One hundred fifty-seven years of American packaged foods — H.J. Heinz, Kraft Foods, the 3G+Berkshire structure, and the CPG turnaround — on one filterable page.
The Kraft Heinz Company (NASDAQ: KHC) is the packaged-foods champion formed in July 2015 by the merger of two independently-storied American companies. H.J. Heinz traces to Henry John Heinz's 1869 Sharpsburg, Pennsylvania horseradish operation, later reorganized as H.J. Heinz Company in 1888 and famed for the 1876 tomato ketchup and the "57 Varieties" slogan. Kraft Foods traces to James L. Kraft's 1903 Chicago wholesale cheese business, later acquired by Philip Morris in 1988, expanded via General Foods and the 2000 Nabisco deal, spun off in 2007, split from Mondelez International in 2012, and merged with the 3G+Berkshire-owned Heinz in July 2015 for combined value of approximately $46B. This page catalogs the material record from the 1869 Heinz founding and 1903 Kraft founding through today — including the transformative 2013 3G Capital + Berkshire Hathaway take-private of Heinz (~$28B), the July 2015 Heinz-Kraft merger, the February 2017 hostile Unilever bid (~$143B, withdrawn within 48 hours), the February 2019 $15.4B goodwill and brand impairment (the public reckoning of the 3G operating model), the 2020 Planters divestiture to Hormel (~$3.35B) and Natural Cheese divestiture to Lactalis (~$3.2B), and the ongoing turnaround under Miguel Patricio and Carlos Abrams-Rivera. This page is the natural companion to the Institute's Berkshire Portfolio Ledger (where KHC is the ~26.7% Berkshire position at ~325M shares) and the AB InBev acquisition record (3G's other and older empire). It is intentionally a living reference: as new deals close, divestitures are announced, or brand transitions occur, the row is added, the roll-ups reflow, and the sitemap timestamp bumps. Nothing here is investment advice. Everything here is a fact-checkable practitioner reference for a very specific question — what does one hundred fifty-seven years of American packaged-foods rollup, followed by a private-equity operating template applied at public scale, actually look like in list form?
Kraft Heinz is the singular case study of dual American CPG parentage forcibly combined by a private-equity operating template. The Heinz side (1869-2013) is a straightforward multi-generational packaged-foods rollup — ketchup, sauces, frozen potatoes, tuna, weight-management, UK sauces, Chinese and Brazilian condiments — punctuated by the 2002 Del Monte spinoff. The Kraft side (1903-2015) is a more complex tobacco-conglomerate parentage story — Philip Morris ownership 1988-2007, the ~$18.9B Nabisco absorption in 2000, the contested Cadbury takeover in 2010, and the 2012 split into Kraft Foods Group (North American grocery) and Mondelez International (global snacks). The July 2015 merger by 3G Capital and Berkshire Hathaway put both sides under one roof at approximately $46B combined equity value.
The 2015 merger mechanics matter for reading everything that follows. Berkshire and 3G had jointly taken Heinz private in 2013 for approximately $28B ($72.50/share) — Berkshire contributed roughly $12.25B (approximately $4.4B common equity plus $8B 9%-yield preferred), 3G contributed roughly $4.4B in common. In the 2015 combination, Kraft Foods Group shareholders received approximately 49% of the combined company plus a $10B special dividend ($16.50/share); Berkshire+3G Heinz shareholders received approximately 51%. Bernardo Hees (from 3G's Burger King operating team) became CEO; Alexandre Behring (3G) chaired the board. Berkshire's preferred was redeemed for approximately $8.32B in June 2016. Since 2015 the 3G stake has been substantially exited via 2021 and 2023 public sales, while Berkshire has held its ~26.7% common position through the entire arc.
