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CASE STUDY · STADIUM SITING AS A 30-YEAR STATE-TAX AND ESTATE DECISION

Chicago Bears

The Bears aren't just choosing a stadium. They're choosing a state tax regime for 30 years, for a franchise now worth roughly $6B, at the exact moment the Halas-McCaskey estate turns over.

In February 2023 the Chicago Bears bought the 326-acre Arlington Park racetrack site for $197.2M and announced a mixed-use redevelopment anchored by a domed stadium. A Cook County Assessor valuation and a multi-taxing-body property-tax impasse stalled the project. In April 2024 team president Kevin Warren unveiled a $4.6B lakefront domed-stadium proposal in Chicago that would have required roughly $2.4B in public financing. Governor Pritzker opposed it; the Illinois General Assembly declined to advance enabling legislation in the 2024 or 2025 sessions. Meanwhile Indiana — under new Governor Mike Braun and the Indiana Economic Development Corporation — began actively courting the franchise, with Gary specifically named as a candidate site. This case treats the decision the way the family office and state-and-local-tax literature does: as a 30-year location arbitrage on state income tax, property tax, jock tax, and estate domicile, layered over an ownership transition triggered by Virginia Halas McCaskey's death at 102 in January 2025.

$197.2MArlington Park (Feb 2023)
$4.6BLakefront proposal (Apr 2024)
$2.4BPublic-financing ask
190 bpsIL vs IN income tax delta
$6.0B (Sportico 2024)Franchise mark
VERSION 1.0 Published: 2026-07-13 Last updated: 2026-07-13 Sources current as of: See sources cited within
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THE SETUP

Soldier Field ran out of room, and the obvious move became a hard problem

The Chicago Bears entered the 2023 offseason with a specific and unambiguous business problem. Soldier Field — the team's home since 1971, extensively renovated in 2003 — is the smallest stadium in the NFL by capacity, at roughly 61,500 seats. It has no roof, which forecloses cold-weather Super Bowl bids, Final Fours, and the concert cadence that generates 200-plus event-days a year at modern domed venues. The lease with the Chicago Park District is economically constrained in ways that a modern NFL business considers structural: gate-share provisions, limited signage rights, and no meaningful ownership economics on the surrounding real estate. And the premium suite inventory is a fraction of what a market the size of Chicago should support — the third-largest media market in the country, with a Fortune 500 corporate base that has repeatedly told the team its hospitality demand exceeds supply.

The obvious move was a new stadium. The question was where — and, as the case unfolded across 2023, 2024, and 2025, that question became a much larger one: in which state. The answer would set the tax base for the franchise, its players, its coaches, its executives, and eventually its estate-planning domicile for the next thirty years. It would set the capital structure of the stadium, the split between private and public financing, and the geometry of the mixed-use real estate opportunity around the building. It would set the fan-transit pattern that determines who buys season tickets and drives the local-revenue base that (per the Packers' audited window) accounts for roughly 40% of a mid-market NFL team's revenue. And it would set the political relationship between the team and every governmental body it needs cooperation from — for the next generation.

The structural point. A stadium decision looks like a real-estate and construction decision. It is not. It is a thirty-year tax, political, and estate decision with a real-estate and construction line item attached. The Bears' 2023-2026 process is the cleanest recent illustration of that reframing available to practitioners.

The three-track saga, at a glance

From February 2023 through mid-2026 the Bears have run three parallel stadium tracks in public. Each has moved on its own timeline; each has its own set of counterparties, tax and financing mechanics, and political constraints. None has yet closed.

TrackTrigger eventCounterpartiesStatus (mid-2026)
Arlington Heights, ILFeb 2023 $197.2M land purchase from Churchill DownsCook County Assessor, Village of Arlington Heights, School Districts 214 / 15 / 25Stalled on property-tax impasse
Chicago lakefrontApr 2024 $4.6B domed-stadium proposalGovernor Pritzker, Speaker Welch, Senate President Harmon, Mayor Johnson, ISFALegislature declined to act, 2024 and 2025 sessions
Indiana (Gary corridor)2024-25 IEDC overtures under Governor BraunGovernor Braun, IEDC, Lake County IN taxing bodies, Indianapolis precedentPublicly courted; no commitment either way

Status as of mid-2026 per public reporting from the Chicago Tribune, Crain's Chicago Business, Bloomberg, ESPN, and Front Office Sports; Indiana overtures per IEDC press materials and Chicago-area coverage of Governor Braun's stated position. Nothing in this table is confidential and no non-public information is used.

