Shad Khan chose to renovate. A ~$1.4B EverBank rebuild, a Duval County + Florida co-finance, and the small-market NFL playbook.
In 2023–24 the Jacksonville Jaguars faced a specific fork every NFL small-market franchise will eventually reach: new-build (Titans, Broncos, Bears, Browns), renovate-and-stay, or relocate. Shad Khan chose renovate. The result is a ~$1.4B EverBank Stadium overhaul, a negotiated public-private split with the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, and the State of Florida, and a broader Khan-family real-estate strategy centered on The Shipyards downtown mixed-use waterfront. This is the first application of the Institute's NFL stadium anatomy framework to a specific team.
The IC memo, financing model, and deck are on the build queue. When they ship they'll be here, free.
In 2023–24 the Jacksonville Jaguars entered a decision moment every NFL small-market franchise will eventually reach. The stadium the team has played in since 1995 — originally Jacksonville Municipal Stadium, then Alltel Stadium, then Jacksonville Municipal Stadium again, then EverBank Field, then TIAA Bank Field, then EverBank Stadium after the 2023 naming-rights renewal — had aged past the point where minor upgrades could keep it competitive with league-average premium hospitality, technology, and fan experience. The Jaguars faced three options.
Shad Khan chose renovate. The reasoning is a legitimate case study in itself: Jacksonville is DMA rank 42 by market size; the local revenue ceiling that a new-build would unlock cannot cover $3–5B in project debt service; Khan's real-estate strategy for the region already places the highest-return capital in the adjacent Shipyards development, not in the stadium building itself; and the political capital required to secure Jacksonville / Duval County / State of Florida co-financing for a $1.4B renovation was fundamentally different from what would have been required for a new-build.
This section walks through the Institute's 15-term NFL stadium framework as it applies specifically to the EverBank renovation. Each of the 15 terms is treated in the order defined in the framework page.
Reported total project budget: ~$1.4B. This figure covers comprehensive modernization: new roof canopy structure to provide shade over the seating bowl (a specific requirement in the Jacksonville climate); seating reconfiguration reducing capacity from ~67,800 to a reported ~62,000–63,000 with increased premium mix; concourse rebuilds; premium suite expansion; technology and audio-visual systems; and improved site circulation. During construction, the Jaguars play home games in a modified reduced-capacity configuration.
The public share on the current negotiated structure is reported as ~$775M to ~$1B, which puts the public share at roughly 55–70% of total project cost. This is above the recent-NFL 40–60% average and reflects the political case Jacksonville leadership made for keeping the Jaguars in the market. Reporting on the exact public / private split has moved as the deal has progressed; the reference splits published by Bloomberg, Sportico, and Front Office Sports vary within this range depending on the report date.
The public authority structure for the Jaguars renovation is unusual by NFL standards: it is not a single-purpose stadium authority (as in Nevada or Erie County) but rather a combined City of Jacksonville + Duval County + State of Florida contribution mechanism. The city and county functions are largely consolidated under Jacksonville's consolidated government structure (which is one of the reasons the deal was politically achievable — there are fewer independent taxing bodies with veto power than in the Bears / Arlington Heights situation). The State of Florida contribution is layered on top through the state's sales-tax rebate program for professional sports venues.
Private team share reported at ~$625M (from Khan / Jaguars) though some reporting has this figure between $400M and $650M depending on how state credits are allocated. The private share is financed through a combination of Khan family equity and access to the NFL's stadium-loan program (which prices at league-syndicate rates rather than single-team rates — a material cost advantage). Khan's estimated net worth (~$12B per Forbes) means the private share sits well within capacity without requiring asset sales elsewhere in the Khan holdings.
The current naming-rights sponsor is EverBank Financial on a 2023 renewal that runs through approximately 2035. Reported annual value: ~$8–10M/year, placing the Jaguars in the lower half of NFL naming-rights value — consistent with the DMA-42 market context. The renewal happened before the renovation was finalized; the modernized stadium may support a materially higher naming-rights value at the next renewal window.