The February 2019 $15.4B writedown was the public reckoning of the 3G operating model at CPG scale. Zero-based budgeting, aggressive cost reduction, and marketing-spend restraint had worked brilliantly at AB InBev and Burger King, where scale economics and price-taking dynamics rewarded operating discipline. Applied to a portfolio of American grocery brands where consumer trust and marketing continuity are the primary durable moats, the same template accelerated the erosion of the underlying brand equity. The February 2019 disclosure combined a $15.4B non-cash goodwill/brand writedown, a dividend cut from $0.625 to $0.40 quarterly, an SEC subpoena into procurement accounting, and the CFO's resignation. Buffett acknowledged at the 2019 annual meeting that Berkshire had "paid too much" for Kraft. The stock fell approximately 27% on the announcement.
The current turnaround era (Patricio 2019-2023, Abrams-Rivera 2023-) is the deliberate reversal. Miguel Patricio, brought in from AB InBev's brand-management tradition rather than 3G's cost-cutting tradition, restored marketing investment, executed the portfolio-pruning divestitures (Planters to Hormel ~$3.35B, Natural Cheese to Lactalis ~$3.2B, others), acquired Primal Kitchen (2018, under earlier leadership), Assan Foods (2021), and majority-then-full Just Spices (2021-2023), and set the "brand health" scorecard as the primary internal metric. Carlos Abrams-Rivera succeeded Patricio in January 2024. The forward posture is disciplined organic growth in Heinz, Kraft, Philadelphia, Oscar Mayer, Lunchables, and international expansion — explicitly not the roll-up ambition of the 2017 Unilever era.
Five strategic observations across one hundred fifty-seven years of packaged-foods rollup and the eleven years of the 3G+Berkshire structural experiment.
(a) The Berkshire + 3G structural partnership is the origin event. The February 2013 take-private of H.J. Heinz Company was executed jointly by 3G Capital (contributing operating discipline via Bernardo Hees, Alexandre Behring, and the Burger King operating team) and Berkshire Hathaway (contributing approximately $12.25B of capital, of which roughly $8B was in a 9%-dividend preferred and roughly $4.4B in common). Berkshire's preferred was structurally the more consequential piece: at 9% coupon, Heinz was paying Berkshire approximately $720M annually until the preferred was redeemed at a premium in June 2016 (~$8.32B). Berkshire has never traded Heinz or Kraft Heinz on a control basis — 3G supplied all operating leadership through 2019, when Miguel Patricio was recruited from AB InBev. This is the closest Berkshire has ever come to a joint-venture structural partnership with a private-equity operating group.
(b) Zero-based budgeting and its consequences. The 3G operating template — brought to Heinz in 2013 and then to combined Kraft Heinz in 2015 — is built on zero-based budgeting (every dollar of expense re-justified annually from zero rather than incrementally against prior year), aggressive plant consolidation, dramatic marketing-spend reductions, and headcount rationalization. Applied to the AB InBev beer combination and the Burger King restaurant network, the template produced multi-year margin expansion and shareholder-value creation that made 3G the most-emulated operating platform in global consumer. Applied to the packaged-foods portfolio, the same template compressed marketing investment behind brands like Kraft Mac & Cheese, Oscar Mayer, Philadelphia, and Maxwell House at the exact moment when Amazon-enabled private label, Aldi-Lidl hard-discount expansion, and health-and-wellness consumer preference shifts were accelerating category disruption. The 2019 writedown was the accounting recognition of the resulting brand-equity erosion.
(c) The Unilever bid of February 2017: forty-eight hours in packaged foods history. On February 17, 2017, Kraft Heinz publicly disclosed a $50-per-share, approximately $143B unsolicited offer for Unilever PLC. The proposal — roughly an 18% premium to Unilever's Feb 16 close — would have created a combined entity with approximately $85B of revenue and the largest single M&A transaction in consumer-packaged-goods history. Unilever's board rejected the bid the same day, characterizing it as "fundamentally undervalu[ing] Unilever" and inconsistent with Unilever's sustainability-focused Compass strategy. Within hours the UK and Dutch governments publicly signaled opposition (Unilever employed approximately 168,000 people, materially in both home markets). Kraft Heinz withdrew the offer on February 19, forty-eight hours after announcement, "in the best interests of both companies." The episode remains the clearest institutional-scale limit encountered by the 3G roll-up thesis in consumer packaged goods.