The through-line across all three tracks is that the Bears have optionality. They own the Arlington Park land outright. They have a functioning (if constrained) Soldier Field lease. And they have a credible outside option in Indiana, which the state of Illinois and the local taxing bodies know exists and cannot fully discount. That optionality — not any single site — is the negotiating asset the team has spent three years building.

The Institute's positioning. The Bears' three-track process is a worked example of location-arbitrage negotiation on a scale rarely visible outside private M&A. Every counterparty (Cook County, Illinois, Indiana) knows the other two exist. Each is negotiating against the outside option. This is the mechanic that any family-office principal facing a domicile decision — on a business, a residence, or an estate — should study.
ARC 1 · FEB 2023 →

Arlington Park — the land, the vision, and the property-tax fight

On February 15, 2023 the Bears closed on the purchase of the 326-acre Arlington Park racetrack site in Arlington Heights, Illinois, from Churchill Downs Incorporated. The purchase price was $197.2M, all-cash. Arlington Park had operated as a thoroughbred racetrack since 1927; Churchill Downs had wound down live racing at the site in 2021 and put the land on the market. The Bears' interest was public from mid-2021, and the purchase agreement was signed in September 2021, but title took roughly seventeen months to transfer because of racetrack-license mechanics, environmental review, and a set of demolition and site-preparation questions that had to close before the deed moved.

The vision the team unveiled alongside the purchase was ambitious: a domed stadium seating roughly 65,000-70,000, surrounded by a mixed-use district of retail, hotel, entertainment, office, and residential development on the same site — a total project cost publicly estimated at roughly $5 billion. The point of the mixed-use component was economic and political: (a) capture 365-day-per-year revenue rather than the 10-game NFL cadence, (b) create the property-tax base that could justify a Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes (PILOT) or Tax Increment Financing (TIF) structure, and (c) build local political support by generating jobs, sales-tax receipts, and hotel-tax receipts that flow to Arlington Heights and Cook County over the long term.

The Kaegi assessment and the impasse.

Cook County Assessor Fritz Kaegi reassessed the Arlington Park property in the 2023 triennial cycle. The reassessed market value came in at roughly $197M — effectively matching the Bears' purchase price. Under Illinois assessment law that is the textbook correct answer: recent arm's-length sales are the most reliable indicator of market value, and a $197.2M sale in February 2023 is the definitional recent arm's-length transaction. The Bears publicly disagreed, arguing that the property's value as a development site pending approvals is materially lower than its purchase price implies, because the entitlements, infrastructure, and public-approval risk have not yet been resolved.

The mechanical problem that followed is what Illinois practitioners recognize as the multi-taxing-body impasse. Arlington Park's property-tax bill is not paid to a single government. It is divided across at least five separate taxing bodies, each of which independently levies:

For a PILOT deal to work, every one of those taxing bodies has to agree to accept a fixed payment schedule in lieu of the assessed property tax. Any single body can veto by refusing to sign. The school districts — whose funding is roughly two-thirds property-tax-dependent — had the strongest reason to refuse: they were being asked to trade a known, adjustable property-tax stream against speculative future economic activity from a redevelopment they could not control. Through 2023 and 2024, the Bears' publicly-stated proposals were repeatedly rejected as insufficient by one or more of the taxing bodies. By early 2024, the Arlington Heights track was effectively stalled and the team was actively exploring alternatives.

