9 | 7.2 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 9.3 | 9.1 | 11.4% | Not a chokepoint but a bypass, and the only one on this table whose volume rises when the others are threatened. The 2024 jump is Red Sea diversion, visible in the data. |
| Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline | 5.4 | 5.2 | 7.3 | 8.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 6.1% | Halved between 2023 and 2024. Closure adds roughly fifteen days to an Arabian Sea-to-Europe voyage. |
| Bab el-Mandeb | 5.7 | 6.0 | 8.0 | 9.3 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 5.3% | Fell by more than half over the same period and for the same reason. Bab el-Mandeb and Suez are two gates on one route, so they move together. |
| Danish Straits | 3.1 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 6.1% | The route out of the Baltic, and therefore the route Russian crude takes to sea. |
| Turkish Straits | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.6% | The Bosporus and Dardanelles, carrying Black Sea crude. The only passage on this table that has risen every year. |
| Panama Canal | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.9% | The smallest of the eight for oil, and the one constrained by fresh water rather than by conflict. |
Source: EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products. Newest data covers first half of 2025. The share column divides each passage's first-half-2025 flow by world maritime oil trade for the same period, so numerator and denominator sit on one clock.
| Denominator or context figure | Figure | Measured | Source | What it carries |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| World maritime oil trade | 79.8 mb/d | first half of 2025 | EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products | The denominator for every share on this page. |
| World total oil supply | 104.4 mb/d | first half of 2025 | EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products | Note this is a first-half-2025 figure and is higher than the July 2026 supply figure of 101.5 mb/d carried elsewhere on this reference. Two clocks, and the gap between them is the disruption. |
| Hormuz crude going to Asia | 89% of Hormuz crude flows | first half of 2025 | EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products | Hormuz is overwhelmingly an Asian supply line. European and American exposure to it is a price exposure, not a barrel exposure. |
The shares in the final column sum to well over 100 per cent, and a reader who adds them has produced a meaningless number. There are three distinct reasons, and each one on its own is sufficient.
Some barrels pass through more than one gate. Suez and Bab el-Mandeb are two ends of a single route. A cargo going from the Arabian Sea to Europe transits both and is counted in both rows, which is why the two lines move together and why they collapsed together.
One row is not a chokepoint at all. The Cape of Good Hope is a bypass — open ocean around the southern tip of Africa. It is on the table because its volume is the measurement of how much traffic has been driven off the short routes, and it is the only line here whose volume rises when the others are threatened. Adding it to the others adds the escape route to the traps.
The denominator is trade, not supply. World maritime oil trade of 79.8 million barrels a day is smaller than world total supply of 104.4, because a great deal of oil never goes to sea: it is consumed near where it is produced, or moves by pipeline. A passage share computed against supply is a smaller and different number from one computed against maritime trade, and mixing the two is a common way to overstate or understate an exposure by a third.
Most datasets require an argument to connect a cause to an effect. This one shows the connection in three rows. Between 2023 and 2024, Suez and SUMED flows fell from 8.8 to 4.8 million barrels a day, a fall of 45.5%. Bab el-Mandeb fell from 9.3 to 4.1, a fall of 55.9%. Over the same year the Cape of Good Hope rose from 6.2 to 9.3, a rise of 50.0%.
Barrels did not disappear; they went the long way round. The volume that left the Red Sea route and the volume that appeared at the Cape are of the same order, which is what a diversion looks like in a flow table. The cost of that diversion is not in this dataset and is real: roughly fifteen extra days on an Arabian Sea-to-Europe voyage, which ties up tankers, raises freight rates, and puts more oil on water and less in tanks.
That last effect connects this page to the inventory numbers. Oil in transit is inventory, and lengthening every voyage increases the volume of oil at sea without a single extra barrel being produced. When observed global stocks fell through 2026 and most of the July decline was in oil on water rather than on land, the routing is part of what that measures. The inventories ledger carries the stock figures; this page carries the reason a barrel can be simultaneously produced, sold and nowhere useful.
The Strait of Hormuz carried 20.9 million barrels a day in first half of 2025. Against world maritime oil trade that is 26.2%; against world total oil supply it is 20.0%. Both figures are correct and they are answers to different questions. The first is the share of seaborne trade at risk; the second is the share of everything the world produces. Quoting one while describing the other is how a strait becomes either an existential threat or a rounding error, depending on which argument is being made.
The Strait of Malacca is larger and is discussed less. It carried 23.2 million barrels a day, or 29.1% of maritime oil trade — more than Hormuz on the same clock. It attracts less attention because the political risk attached to it is lower, not because the volume is, and a reader building a risk map from headline frequency will get the volumes backwards.