(d) The February 2019 writedown as inflection point. The $15.4B goodwill and brand impairment disclosed February 21, 2019 is the single most-cited event in the Kraft Heinz record. Directly it wrote down the carrying value of the Kraft and Oscar Mayer brand intangibles by approximately $7B and $8B respectively. Simultaneously the quarterly dividend was cut from $0.625 to $0.40 (a 36% reduction), an SEC subpoena into the company's procurement accounting was disclosed, the CFO David Knopf resigned within weeks, and certain 2016-2018 financials were subsequently restated. The stock closed down approximately 27% the following trading day. Warren Buffett's May 2019 acknowledgment that Berkshire had "paid too much" for Kraft in 2015 — and his subsequent detailed defense of the underlying business at the 2019 shareholder meeting — ended a five-year period during which the 3G template had been widely emulated across US consumer. Post-2019, the 3G approach lost its role as the dominant consumer-operating template.
(e) Portfolio pruning 2020-2024 and the current era. Under Miguel Patricio (CEO 2019-2023) and Carlos Abrams-Rivera (CEO from January 2024), Kraft Heinz executed a disciplined portfolio-pruning program: the June 2020 sale of Planters, Corn Nuts, and Cheez Balls to Hormel Foods for approximately $3.35B; the September 2020 sale of the Natural Cheese business (Kraft-branded shredded/chunk cheese, Breakstone's, Cracker Barrel US, Polly-O, Athenos) to Groupe Lactalis for approximately $3.2B; smaller divestitures of the Baby Nurser business, certain low-margin non-strategic brands, and various international operations. Selective acquisitions filled the strategic gaps: Primal Kitchen in 2018 (~$200M), Assan Foods in Turkey in 2021 (~$100M), and the majority-then-full Just Spices acquisition in Germany (2021 minority, 2023 majority). Cumulative 2020-2024 divestitures raised approximately $7B+ against approximately $600M+ of bolt-on acquisitions — a net cash-generative posture that funded dividend support and debt reduction.
Every material acquisition, divestiture, and brand transition across H.J. Heinz Company (1869-2013), Kraft Foods (1903-2015), and the merged Kraft Heinz Company (2015-present), anchored by the 2013 3G+Berkshire Heinz take-private (~$28B), the July 2015 Heinz-Kraft merger (~$46B combined value), the February 2017 Unilever bid (~$143B, withdrawn within 48 hours), the February 2019 $15.4B goodwill and brand impairment, the 2020 Planters divestiture to Hormel (~$3.35B), and the 2020 Natural Cheese divestiture to Groupe Lactalis (~$3.2B). Sortable by year, sector, deal size, structure, and portfolio-retention pattern. Search by target or brand (Heinz, Kraft, Ore-Ida, Star-Kist, Weight Watchers, Nabisco, Cadbury, Oscar Mayer, Philadelphia, Planters, Primal Kitchen, Just Spices, Assan Foods, Maxwell House, Grey Poupon, Cracker Barrel cheese, Velveeta, Lunchables, HP Foods, Foodstar, Coniexpress, Kool-Aid, Jell-O). This is a living dataset — updated whenever Kraft Heinz closes a material deal, executes a divestiture, or announces a portfolio adjustment.
| Year | Target / Divestiture | Sector | Deal Type | Approx. Consideration | Retained | Practitioner Note | Status |
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Roll-ups reflect the material events cataloged in the table above. Dollar totals are directional and reflect only the subset of transactions where consideration was publicly disclosed. Structural events (the 2015 merger, 2017 Unilever withdrawn bid, 2019 writedown) contribute proportionally to the era in which they occurred. The 2015 Heinz-Kraft merger (~$46B combined value), the 2013 Heinz take-private (~$28B), the 2010 Cadbury acquisition (~$19.5B on the Kraft side), the 2000 Nabisco absorption (~$18.9B on the Kraft side), and the 1988 Philip Morris acquisition of Kraft (~$12.9B) anchor the dollar rollups.