The mechanic. Illinois property-tax law makes large-project PILOTs structurally hard. Every taxing body votes separately; any single one can hold up the whole deal; the school-district share is always the biggest and always the hardest to move. This is why major Illinois redevelopments — casinos, arenas, stadium districts — take years and often collapse. Practitioners underwriting Illinois real estate should assume the multi-body veto is the binding constraint, not the assessed value.
ARC 2 · APR 2024 →

The Chicago lakefront pivot — a $4.6B ask that met a Springfield wall

On April 24, 2024, team president Kevin Warren, joined by Mayor Brandon Johnson at a press event on the lakefront near Soldier Field, unveiled a proposal for a new domed stadium on the Museum Campus, immediately north of the existing Soldier Field footprint. The projected total project cost was roughly $4.6 billion. The financing structure the team proposed included approximately $2 billion in private capital from the Bears' ownership (contributed as equity plus a G-4 stadium loan facility from the NFL), plus approximately $2.4 billion in public financing to be raised through the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority (ISFA) via bond issuance, with debt service to be paid from a combination of hotel-tax revenue in Chicago, an existing bond program, and additional revenue mechanisms the team asked the state to authorize.

The proposal landed in a specific political environment. Illinois faced ongoing fiscal pressure from pension obligations. The ISFA was already carrying debt from the 2003 Soldier Field renovation and the 1991 White Sox Guaranteed Rate Field construction — a debt package that had required a hotel-tax bailout in prior cycles. The state's Democratic legislative leadership — House Speaker Chris Welch and Senate President Don Harmon — had competing priorities including transit funding, K-12 education, and Medicaid expansion. Governor JB Pritzker made his position clear at multiple press availabilities in April and May 2024: he was skeptical of using public money to finance a private stadium at a time of broader fiscal constraint, and he was unwilling to champion the legislation.

What the political math looked like.

Even setting aside Pritzker's stated skepticism, the legislative math was hard. A stadium-financing bill of the scale the Bears requested would have needed:

The proposal did not clear the 2024 spring session and did not return in a serious form in the 2025 spring session. By late 2025, industry reporting treated the lakefront proposal as functionally dead unless it was reintroduced with a materially smaller public-financing ask. Mayor Johnson, who had appeared at the April 2024 unveiling, had backed off active advocacy by mid-2025 as his own political capital narrowed. Kevin Warren's public statements shifted from lakefront-specific to site-agnostic language across the same period.

Reading the lakefront outcome. The Bears' Chicago pivot failed for a reason that has nothing to do with the merits of the stadium and everything to do with fiscal-political calendar: Illinois in 2024 could not politically afford to sign a $2.4B check to a private business at a time of pension and Medicaid pressure. In a different fiscal environment the outcome might have been different. Practitioners underwriting public-financing components of stadium and infrastructure projects should always model the state's fiscal calendar as a first-order variable.
ARC 3 · 2024-26

The Indiana courtship — Governor Braun, IEDC, and the Gary corridor

In January 2025 Mike Braun was sworn in as Governor of Indiana, having defeated the outgoing administration's designated successor on a platform that included aggressive economic-development recruiting. Within weeks the Indiana Economic Development Corporation (IEDC) and the Governor's office had made public overtures to the Bears about relocation, with Gary, Indiana — roughly 30 miles from downtown Chicago on the I-90 corridor — named specifically as a candidate site. The pitch was direct: Indiana would deliver a competitive public-financing package, tax abatements on the stadium and mixed-use development, and a structural tax environment that would benefit every team-affiliated earner (owners, executives, coaches, players) for as long as they were Indiana-resident or Indiana-employed.

Why the Gary corridor is a credible option, not just political theater.

Three facts make the Indiana overture structurally serious, not just a talking point:

As of mid-2026 the Braun administration's overtures had not converted into a signed deal. The Bears have not committed to Indiana. But they have also not ruled it out — and the very existence of a serious Indiana option has changed the negotiating posture in Springfield and in Arlington Heights.

The state-tax arbitrage — IL vs IN, compounded over 30 years

This is the section where the Institute's state-and-local-tax and family-office framework does the heavy lifting. The Bears' stadium decision is often framed in the sports media as a real-estate or public-financing story. It is more accurately framed as a state-tax domicile decision for a business that generates roughly $500M-plus in revenue, employs a $255M-plus player payroll (per the 2025 salary cap), and pays coaches and executives in the high-seven-figures-to-eight-figures range.

The rate stack, side by side.