One further proportion changes who is exposed. About 89 per cent of the crude leaving Hormuz goes to Asia. European and American exposure to a Hormuz closure is therefore overwhelmingly a price exposure transmitted through a global market, not a barrel exposure — those cargoes were not going there anyway. The distinction matters for policy: a strategic reserve release addresses a barrel shortage, and it addresses a price shock only weakly and briefly.
| Bypass route | Figure | Measured | Source | What it carries |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi East-West pipeline plus UAE Abu Dhabi crude pipeline | about 4.7 mb/d of combined bypass capacity | as assessed March 3, 2026 | EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products | Against Hormuz flows of roughly 20.9 mb/d, existing bypass covers under a quarter. |
| United Arab Emirates planned expansion | a further 1.5 mb/d by 2027 | plan stated as of March 3, 2026 | EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products | A plan, not a capacity. Carried as a plan. |
| Iran, Goreh-Jask pipeline | about 0.3 mb/d effective | as assessed March 3, 2026 | EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, last updated March 3, 2026; volumes are total oil flows including crude, condensate and refined products | Nameplate capacity is higher than effective throughput. |
Every figure here is a capacity or a plan as assessed on the source's March 3, 2026 update, not a flow. A pipeline's nameplate and its sustained throughput are different numbers, and where the source distinguishes them the effective figure is the one carried.
Existing bypass capacity of about 4.7 million barrels a day covers 22.5% of the 20.9 million that actually moves through the strait. That is the whole arithmetic of the bypass question, and it is why the phrase “alternative routes exist” is true and nearly useless. Routes exist for under a quarter of the volume.
The planned expansion is carried as a plan. A further 1.5 million barrels a day by 2027 would raise coverage materially, and a plan stated in March 2026 is not capacity in September 2026. This reference does not add announced capacity to installed capacity in a single column, on the same principle that keeps announced production adjustments separate from measured production on the quota ledger.
Responses collected responses collected April 15–20, 2026. This is the rare case where a reference can print a forecast and its outcome on the same page.
| Question put to the firms | Response | Share of respondents |
|---|---|---|
| When will flows through the Strait of Hormuz return to normal? | By May 2026 | 20% |
| When will flows through the Strait of Hormuz return to normal? | By August 2026 | 39% |
| When will flows through the Strait of Hormuz return to normal? | By November 2026 | 26% |
| When will flows through the Strait of Hormuz return to normal? | Later than November 2026 | 14% |
| How likely is another disruption of Hormuz within five years? | Very likely | 48% |
| How likely is another disruption of Hormuz within five years? | Somewhat likely | 38% |
| How likely is another disruption of Hormuz within five years? | Unlikely | 14% |
| How much have Persian Gulf shipping costs risen per barrel since the conflict began? | More than $2 but not more than $4 (modal response) | 36% |
| How much will United States production rise in 2026 in response? | More than 0 but not more than 0.25 mb/d (modal response) | 43% |
| How much will United States production rise in 2027 in response? | More than 0.25 but not more than 0.50 mb/d (modal response) | 32% |
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas Fed Energy Survey special questions, published April 23, 2026; responses collected April 15–20, 2026 from 120 firms (78 exploration and production, 42 oilfield services). Shares are of responding firms and are rounded by the publisher; the modal-response rows carry the share attaching to the modal band only, not to the whole distribution.
About two thirds of respondents expected at least 90 per cent of shut-in production to return eventually. Eventually is doing a great deal of work in that sentence, and the survey did not ask when.
Read the two answers together. Thirty-nine per cent of firms expected Hormuz flows normal by August 2026, and this reference is published in September 2026 with 8.3 million barrels a day still shut in. The industry's own median expectation, taken in April, was wrong. And the same firms put a 48 per cent probability on 'very likely' for a repeat within five years — so the people closest to the asset expected a quick resolution and a recurring problem at the same time. That combination is what produces a rig count that does not move: nobody underwrites a decade of drilling against a price they expect to be temporary and a risk they expect to return.
The modal answer — 39% of firms — was that Hormuz flows would be normal by August 2026. August 2026 can now be graded on its own clock: the EIA measured 6.72 million barrels a day of Gulf production shut in that month, up from 4.98 in July, and the IEA's wider read on July was 8.3. Whichever of the two is used, flows were not normal and were not improving. The people closest to the asset, answering in April, got it wrong, and the Institute prints the miss rather than quietly dropping the survey.
The same firms put 48% on “very likely” for another Hormuz disruption within five years. Hold those two answers together and the investment behaviour follows: a quick resolution expected, and a recurring problem expected. Nobody underwrites a decade of drilling against a price they think is temporary and a risk they think is permanent. That is the mechanism behind the unmoved rig count on the rig ledger, and it is a better explanation than capital discipline as a matter of corporate temperament.