The 2013-present 3G+Berkshire era anchors the total on the strength of the 2013 Heinz take-private, the 2015 Kraft Heinz merger, and the 2020-2024 divestiture proceeds. The 1980s-1990s era captures the Philip Morris-driven Kraft rollup (1988 Kraft acquisition, 1989 General Foods consolidation). The 2000s captures Nabisco (2000) and Cadbury (2010) on the Kraft side. Bar length is proportional within this table only.
Whole-company acquisitions are the backbone of the pre-2013 record. The 2013 Heinz take-private and 2015 Kraft-Heinz merger are the largest single-structure entries. Divestitures cluster in 2019-2024 as the post-writedown portfolio-pruning program is executed — the structural signature of the Miguel Patricio and Carlos Abrams-Rivera turnaround era.
Condiments & Sauces (Heinz ketchup, Grey Poupon, HP, Lea & Perrins) and Cheese & Dairy (Kraft cheese, Philadelphia, Velveeta, Natural Cheese divested) anchor the record. Meats & Cold Cuts (Oscar Mayer, Lunchables) and Grocery & Center-Store (Mac & Cheese, Miracle Whip) are the other major clusters. International events cluster in the 2005-2011 Heinz expansion and the 2021-2023 Assan / Just Spices era.
Roughly 55-65% of cataloged material events remain inside the current Kraft Heinz portfolio. The remainder are pre-merger divestitures (2000 Star-Kist, 2002 Del Monte spinoff, 2012 Mondelez split) or post-2019 portfolio-pruning divestitures (Planters, Natural Cheese, Baby Nurser). The structural signature: a rollup portfolio that has been actively pruned rather than passively held.
On February 21, 2019, Kraft Heinz disclosed a non-cash impairment charge of approximately $15.4B against goodwill and intangible-brand values, primarily writing down the Kraft brand by approximately $7B and the Oscar Mayer brand by approximately $8B. Simultaneously the company announced a quarterly dividend cut from $0.625 to $0.40 (36% reduction), disclosed an SEC subpoena into procurement accounting practices, and reported that the audit committee's investigation into supplier-contract accounting had led to restatement of certain 2016-2018 financials. CFO David Knopf resigned within weeks. The stock closed down approximately 27% the following trading day — the largest single-day decline in the company's post-merger history.
The direct read is straightforward: the 3G operating template — zero-based budgeting, aggressive plant consolidation, marketing-spend restraint, and headcount rationalization — had structurally compressed the brand-equity investment behind Kraft, Oscar Mayer, and the wider portfolio at the moment when Amazon-enabled private label, Aldi and Lidl hard-discount expansion, and health-and-wellness consumer preference shifts were accelerating category disruption. The 2019 writedown was the accounting recognition of what had already occurred operationally. Warren Buffett acknowledged at the May 2019 Berkshire annual meeting that Berkshire had "paid too much" for Kraft in 2015, while defending the underlying business quality.
Practitioner reading: The 2019 writedown is a Rosetta-Stone case study in the interaction between financial-operating discipline and brand equity in mass-market CPG. Zero-based budgeting rewards short-term operating leverage; brand equity accretes over long-arc marketing continuity. When the two are placed in tension, the accounting statement lags the brand-health erosion by two to three years. The recovery under Miguel Patricio (2019-2023) and Carlos Abrams-Rivera (2024-) has been explicitly framed as a re-investment in brand-health metrics as the primary operating scorecard — a reversal of the 2015-2018 direction.
The Kraft Heinz shareholder register is the residue of a specific 2013 structural transaction. In February 2013, Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital jointly acquired H.J. Heinz Company for approximately $28B ($72.50/share, ~20% premium). Berkshire contributed approximately $12.25B — roughly $4.4B of common equity for approximately 50% of the common, plus $8B of preferred stock at a 9% dividend yield. 3G Capital contributed approximately $4.4B for approximately 50% of the common. 3G supplied operating leadership (Bernardo Hees as CEO, Alexandre Behring as Chairman); Berkshire supplied capital and the preferred coupon income.