The Jaguars have historically operated with a modest PSL program relative to large-market NFL peers, consistent with the Jacksonville market ability-to-pay. Premium and club seating in the renovated venue is expected to command a PSL-equivalent premium, but the reported PSL revenue targets have been notably lower than the SoFi ($500M+) or Highmark ($100M+) levels. This is one of the reasons the renovation project relies on a heavier public-financing share to close the funding gap: PSL proceeds cannot carry as much of the private-share load as they can in top-DMA markets.
The renovation is paired with a Jaguars lease extension that reportedly commits the team to Jacksonville through approximately 2058 (30 years from the target 2028 renovation completion, with additional renewal options). This is a materially longer commitment than the pre-renovation lease and is one of the political anchors of the deal — the public authority is co-financing a 30-year asset improvement in exchange for a 30-year no-relocation covenant. The lease structure is authority-owned (City of Jacksonville) / team-operated, with a low-nominal rent structure typical of modern NFL leases.
Jacksonville has historically been a light non-NFL event market for the stadium: the annual Florida-Georgia college football game is a fixture, plus occasional major concert tours and monster-truck / motorsports events. The renovated venue is being designed with better acoustics, better temperature-controlled premium spaces, and better technology infrastructure specifically to expand the non-NFL calendar. The team expects an incremental 10–25 event days per year post-renovation, which is meaningful but is not the SoFi (~200/year) or Allegiant (~150/year) scale.
The Jacksonville / Duval County structure uses a combination of TIF-adjacent mechanisms (capturing incremental tax revenue in the stadium-adjacent district) and Florida's state sales-tax rebate program for professional sports facilities. Florida's state-level program provides eligible facilities with a per-year sales-tax rebate for a defined term. The stadium itself is city-owned, which addresses much of the property-tax question at the venue level. The combined structure is materially simpler than the Illinois multi-body PILOT problem in the Bears case, which is one of the structural reasons the Jaguars deal was politically achievable and the Bears deal has stalled.
The public share is expected to be financed through Jacksonville Sports Authority revenue bonds (or a functionally equivalent city-issued security) secured primarily by hotel-occupancy tax and event-day revenues, plus a supporting pledge of team-side payments under the lease. Rating-agency posture on the bond issuance has been reported as investment-grade based on the diversified revenue pledge and the state contribution overlay. The bonds carry standard modern-stadium covenants: reserve accounts, refinancing consent requirements, and minimum debt-service coverage ratios.
The renovation deal includes standard public-benefit obligations for a project of this scale: local-hire commitments for construction workforce, MBE / WBE contracting quotas, defined community-event days at the renovated venue, and integration with Jaguars Foundation community programming. These are enforceable through the lease and through the bond documents. Public-benefit obligations of this type are the political anchor for the local-approval process.
The lease extension reinforces the no-relocation covenants across the 30-year commitment period. The specific language is described as strong specific-performance-style commitments, consistent with the modern NFL norm where the public authority insists on multi-decade market commitment in exchange for public financing. Combined with the NFL's own $650M relocation-fee overlay, the Jaguars are structurally committed to Jacksonville for the foreseeable future.
Khan / Jaguars are reported to take the ongoing capex obligation for the renovated venue over the lease term. This is consistent with modern NFL practice: the team ownership funds the reinvestment cycles required to keep the asset competitive. The renovation itself is being treated as the first major capex cycle; subsequent reinvestments (technology refresh, premium-space refresh) are expected on 10–15 year cycles funded from team-side reserves.