LineIllinoisIndianaDelta
State personal income tax (flat)4.95%3.05%190 bps
Scheduled 2027 rate4.95%~2.90%205 bps
County / local income taxNone (Cook County)~1.50% (Lake County IN)(150 bps)
Combined effective (2025)~4.95%~4.55%~40 bps
Corporate income tax9.5% (7.0% + 2.5% PPRT)4.9%460 bps
Estate taxYes (max 16% over $4M exemption)Nonematerial
Jock tax on visiting playersAppliesApplieseven

Rates as of 2025 per Illinois Department of Revenue and Indiana Department of Revenue published schedules. Lake County IN local income tax rate per Indiana DOR published county rates; other Indiana counties differ. Illinois corporate income tax includes the personal property replacement tax (PPRT). Illinois estate tax exemption is $4M with a graduated rate structure. This table is a summary; the actual analysis in any real advisory engagement layers in residency rules, source-income allocation, and specific individual facts.

What this looks like in the roster and front office.

Under the NFL's 2025 salary cap and the actual composition of a top-half Bears roster, the annual state-tax delta is meaningful in absolute dollars. A stylized illustration:

Earner typeComp ($M)IL take (~4.95%)IN take (~4.55% combined)Annual saving
Starting QB (top of market)$50$2.48M$2.28M~$200K
Franchise skill / edge (2 x)$25 each ($50)$2.48M$2.28M~$200K
Mid-tier veterans (10 x)$8 avg ($80)$3.96M$3.64M~$320K
Rest of roster~$75$3.71M$3.41M~$300K
Head coach + coordinators$18$0.89M$0.82M~$70K
Front office (GM + senior)$15$0.74M$0.68M~$60K
Annual roster-and-staff delta~$288M$14.26M$13.11M~$1.15M

Stylized illustration only. Real-world jock-tax mechanics allocate income across every state a player plays a game in, using duty-day formulas. The Illinois vs Indiana delta above applies only to the fraction of income sourced to the home state. Actual advisory work sizes this precisely per individual using a duty-day model. Team-side compensation (coaches, front office) is more heavily home-sourced. The point of the table is directional magnitude, not a precise number.

The stylized total — on the order of $1M-plus per year across the roster, coaches, and front office — is small relative to team revenue. But three amplifiers make it much larger in practice.

The Institute's framing. When a business decision involves a state-tax delta of 190 bps on income tax and a full state-estate-tax exposure, and the decision is a 30-year commitment, the tax component is not a secondary consideration. It is a first-order variable. The Bears' Indiana overture is not just an economic-development play by Governor Braun; it is a permanent structural tax rearrangement that Illinois cannot match without changing its own tax code. That constraint is the reason the Indiana option is credible even if the Bears never actually move.
FOR PLAYERS ON THE FIELD

What this means for the players who read this

For the players on this roster: the Illinois-vs-Indiana state-tax delta discussed in this case (4.95% vs 3.05%) has direct implications for you if the Bears eventually relocate. A $30M/year Bears player currently pays Illinois roughly $1.5M/year in state tax on home-game duty days; the same player at a hypothetical Indiana stadium would pay approximately $1.35M — a $150K annual savings for that individual player. Multiply across a 53-man roster and the team-level economics shift meaningfully. If a relocation happens during your contract, your agent should already have modeled this. If you're contract-negotiating with the Bears now, factor the possibility into your domicile-planning decisions.

RELATED · ATHLETE'S WEALTH PLAYBOOK
The full playbook for the athlete side of this math.

The Institute's Athlete's Wealth Playbook covers state-tax residency planning, endorsement sourcing, jock-tax mechanics, rookie contracts, career-earnings trajectories, and the specific tax and financial decisions a professional athlete has to make in the first 90 days after signing.

Athlete's Wealth Playbook → Free hub · NIL & college Free tool · Career earnings model Free tool · State-tax migration Free brief · MLB CBA & Bonilla deferred comp Free tool · Pro Team-Picker (jock tax + endorsement sourcing)
THE PROPERTY-TAX MECHANIC

Illinois property tax — why every big project fights the same fight

The Arlington Park impasse is not a Bears-specific problem. It is a structural feature of Illinois property-tax law that any large redevelopment in Cook, Lake, DuPage, or Will County will face. Understanding the mechanic is worth doing once because it applies to every subsequent case in the Institute's real-estate library.