In July 2015, Kraft Foods Group merged with the 3G+Berkshire-controlled Heinz to form Kraft Heinz. Kraft Foods Group shareholders received approximately 49% of the combined public company plus a $10B special dividend ($16.50/share); the Berkshire+3G Heinz shareholders received approximately 51% (roughly divided as 26.7% Berkshire common, 24% 3G common). Berkshire's original $8B preferred was redeemed in June 2016 for approximately $8.32B at a premium. Berkshire has not sold material common shares since — the position remains at approximately 325.6M shares (~26.7% of outstanding) as of 2026, one of the top-10 Berkshire equity positions.
3G Capital has substantially exited. Beginning in August 2021 and continuing through 2023, 3G executed a series of public-market share sales that reduced its position from approximately 24% to below the 5% Schedule 13G reporting threshold. 3G no longer files as a material holder and no longer supplies operating leadership — Miguel Patricio (2019-2023) was recruited from AB InBev's brand-management tradition rather than the 3G cost-cutting tradition, and Carlos Abrams-Rivera (2024-) came from Mondelez's North America organization. Ted Weschler served on the Kraft Heinz board as Berkshire's representative for several years before rotating off. Berkshire has been publicly clear it does not intend to acquire the remaining shares nor materially reduce the current position — a long-hold posture despite the acknowledged overpay.
On Friday, February 17, 2017, Kraft Heinz publicly disclosed an unsolicited $50-per-share, approximately $143B offer for Unilever PLC — the Anglo-Dutch consumer-goods conglomerate whose portfolio includes Dove, Hellmann's, Ben & Jerry's, Knorr, Lipton, Axe/Lynx, Persil, and Vaseline. The proposed price was approximately an 18% premium to Unilever's February 16 close of GBP 33.60. A combined entity would have generated approximately $85B of revenue and displaced Nestle as the world's largest consumer-packaged-goods company by revenue — the largest single M&A transaction in CPG history.
Unilever's board, led by CEO Paul Polman, rejected the proposal the same day. The rejection statement characterized the offer as "fundamentally undervalu[ing] Unilever" and inconsistent with Unilever's Compass sustainability strategy. Within hours the UK and Dutch governments signaled opposition on employment and industrial-policy grounds — Unilever employed approximately 168,000 people, materially in both home markets, and the political sensitivity of allowing a 3G-run cost-cutting operator to acquire a UK-Dutch national champion was immediate. Polman personally contacted then-UK Prime Minister Theresa May's office and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte's office.
On Sunday, February 19, 2017 — forty-eight hours after the initial disclosure — Kraft Heinz issued a terse joint statement withdrawing the offer "in the best interests of both companies." No revised bid was ever made. Unilever subsequently accelerated its own portfolio review, sold its spreads business (I Can't Believe It's Not Butter) to KKR for approximately $8B in 2017, and Paul Polman retired in 2019. The Kraft Heinz Unilever episode remains the clearest institutional-scale limit encountered by the 3G roll-up thesis in consumer packaged goods — and the moment at which the largest possible next 3G move was structurally foreclosed.
The most common practitioner questions about the Kraft Heinz acquisition record.
The Kraft Heinz Company (NASDAQ: KHC) is a publicly traded company, but its shareholder register is dominated by two large blocks left over from its 2013 Heinz take-private and 2015 Kraft merger structure. Berkshire Hathaway holds approximately 26.7% of common shares (roughly 325M shares) — still a top-10 Berkshire equity position and one of the largest single positions in the entire Berkshire book. 3G Capital, the Brazilian private-equity firm, held approximately 24% at the 2015 merger; 3G has since substantially exited its position through public-market sales in 2021 and 2023, and no longer holds a material stake as of 2024. The remaining approximately 50% of the float is held by public shareholders, index funds (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street), and institutional owners.