This is where the Jaguars deal is analytically most interesting. Khan owns The Shipyards — approximately 70 acres of downtown Jacksonville waterfront real estate immediately adjacent to the stadium footprint. The Shipyards is being planned as a large mixed-use development: hotel, retail, apartments, entertainment, potentially medical and office. The stadium renovation is designed in coordination with the Shipyards master plan — site circulation, event-day activation, hospitality flow, and utility infrastructure are being planned as a single district. This is the Rams / Hollywood Park model applied to Jacksonville: the stadium is the anchor, the ancillary real estate is where the largest team-side returns live.
The Jaguars enjoy the same national-revenue floor as every other NFL franchise: approximately 70% of team revenue comes from equally-split national broadcast media, national sponsorship, licensing, and league ventures. On a small-market team the national floor is proportionally more important; local revenue is proportionally more constrained. This is the analytical reason the renovation strategy (rather than a $5B new-build) is correct for Jacksonville: the local-revenue optimization from a renovated stadium closes most of the gap between EverBank and a new-build without the capital cost that a new-build would require.
The renovation-versus-new-build decision framework for an NFL team turns on four variables. Applied to Jacksonville each variable pointed to renovation.
| Variable | New-build case | Renovation case | Jacksonville answer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Market size (DMA) | Top-20 market can support $3–5B build economics | Small-market renovation stays inside market ability-to-pay | DMA #42 → renovation |
| Capital efficiency | $3–5B for a fresh 40-year asset | $1–1.5B for a 25–30 year extension | $1.4B for ~30-year extension is right-sized |
| Political feasibility | Requires new-build public-financing appetite (~$1–3B public) | Requires renovation public-financing appetite (~$500–1000M public) | ~$775M public was approvable; new-build wouldn't have been |
| Real-estate strategy | Stadium as anchor for greenfield mixed-use (Rams / Hollywood Park) | Coordinated with existing urban real-estate footprint | Shipyards adjacent to existing stadium site → renovate |
This framework is transferable to any small-to-mid-market NFL franchise facing the renovate-vs-new-build fork. It also applies (with adjustments) to NBA, MLB, and NHL small-market venues.
The counter-case — that Jacksonville should have relocated to a larger market — is not credible under the current NFL environment. Relocation approvals require 24 of 32 owner votes, involve a $650M+ relocation fee, and confront the political reality that the NFL has been actively adding markets (Las Vegas, likely London) rather than consolidating. Khan has never publicly indicated he considered relocation; the annual Jacksonville-London games are an international-market expansion play, not a relocation setup.
Shad Khan's holdings sit at the top of the diversified-family-office archetype and are worth analyzing as a system. The Khan portfolio includes four flagship asset categories.
| Asset | Category | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Flex-N-Gate | Operating business | Auto-parts manufacturing (bumpers, body panels, lighting); reported ~$10B+ revenue; the original Khan business and the primary cash generator. |
| Jacksonville Jaguars | NFL franchise | Purchased 2011 from Wayne Weaver for ~$770M; current mark $4.5B (Sportico 2024); the flagship trophy asset. |
| Fulham FC | English Premier League club | Purchased 2013 for ~£150–200M; London-based; a natural fit with Jaguars' London-market strategy. |
| The Shipyards | Real estate | ~70 acres downtown Jacksonville waterfront; mixed-use development in planning; the ancillary-real-estate anchor for the stadium renovation. |
| Other holdings | Investments, wrestling, private equity | Includes All Elite Wrestling (2019 founding), private-equity co-invest positions, and family-office diversified investments. |
Sportico 2024 franchise value is the trade-press mark, not an audited valuation. Fulham FC purchase price is per contemporaneous reporting; Premier League clubs typically trade in a range without audited transactional financials. Flex-N-Gate revenue figures are per Forbes / Fortune / Automotive News trade coverage; the company is privately held.
The system-level view: Flex-N-Gate generates operating cash flow, which underwrites the family office. The NFL and Premier League franchises are trophy holdings that compound at scarcity-driven multiples over long horizons. The Shipyards real estate is the coordinated ancillary play that captures upside from the stadium's anchor status. This is a textbook diversified family-office structure with the operating business as the cash engine, sports assets as flagship holdings, and real estate as the strategic coordination piece.