This is the authoritative dataset on the subject and it is twelve months behind the market it describes. EIA last updated the chokepoints analysis on March 3, 2026 and its newest data covers the first half of 2025 — before the disruption that has driven every price on this reference. So the flow figures below describe how much oil moved through each passage in a normal period, not how much is moving now. That is still the most useful thing a reader can have, because it measures what is at stake in each passage. It is not a current reading, and nothing on this page pretends it is.
The authoritative dataset on the world's oil chokepoints is a year behind the largest chokepoint disruption in two decades. That is not a criticism of the publisher, whose update cadence is what it is. It is a fact a reader has to hold while reading the table: every flow figure here describes a normal period, and the value of a normal-period figure is that it measures the exposure rather than the event.
Used correctly, a stale flow table is the right instrument. The question “how much oil is moving through Hormuz this week” cannot be answered from this dataset and should not be. The question “how much is at stake in Hormuz” is answered precisely, and it is the question that matters for anyone sizing a risk rather than trading a headline.
The two-clock discipline is what makes the page usable at all. A page that presented these figures as current readings would be wrong in September 2026 in a way no reader could detect. A page that dates them is correct and remains correct, which is the whole argument for dating every figure on this reference rather than dating only the page.
Prices, the supply and demand balance, refining, the two-clock rule and the plain-English glossary that serves all 13 ledgers.
Back to the hub →LedgerWhere every cent of a $4.48 gallon goes — crude, refining, distribution and tax — with each of the four components on its own clock and three of the four defined differently from how a reader assumes.
Open the ledger →LedgerSeventy-six years of crude prices deflated to constant July 2026 dollars. The 2008 records are still records in real terms and today's are not close.
Open the ledger →LedgerOne central bank, one date, one fixing time. A dollar barrel converted into 29 currencies without mixing thirty sources and thirty clocks.
Open the ledger →LedgerWhat the shape of the curve does to inventory and why it drives storage behaviour rather than describing it — then the full strip: 63 listed WTI months from the exchange's own Daily Bulletin, $96.05 front against $72.60 a year out, $23.45 of backwardation, open interest printed beside every settlement.
Open the ledger →LedgerTwo entirely different questions that share one word. The price a well needs and the price a treasury needs, kept rigorously apart — with the gaps in each named.
Open the ledger →LedgerAll 41 countries the OPEC bulletin itemises, ranked, with share of world total and reserve life computed two ways. Venezuela first at 303.701 billion barrels; the United States ninth with a reserve life of 8.4 years.
Open the ledger →LedgerEvery OPEC+ member's output for July 2026 against its implied target and its sustainable capacity. Effective spare capacity is 1.09 mb/d, or 1.07% of a 101.5 mb/d market.
Open the ledger →LedgerThe seven countries that hold the voluntary cuts — not eight, and not the full membership — their August and September 2026 decisions, and why quota discipline is currently the wrong lens.
Open the ledger →Ledger588 rigs turning in the United States, 449 drilling for oil, 1,907 worldwide. A forty per cent move in price has produced a 1.4 per cent move in the American count.
Open the ledger →LedgerCapacity measured on two clocks five months apart, crack spreads computed from same-week legs in both units the market quotes, and the one undated figure on this reference, labelled as such.
Open the ledger →LedgerDiesel at $5.967 a gallon, a nominal record and not a real one. Why distillate is tighter than gasoline, and why distillate fuel oil is not diesel.
Open the ledger →LedgerCommercial crude one per cent above its five-year average in the same week the Strategic Petroleum Reserve reads 39.3% of capacity and its lowest since November 1982. The two facts are causally linked.
Open the ledger →Provenance. Reserve figures are transcribed from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin; production, spare-capacity, stock and refining figures from the International Energy Agency Oil Market Report; United States production, refinery capacity and inventory figures from the Energy Information Administration; rig counts from the Baker Hughes North America and Worldwide rig counts; benchmark prices from published daily quotes. Each row names its source and the date the figure was measured. Where a figure was not published, or where a published series does not itemise a country, the cell reads n/d rather than carrying a fabricated estimate. Derived quantities — reserve life, shares of world total, capacity utilisation, spare capacity as a share of supply — are computed from the figures shown and are not separately sourced; they inherit the measurement dates of their inputs, and where the two inputs run on different clocks the page says so. The Baratelli Institute is a publisher operating under the Lowe v. SEC publisher exception. Nothing here is investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security or commodity. Figures change; verify against the primary source before relying on any of them.