On February 21, 2019, Kraft Heinz disclosed an approximately $15.4B non-cash impairment charge against goodwill and intangible-brand values, primarily writing down the Kraft and Oscar Mayer brands. Simultaneously the company cut its quarterly dividend from $0.625 to $0.40, disclosed an SEC subpoena into its procurement accounting, and the CFO resigned. The stock dropped approximately 27% the next trading day. The writedown reflected the reality that the 3G operating template — aggressive cost cutting, zero-based budgeting, and marketing-spend reductions — had structurally impaired the pricing power and brand equity of the underlying CPG portfolio. Warren Buffett, at the 2019 Berkshire annual meeting, said Berkshire had "paid too much" for Kraft. It is widely regarded as the public reckoning of the 3G operating model at scale.
Yes, briefly. On February 17, 2017, Kraft Heinz publicly disclosed an unsolicited approximately $143B offer for Unilever PLC — the Anglo-Dutch consumer-goods giant behind Dove, Hellmann's, Ben & Jerry's, Knorr, and Lipton. The proposal valued Unilever at approximately $50 per share, a roughly 18% premium. Unilever's board rejected the bid within hours as "fundamentally undervaluing" the company, and political pressure from the UK and Dutch governments (Unilever employs approximately 168,000 people, many in the two home markets) intensified rapidly. Kraft Heinz withdrew the offer within 48 hours, on February 19, citing Unilever's "lack of interest." The episode is widely viewed as the high-water mark of the 3G roll-up ambition in packaged foods — and its clearest institutional-scale limit.
3G Capital is a Brazilian-American private-equity firm founded by Jorge Paulo Lemann, Marcel Telles, and Carlos Alberto Sicupira, best known for controlling the AB InBev beer combination (Anheuser-Busch InBev, formed via a series of mergers culminating in the 2008 Anheuser-Busch deal and the 2016 SABMiller acquisition) and for the Burger King / Restaurant Brands International restaurant platform. 3G partnered with Berkshire Hathaway to take H.J. Heinz private in 2013 and to structure the 2015 Heinz-Kraft merger. 3G held approximately 24% of Kraft Heinz at the 2015 merger. Through substantial public-market sales in August 2021 and 2023, 3G has largely exited the position and no longer files as a material holder. The 3G operating template — zero-based budgeting, aggressive cost reduction, integration synergies — is the signature of every 3G-controlled company.
Yes. Berkshire Hathaway continues to hold approximately 325.6 million shares of Kraft Heinz, representing roughly 26.7% of common shares outstanding — still one of Berkshire's top-10 equity positions by size and one of its largest single-name exposures. Berkshire has not sold any material Kraft Heinz common stock since the 2015 merger, despite the 2019 writedown and Warren Buffett's public acknowledgment that Berkshire "paid too much" for Kraft. The position sits at a substantial book-vs-market spread — carried near cost basis of roughly $17-18B against a market value that has ranged from roughly $10B (post-2019 writedown) to approximately $30B (2022-2023 peak). Berkshire's original 2013 preferred position ($8B at 9% dividend) was redeemed in 2016 for approximately $8.3B; the current position is entirely in common equity.
Following the February 2019 writedown, Kraft Heinz executed a multi-year portfolio-pruning program under CEO Miguel Patricio (2019-2023). The two flagship divestitures were the June 2020 sale of the Planters, Corn Nuts, Cheez Balls, and other nuts brands to Hormel Foods for approximately $3.35B, and the September 2020 sale of the Natural Cheese business (including Kraft-branded shredded and chunk cheese, Breakstone's, Cracker Barrel cheese for the US market, Polly-O, and Athenos) to French dairy group Groupe Lactalis for approximately $3.2B. Smaller divestitures included the Baby Nurser business, certain low-margin non-strategic brands, and various regional operations. Combined 2020-2024 divestitures raised approximately $7B+ and reduced the portfolio to a core focus on Heinz, Kraft, Philadelphia, Oscar Mayer, Lunchables, Kool-Aid, Maxwell House, Ore-Ida, Velveeta, and international growth brands.