Florida has no state income tax. For the Jacksonville Jaguars specifically, this creates three structural advantages worth quantifying.
Shad Khan's personal income — whether from Flex-N-Gate, Jaguars distributions, Fulham FC, or investment income — has no Florida state tax exposure. Compare to owners in Illinois (Bears, McCaskey family, 4.95% flat rate), New York (Giants / Jets ownership, 6.85% top marginal), Minnesota (Vikings / Wilf family, 9.85% top marginal), or California (Rams / Kroenke and 49ers / York family; California top marginal 13.3%). Over a multi-decade hold the state tax delta compounds materially.
NFL players are subject to state income tax in the state where each game is played (the "jock tax"). Home games in Florida are 0% state tax to the player. Home games in California are 13.3% state tax. Home games in Minnesota are 9.85% state tax. For an NFL player earning $10–$40M per year, the delta across 9 home games (8 regular season + 1 preseason) is a meaningful percentage of gross earnings. This is a structural recruiting advantage the Jaguars have never fully monetized in the free-agency market.
Even for road games, Florida-based players avoid state-tax-on-top-of-jock-tax. Players resident in Illinois or California pay their home state's rate on income not attributable to another state's jock tax. Florida-resident players pay only the visiting state's jock tax on road games.
| Team | State | Top marginal state rate | Est. delta vs Florida on $20M salary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jaguars | Florida | 0% | — |
| Titans | Tennessee | 0% | — |
| Cowboys | Texas | 0% | — |
| Bears | Illinois | 4.95% | ~$300–500K/year |
| Bills | New York | 6.85% | ~$500–800K/year |
| Vikings | Minnesota | 9.85% | ~$800K–$1.2M/year |
| Rams / 49ers | California | 13.3% | ~$1.0–1.5M/year |
Delta estimates are approximate and depend on the road-game schedule, individual player residency, and the specific jock-tax rules by state. Full detail on jock-tax planning is in the Athletes Wealth Playbook. State top marginal rates as of 2025; individual state law changes.
For the players on this roster: Florida's 0% state income tax is a structural advantage on par with Texas, Nevada, and Washington. On a $30M/year contract with home games at EverBank Stadium, you pay Florida $0 state tax on home-game duty days. That's the same benefit Texas-based Cowboys or Texans players get. Road games in California, New York, or Illinois still generate jock-tax liability, but your home-market tax burden is zero. The Jaguars' small-market local revenue (lower gate + sponsorship than large-market franchises) means the team has less flexibility to offer above-cap contract bonuses; but the CBA-level salary is materially identical to what the Cowboys or Rams could offer. When your agent compares Jaguars deals to competing offers, the state-tax structure is a real component of the after-tax math.
The Institute's Athlete's Wealth Playbook covers state-tax residency planning, endorsement sourcing, jock-tax mechanics, rookie contracts, career-earnings trajectories, and the specific tax and financial decisions a professional athlete has to make in the first 90 days after signing.
Jacksonville is DMA rank 42 — smaller than any NFL market except Green Bay (which has the Wisconsin/Milwaukee combined-market extension) and Buffalo. The Jaguars' local revenue ceiling is materially lower than Cowboys ($540M+ local), Rams (~$400M+ local), or Giants (~$400M+ local). Under the framework, this constrains the stadium-capex answer.
The renovation strategy is the correct approach for small-market NFL franchises. The playbook has five elements.
Every small-market NFL franchise (Bills, Bengals, Colts, Titans, Panthers, Buccaneers, Ravens, Steelers, Broncos, Packers) will face variations of the same fork in the next 15 years. The Jaguars case is a template for how to answer it.