The four features that create the impasse.

The result is that any big Illinois redevelopment — not just stadiums — typically takes 2-5 years to negotiate the multi-body agreement even before construction bids go out. Large commercial developments, casinos, arenas, and mixed-use districts run this gauntlet routinely. The Bears' Arlington project is unusual only in scale, not in the underlying mechanic.

What this means for practitioners. Family offices and real-estate developers underwriting Illinois projects should model the multi-body PILOT / TIF negotiation as a binding 24-48 month gate, budget legal and government-affairs spend to match, and price the project's economics around a base case that does not require abatement. If abatement lands, treat it as upside. If it does not, the project must stand up without it. The Bears learned that the hard way.

The Halas-McCaskey estate — ownership across three generations

The Chicago Bears are one of only a handful of major U.S. sports franchises that have never been sold. George Halas co-founded what became the Chicago Bears with a $100 stake in the Decatur Staleys in 1920, moved the franchise to Chicago in 1921, and controlled it for the rest of his life. On Halas's death in 1983, the franchise passed by inheritance to his daughter Virginia Halas McCaskey and her husband Ed McCaskey. Virginia's generation held the team through the 1985 Super Bowl XX championship year, the Michael McCaskey team-president era, the Ted Phillips era, and the current Kevin Warren era. On January 30, 2025, Virginia Halas McCaskey died at 102. Her thirteen surviving children and grandchildren now hold the ownership interest, with George Halas McCaskey serving as team chairman.

This structure is a family-office and estate-planning case as much as it is a sports-business case. The Institute's positioning is that the stadium decision cannot be understood in isolation from the ownership transition — the two decisions are being made simultaneously by the same family, and the state-tax and domicile choices bear directly on both.

What the estate has to solve for.

Standard tools already in play (or that should be).

Family offices operating at the McCaskey generational scale customarily use, and are widely reported to use, a stack of tools:

The Bears' stadium decision and the McCaskey estate plan are the same decision viewed from two angles. The domicile choice sets the estate-tax base for the family. The stadium siting choice sets the domicile choice. Practitioners advising family-office principals with concentrated, illiquid, appreciated assets should treat this case as a worked example of how these decisions interlock.

Cross-reference: Family Office Reference Guide for the multi-generation governance framework, Estate Planning Decoded for the trust, GRAT, and ILIT mechanics, and International Tax & Cross-Border Wealth for the state-of-residency framework that underlies domicile planning.

THE COMPARABLES

Recent NFL stadium moves — what each optimized for

The Bears are not moving to a new city. They may be moving to a new state. That distinction matters because it puts this case in a different comparable set than the standard NFL relocation. The comparables below share elements with the Bears' situation but none of them tracks exactly.

DealYear(s)Move typePublic financingWhat it optimized for
Rams — St. Louis to Inglewood2016 relocation, 2020 openCity-to-cityMinimal; ~$5B privateMarket size + Kroenke real estate
Raiders — Oakland to Las Vegas2017 vote, 2020 openCity-to-city, state-to-state$750M via NV hotel taxPublic financing + no state income tax
Bills — new Highmark Stadium2022 deal, 2026 openSame market, adjacent site$850M NY + Erie CountyPublic-financing scale, no relocation
Chargers — San Diego to LA2017 relocationCity-to-cityShared SoFi tenantMarket size, but CA tax cost
Bears — TBD2023-?Possibly state-to-state, adjacentTBD; declined so far in ILCombined tax + siting + estate

Rams (Inglewood). Stan Kroenke financed the SoFi Stadium project personally at roughly $5B, plus the NFL relocation fee of $650M. The economic case was market size (LA vs St. Louis), Kroenke's control of the surrounding real estate, and long-term entertainment-district value. California's top marginal income-tax rate of 13.3% is a permanent negative on player and executive personal income, but the LA market premium has been large enough to justify it. This is the closest comparable for the real-estate value-capture element of the Bears' Arlington vision.

Raiders (Las Vegas). The Davis family moved from Oakland to Las Vegas after Nevada delivered $750M in public financing via a hotel tax on Allegiant Stadium ($1.9B total project). Nevada also has no state income tax, permanently benefiting every team-affiliated earner. This is the closest comparable for the state-tax element of the Bears' Indiana option — though Indiana's rate is not zero, the Illinois-to-Indiana delta is a meaningful step toward the same benefit.