The Kraft Heinz Company was formed in July 2015 via the merger of two independently-storied American food companies. The Heinz side traces to Heinz Noble & Co., founded by Henry John Heinz in Sharpsburg, Pennsylvania in 1869 (later reorganized as H.J. Heinz Company in 1888) — launched originally as a horseradish producer, made famous by the 1876 introduction of Heinz Tomato Ketchup and the "57 Varieties" slogan. The Kraft side traces to J.L. Kraft & Bros., founded by James L. Kraft in Chicago in 1903 as a wholesale cheese distributor. Kraft went through Philip Morris ownership from 1988 through 2007, acquired Cadbury in 2010, split into Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez International in 2012, and merged with the 3G+Berkshire-owned Heinz in July 2015. The combined company is headquartered in Pittsburgh and Chicago and trades on the NASDAQ under KHC.
Kraft Heinz and Mondelez International are the two companies created by the October 2012 split of the historical Kraft Foods Inc. Kraft Foods Group (NASDAQ: KRFT) was spun off as the North American grocery business — Kraft Mac & Cheese, Kraft Singles, Miracle Whip, Cool Whip, Jell-O, Maxwell House, Oscar Mayer, Philadelphia, Planters at the time, and other center-store US and Canadian grocery brands. Mondelez International (NASDAQ: MDLZ) retained the global snacks business — Oreo, Cadbury, Milka, Toblerone, Ritz, Chips Ahoy!, Trident, and other snack, biscuit, and chocolate brands sold internationally. Kraft Foods Group then merged with H.J. Heinz in July 2015 to form Kraft Heinz. Mondelez remains an independent public company. The clean summary: Kraft Heinz is the North American grocery successor; Mondelez is the global snacks successor.
Kraft Heinz sits at the intersection of two ownership stories the Institute already covers: the Berkshire long-hold tradition (KHC is a top-10 Berkshire equity position) and the 3G Capital operating template (AB InBev, Burger King, RBI). Read alongside the following pages.
Educational reference. Not investment advice. Not a solicitation. Not affiliated with The Kraft Heinz Company, H.J. Heinz Company, Kraft Foods Group, Kraft Foods Inc., Mondelez International, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 3G Capital, Anheuser-Busch InBev, Restaurant Brands International, Unilever PLC, Groupe Lactalis, Hormel Foods, Del Monte Foods, Nestle S.A., Groupe Danone, Nabisco, Cadbury, Philip Morris International, Altria Group, or any of their subsidiaries or affiliates, nor with Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, Ted Weschler, Jorge Paulo Lemann, Marcel Telles, Carlos Alberto Sicupira, Alexandre Behring, Bernardo Hees, Miguel Patricio, Carlos Abrams-Rivera, Paul Polman, or any past or present Kraft Heinz, Berkshire, 3G, Unilever, or Kraft Foods executive. The Baratelli Institute publishes under the Lowe v. SEC publisher exception; neutral positioning maintained throughout. Deal figures cited in this catalog are sourced primarily to Kraft Heinz Company SEC filings (10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, DEF 14A), Berkshire Hathaway annual reports and shareholder letters, H.J. Heinz Company historical filings, Kraft Foods and Kraft Foods Group historical filings, Mondelez International 10-K disclosures, contemporaneous press coverage (Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Bloomberg, Reuters, The New York Times, CNBC), and standard practitioner references. Dollar amounts are approximate; where original consideration was denominated in EUR, GBP, BRL, TRY, or other non-USD currencies the USD equivalent is directional and reflects contemporaneous FX rates. Several venture rounds and follow-on positions are individually undisclosed and are flagged with "approx" or "n/d" (not disclosed) rather than fabricating precision. Corrections welcome via the link in the footer.
“We were wrong on paying too much for Kraft. It's a good business, it's not a great business. It'll earn about $6 billion pre-tax on around $7 billion of tangible assets. That's a fantastic business. But we paid $100 billion of tangible assets, plus, over that. So for us, it has to earn like $100 billion. It doesn't.”