Three comparable stadium deals highlight why renovation was the right call for Jacksonville and why new-build was the right call elsewhere.
| Team | Deal | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Chiefs | Arrowhead renovation (planned; April 2024 KC sales-tax referendum failed) | Kansas City is DMA #31; the renovation case was analytically similar to Jacksonville but the political process failed because Jackson County voters rejected the sales-tax funding mechanism. Chiefs and Royals are re-evaluating; a revised renovation or a Kansas / Missouri competition is in play. |
| Vikings | US Bank Stadium new-build (2016) | Minneapolis-St. Paul is DMA #15; the market can support new-build economics and Zygi Wilf secured 45% public financing under Minnesota's Sports Facilities Authority structure. New-build was appropriate for a top-15 market. |
| Falcons | Mercedes-Benz Stadium new-build (2017) | Atlanta is DMA #9; large-market economics support the $1.6B new-build; ~20% public share via the Georgia World Congress Center Authority. New-build was appropriate for a top-10 market with retractable-roof revenue potential. |
The pattern: new-build is correct for top-15 markets or where retractable-roof revenue potential is large (Falcons); renovation is correct for smaller markets where new-build financing is not politically or economically feasible (Jaguars).
The Institute's signature framing is the Power of the Pack: each advisor is strong, all advisors properly led are unstoppable, and the Family Office CFO seat is the quarterback who runs the play. For a principal running Flex-N-Gate + Jaguars + Fulham + Shipyards + AEW + assorted investments, the pack is specific.
Every one of these seats is standard for a family office of this scale. The specific integration — NFL franchise, Premier League club, downtown real estate, operating business, all under a single Florida-domiciled family structure — is the case study in modern diversified family-office design.
Live-deal watch items that will move the Jaguars stadium case over the next several years.
This case draws exclusively on public sources: Sportico franchise valuations and stadium-finance coverage; Forbes historical franchise-value series; Bloomberg deal-flow reporting; Front Office Sports ongoing stadium-negotiation coverage; City of Jacksonville and Duval County government documents including council votes and bond materials; State of Florida sports-facility program materials; Jaguars press releases and team communications; EverBank Financial disclosures on the naming-rights renewal; and NFL press releases where the league has publicly commented on the transaction.
Where a term is negotiated but not publicly disclosed we note "reported" rather than "confirmed." Where reporting is inconsistent across outlets, we identify the range.
Khan family financials are per Forbes / Sportico trade coverage; Flex-N-Gate revenue is per Automotive News and Fortune trade estimates (the company is privately held); Fulham FC purchase and current-valuation figures are per Deloitte's Football Money League and Sportico's Premier League coverage; The Shipyards development scope is per City of Jacksonville planning-department materials.
Independent editorial analysis · Not affiliated with or endorsed by the Jacksonville Jaguars, the NFL, Shad Khan, Flex-N-Gate, Fulham FC, the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, the State of Florida, EverBank Financial, or any advisor named.
This case study is independent editorial and educational analysis of publicly available information. The Baratelli Institute is not affiliated with, endorsed by, sponsored by, or connected to any organization, family, or entity named. All marks are the property of their respective owners. Analysis draws exclusively on public sources (municipal bond disclosures, city and county government records, state agency records, team press releases, and trade-press coverage including Sportico, Bloomberg, Forbes, and Front Office Sports); no non-public information has been used. Where reporting is inconsistent across outlets or a term is negotiated but not publicly disclosed, we identify the range. Stadium-finance figures, ownership-side asset valuations, and lease terms are as reported at time of publication and are subject to change. Presented for educational and editorial purposes. Nothing here constitutes investment advice or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any interest in any franchise, stadium bond, or security. The Institute is not a registered investment adviser; this is a Lowe v. SEC publisher-exception publication. Consult licensed advisors before any investment or ownership decision.
Every analytical move in this case cross-references a Guide chapter. If you want to learn the methodology in full, the Guides are where it’s taught.
“Renovation is what a well-run small-market franchise chooses when new-build is the wrong answer.”