Bills (Highmark Stadium). Terry Pegula secured $850M in public financing from New York State and Erie County toward the $1.7B project cost, with no relocation. This is the pure public-financing comparable — and the model the Bears attempted, unsuccessfully, in Illinois in 2024. The material difference is that New York was politically willing to commit public capital to retain the Bills; Illinois so far has not been willing to commit similar capital to retain the Bears.

Chargers (LA). The Chargers moved from San Diego to LA in 2017 to share SoFi Stadium with the Rams. The market-size upside has been slower to materialize than projected, the fan base has not fully re-anchored, and the California personal-income-tax burden applies to every player and coach. This is the cautionary comparable: relocation to a larger market with a higher tax burden is not automatically a win.

What none of the comparables captures. None of the recent NFL relocations has been a state-to-state move by a franchise not leaving its home fan base. The Bears' potential Gary option is exactly that: still within the Chicago DMA, still accessible to the existing season-ticket base, but domiciled in a different state for tax purposes. That is a novel structure. If it happens, it will be studied as the first of its kind.
THE PACK

What we'd want on the Bears' advisory bench

The Institute's signature framing is the Power of the Pack: each advisor is strong, all advisors properly led are unstoppable, and the Family Office CFO seat is the quarterback who runs the play. For a decision that combines stadium finance, state-and-local-tax structuring, multi-body property-tax negotiation, and a $6B family-office estate transition, the pack has to be specific.

The Bears have most of these seats staffed. The public reporting on Kevin Warren's tenure indicates a professionalization of the front office that includes many of these functions. The reason to enumerate the pack is that the case study is transferable: every family office facing a comparable domicile-plus-real-estate-plus-estate decision needs the same seat map. The names change; the seats do not.

THE ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESS

A modern stadium is a 365-day content platform, not a 10-game venue

An NFL team plays 10 home games in a normal year — 9 regular-season plus 1 preseason, occasionally 2 preseason. Under Institute framing (see the Institute's positioning on sports franchises as entertainment businesses), the modern domed stadium is a content platform whose economics depend on utilization across the remaining 355 days.

What a domed stadium hosts, in a typical calendar year.

Lucas Oil Stadium in Indianapolis reports approximately 200 event days per year beyond the Colts' game inventory. SoFi Stadium in Inglewood has hosted a Super Bowl (LVI, February 2022), a WrestleMania, the LA Bowl, US Open Cup soccer, and a rotation of major concerts. The Bears' Arlington vision was explicitly structured to capture 365-day economics through the mixed-use district. Whichever siting outcome the Bears eventually choose, the underwriting math depends on the non-NFL event calendar as much as it depends on the ten home dates.

The state-tax structure affects this business too. Concert promoters, touring artists, corporate hospitality executives, and event contractors all pay income tax in the state where the event is booked or the venue operates. A 190-bps state-tax delta between Illinois and Indiana is a small but real factor in booking negotiations, executive compensation, and long-term operating cost. On a stadium expected to host 200-plus events per year for 30 years, that delta compounds.

Reframing the decision. The Bears are not choosing a site for 10 football games a year. They are choosing a site for 200-plus events per year for 30 years, and a tax regime for every economic actor involved in producing those events. The framing changes the underwriting: capex per event day, tax burden per event day, ancillary revenue per event day. The stadium is the product; football is the anchor tenant.

Location arbitrage as a strategic input — not a footnote

The Bears' decision is a rare public example of what family-office principals across many asset classes face routinely: a location choice that is really a tax and estate choice dressed up as an operating choice. The Institute's reader is most likely to encounter this pattern in four private-life contexts:

The unifying principle is that state and jurisdictional choice is a first-order strategic input, not a footnote. Framing it as a footnote — something to sort out with the accountant after the deal is signed — is the single most common mistake the Institute sees in family-office practice. The Bears' three-track saga is playing out in public because a family the size of the McCaskeys must resolve the decision in public. The same decision, at smaller scales, is being made in private by every family-office principal reading this case.

FORWARD-LOOKING

What to watch — the case is live and will update

This case is not closed. The Bears have not committed to a site as of the publication date. The Institute treats this as a live case that will be revised as the following developments resolve:

Each of these developments would move the analysis. The Institute will update this case when material developments land.

METHODOLOGY

Sources, methodology, and treatment of an ongoing story

This case draws exclusively on public sources: Cook County Assessor's Office property records and public statements from Assessor Fritz Kaegi; Illinois General Assembly bill tracking and committee minutes from the 2024 and 2025 spring sessions; Illinois Sports Facilities Authority public materials and outstanding bond disclosures; Chicago Bears organizational statements and press releases; Indiana Economic Development Corporation press materials and public statements from Governor Mike Braun's office; Chicago Tribune, Crain's Chicago Business, Bloomberg, ESPN, Sportico, Front Office Sports, and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel beat coverage; NFL constitutional provisions in the public record; and published state-tax schedules from the Illinois Department of Revenue and the Indiana Department of Revenue.

Numeric estimates in the state-tax arbitrage tables are stylized illustrations. Actual advisory work uses duty-day allocation for jock tax, layered residency and source-income rules, and specific individual facts. The tables here are directional and are intended to convey the magnitude of the tax delta, not to substitute for tailored tax counsel.

Franchise value is the Sportico latest published mark and is not audited. NFL franchise valuations are trade-press estimates, not financial statements. The Institute's Packers case (case-study-packers.html) explains why the Packers are the only audited data point in the league and how every other estimate should be triangulated against that book.

Estate structure for the McCaskey family is not public. The specific trusts, GRATs, ILITs, and FLPs used by the family are proprietary. The Institute's discussion in the family-office section describes tools that families operating at this scale customarily use and that generally-applicable estate practice would recommend. It is not a claim about the specific McCaskey plan.

Political and legislative dynamics are per public reporting. Statements attributed to Governor Pritzker, Governor Braun, Speaker Welch, Senate President Harmon, Mayor Johnson, and Assessor Kaegi are as reported in the outlets listed. The Institute is neither endorsing nor opposing any official's position; the analysis is descriptive and structural.

Reporting inconsistencies to flag. Public reporting on the exact split of the $2.4B public-financing ask (April 2024) between hotel-tax bond capacity, ISFA capacity, and state general-fund contribution has varied across outlets. The reporting on Indiana's specific site is loosely centered on Gary but has occasionally named other Lake County parcels. The reporting on Cook County property-tax appeal amounts and settlement offers has evolved as the appeal process has progressed. This case uses the most consistent reporting across major outlets and flags uncertainty where it exists.

Independent editorial analysis · Not affiliated with or endorsed by the Chicago Bears, the NFL, the McCaskey family, the State of Illinois, the State of Indiana, the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority, the Cook County Assessor's Office, the Indiana Economic Development Corporation, or any advisor named.
This case study is independent editorial and educational analysis of publicly available information. The Baratelli Institute is not affiliated with, endorsed by, sponsored by, or connected to any organization or public official named. All marks are the property of their respective owners. Analysis draws exclusively on public sources (Cook County Assessor filings; Illinois and Indiana Department of Revenue schedules; Illinois General Assembly legislative records; IEDC press materials; trade-press reporting including Sportico, Bloomberg, ESPN, Front Office Sports, Chicago Tribune, and Crain's Chicago Business); no non-public information has been used. Numeric illustrations in the state-tax section are stylized and directional; actual tax planning must be tailored to individual facts by licensed counsel. Franchise-value estimates are trade-press marks, not audited financials, and will change. Presented for educational and editorial purposes. Nothing here constitutes investment, legal, tax, or accounting advice or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any interest in any franchise or security, or to relocate, establish domicile, or restructure an estate. The Institute is not a registered investment adviser; this is a Lowe v. SEC publisher-exception publication. Consult licensed advisors before any siting, tax, estate, or ownership decision. The Institute takes no position on any question of public policy, on any candidate for office, or on any specific stadium or public-financing outcome.

The methodology lives in the Guides

Every analytical move in this case cross-references a Guide chapter. If you want to learn the methodology in full, the Guides are where it’s taught.